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This Article offers a new explanation for the puzzling origin of
modern civil liberties law. Legal scholars have long sought to explain
how Progressive lawyers and intellectuals skeptical of individual rights
and committed to a strong, activist state came to advocate for robust
First Amendment protections after World War I. Most attempts to solve
this puzzle focus on the executive branch’s suppression of dissent during
World War I and the Red Scare. Once Progressives realized that a
powerful administrative state risked stifling debate and deliberation
within civil society, the story goes, they turned to civil liberties law in
order to limit the reach of that state. Drawing on a wealth of unexplored
archival material, this Article inverts the conventional story: It argues
that lawyers within the executive branch took the lead in forging a new
civil-libertarian consensus and that they did so to strengthen rather
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than circumscribe the administrative state. Tasked with implementing
the World War I draft, Felix Frankfurter, Harlan Fiske Stone, and
other War Department administrators embraced civil libertarianism as
a tool of state-building, not a trump against state power.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article offers a new explanation for the puzzling origin of mod-
ern civil liberties law. Legal scholars have long sought to explain how a
group of Progressive1 lawyers and intellectuals skeptical of individual
1. Throughout this Article, “Progressive” indicates a multigenerational network of
American individuals, ideas, and institutions prominent from the 1880s to the 1930s. The
common feature of this network was a belief that new organizations of public power
should and could resolve the challenge to social stability posed by economic, ethnic, and
religious difference. See generally Eldon J. Eisenach, The Lost Promise of Progressivism
25–29 (1994); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 33–39 (1992); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social
Politics in a Progressive Age 12–17 (1998); Marc Stears, Progressives, Pluralists, and the
Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1906–1926,
at 23–24 (2002); William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920, in
2 The Cambridge History of Law in America 643, 643–96 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). The major disagreements within the Progressive network
involved the scale and structure of public power—whether public power should be
organized at the level of workplaces, communities, cities, states, or the nation itself, and
whether it should take legislative, executive, or judicial form. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst,
Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck,
1894–1932, 23 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 171, 171–88 (2009) [hereinafter Ernst, American
Rechtsstaat]; William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 51–57
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rights and committed to a strong, activist state came to advocate for
robust First Amendment protections after World War I.2 Most attempts to
solve this puzzle focus on the executive branch’s suppression of dissent
during World War I and the Red Scare.3 Once Progressives realized that a
powerful administrative state risked stifling debate and deliberation
within civil society, the story goes, they turned to civil liberties law in
order to limit the reach of the state. Drawing on a wealth of unexplored
archival material, this Article inverts the conventional story: It argues that
Progressive lawyers within the executive branch took the lead in forging a
new civil-libertarian consensus and that they did so to strengthen rather
than to circumscribe the administrative state.4
(1999) [hereinafter Forbath, Caste, Class, and Citizenship]. The Progressive
administrators discussed herein embraced both the national scale and the administrative
discretion they felt was necessary to regulate a national population. They were what Marc
Stears has labeled “nationalist progressives,” Stears, supra, at 16, and were committed to
what Stephen Skowronek has called “presidential democracy.” Stephen Skowronek, The
Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Development Perspective on the
Unitary Executive, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2070, 2087 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of
Civil Libertarianism 65–74, 82–83 (1991) (describing Progressives’ skepticism of individual
rights claims); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years 3–4, 299 (1999)
(describing Progressives’ “prewar faith in a benevolent state and their corresponding
aversion to constitutional rights”); John Fabian Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden
Histories of American Law 157 (2007) (identifying “[p]uzzle of American Civil Liberties”
as recurrent question in academic literature).
3. E.g., Robert Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin and the American Civil Liberties Union
49–50 (2000) (arguing “modern civil liberties movement” was defensive response to
government action); Graber, supra note 2, at 11, 78 (noting the importance of wartime
repression); Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the
Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union 197 (1963) (interpreting civil liberties
movement as response to “coercive” character of wartime “federal government”); Paul L.
Murphy, World War I and the Origin of American Civil Liberties in the United States 25–
31 (1979); Rabban, supra note 2, at 3–4, 299; Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free
Speech in Wartime 230 (2004) [hereinafter Stone, Perilous Times]; Samuel Walker, In
Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU 37–47 (1990); Witt, supra note 2, at
155–58, 207; G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of
Free Speech in Twentieth Century America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 312–14 (1996)
[hereinafter White, Emergence of Free Speech].
4. This argument is indebted to a group of legal scholars who have previously noted a
positive relationship between civil libertarianism and state building in early twentieth-
century America. Such a positive relationship is clearest in the context of the labor
movement, where administrative agencies and congressional committees rather than
courts came to be seen as the best guardians of workers’ associational and expressive
rights. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor & Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New
Deal 8–11 (1966) (describing use of executive and legislative coercion to vindicate
workers’ civil liberties); William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement 139–66 (1991) [hereinafter Forbath, Law and Shaping] (tracking positive and
negative accounts of civil liberties law in the context of labor politics); Laura Weinrib,
From Public Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech, Liberal Individualism, and the
Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 Law & Soc. Inquiry 187, 201 (2009) [hereinafter Weinrib,
Public Interest to Private Rights] (describing how interwar civil-libertarian leaders
sympathetic to labor “sought to use government affirmatively to advance their free speech
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agenda”); Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the Limits
of State Power, 1917–1940 (May 2011) [hereinafter Weinrib, Liberal Compromise
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (tracing intersection of civil libertarianism and labor politics and shifting positive
and negative accounts of civil liberties law).
While Laura Weinrib focuses on nongovernmental actors centered at the American
Civil Liberties Union, this Article turns to wartime public officials who embraced civil
libertarianism as both a goal and a method of governance. Ken Kersch similarly focuses on
governmental actors, arguing that, beginning in the early twentieth century, public
officials invoked civil liberties to legitimate their regulatory efforts. Ken Kersch,
Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American
Constitutional Law 338–41, 359–61 (2004). Kersch, however, does not address the
formative World War I moment or the role that rights played in shaping, as opposed to
legitimating, new forms of state power. See id. at 12, 360. Meanwhile, William Novak has
alluded to the capacity of individual rights, including civil liberties, to “integrate[]
individual citizens with the national socioeconomic ambitions of the [early twentieth-
century] state.” William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in
Looking Back at Law’s Century 249, 265 (Austin Sarat, Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan
eds., 2002).
Significantly expanding on Novak’s theme, Karen Tani has argued that administrative
provision of welfare rights during the New Deal functioned as a “language of the state”—a
language that marked both local bureaucrats and regulated individuals as national
citizens. See Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a
Language of the State, 122 Yale L.J. 314, 321–23 (2012) (“Government-issued rights
language, trickling down from federal administrators to local welfare workers, helped
central-state authority expand into new domains” and “marked poor individuals—still
accustomed to thinking of themselves as state and local subjects—as citizens of a
beneficent nation-state”). In such a language, rights do not delineate a sphere beyond the
state, but serve to recommit all Americans to the fashioning of a democratic and
interdependent national polity. Id. at 383 (“To speak in the language of rights . . . is to
speak to central-state power in a shared language, a language that historically has bypassed
state and local intermediaries to demand the perquisites of national citizenship.”). This
Article develops Tani’s important insight in two ways. First, it traces the use of individual
rights as a method of state building back to the supposedly rights-skeptical Progressive
era—particularly the years of World War I—when the administrative theorists and
practitioners who would shape the New Deal first took power. While Tani notes that New
Deal welfare rights were an effort to continue “progressive” reform, she does not provide a
more detailed genealogy. Tani, supra, at 323–24; cf. Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of
Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106
Mich. L. Rev. 399, 402, 413 (2007) (describing New Dealers as “descendants” of
“Progressive” administrative reformers). Second, this Article identifies the provision of
specifically civil-libertarian rights as a critical aspect of state building.
Between this Article’s World War I-era administrative civil libertarians and Tani’s New
Deal administrators, Reuel Schiller provides a critical historical bridge, documenting how
the “constitutional protection of freedom of expression was subsumed under
administrative law” during the interwar period. Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and
Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (2000) [hereinafter Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise]. Schiller
attributes administrative autonomy in the realm of freedom of expression to the
Progressives’ faith in expertise. Id. at 21. This Article adds to Schiller’s story by identifying
a Progressive theory of civil libertarianism that was a condition of the more general
Progressive commitment to the autonomy of expert administrators. For the Progressives
discussed herein, not bare expertise but civil-libertarian expertise merited decisional
autonomy.
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While there were civil-libertarian rumblings within the Justice and
Labor Departments,5 this Article focuses on the War Department, a
surprising center of civil-libertarian creativity during World War I. One of
the chief drivers of the wartime expansion of the American administra-
tive state was the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1917, the first
draft law in U.S. history that did not allow men to pay their way out of
military service.6 Although pro-war Progressives lauded this “democratic”
Finally, a historical analogue to this Article’s account of civil-libertarian state building
is Anuj Desai’s argument that the administrative practices of the U.S. Post Office
established a set of expressive and privacy norms that would later be incorporated into
First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of
Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First
Amendment Doctrine, 58 Hastings L.J. 671, 727 (2007) [hereinafter Desai,
Transformation] (arguing American Post Office practices spurred “First Amendment
restrictions on government spending and the right to receive ideas”); Anuj C. Desai,
Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy,
60 Stan. L. Rev. 553, 556–58 (2007) [hereinafter Desai, Wiretapping] (“The constitutional
principle [of communications privacy] was not rooted in the Fourth Amendment in
abstract, textual, or even historical terms; rather, it was a principle deeply embedded in
the history of the post office.”). Crucial to Desai’s argument is the insight that the
libertarian character of the Post Office advanced governmental interests. See, e.g., id. at
565 (“[T]he principle of confidentiality of the mail in the American postal network dates
back to, and is intimately intertwined with, the revolutionary goals of those who sought
independence.”).
5. Both Richard Steele and Geoffrey Stone have noted that John Lord O’Brian, head
of the Justice Department’s War Emergency Division, advocated for a nuanced
prosecution of dissent during the war and opposed both local vigilantism and the excesses
of military intelligence officials. Richard W. Steele, Free Speech in the Good War 5–7
(1999); Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at 212–20. Similarly, some Labor Department
officials, most famously Louis F. Post, actively resisted the deportation of political radicals.
See Investigation of Administration of Louis F. Post, Assistant Secretary of Labor, in the
Matter of Deportation of Aliens: Hearings on H. R. Res. 522 Before the H. Comm. on
Rules, 66th Cong. 6 (1920) [hereinafter Post Hearings] (statement of Rep. Homer Hoch)
(“A number of times it has been charged on the floor of the House that Assistant Secretary
of Labor Post, by his attitude toward the law and by his action in specific cases, has virtually
nullified the law against alien reds and anarchists.”); Peter H. Irons, “Fighting Fair”:
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., the Department of Justice, and the “Trial at the Harvard Club,” 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1205, 1219–20 (1981) (“Labor Department officials . . . began to seek a way
to block the deportation of all but ‘conscious’ members of the Communist Party, thus
freeing those who had joined the Party without knowledge of its revolutionary
doctrines.”). See generally Louis F. Post, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty
(1923) (narrating author’s experience during Red Scare).
6. Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78–80, repealed by Act June
15, 1917, ch. 29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217 (providing compulsory military service should cease
four months after proclamation of peace by President); see also 1 U.S. Selective Serv. Sys.,
Special Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 49 (1950) (“In this war, conscription
became personal, universal, and absolute; there was no provision whatsoever for the hiring
of a substitute or the paying of a commutation fee.”). For the importance of the war, and
the draft in particular, to state building, see Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants
You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen 210 (2008)
(“‘Government’ got bigger during the war and, in some areas, stayed that way, with a
standing army, a growing apparatus of surveillance and policing, a nascent welfare state,
practice in managing the relations between labor and capital, and experience levying an
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approach to conscription, administrators within the War Department,
including future Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter and Harlan
Fiske Stone, thought that the Selective Service Act’s exemption of mem-
bers of pacifist religious sects from combat duty7 was far too narrow.8
They argued that novel administrative procedures should be devised to
recognize and respect the rights of individual conscience, rights held by
all citizens, whether sectarian or nonsectarian, religious or nonreligious.9
These Progressive administrators emphasized that democratic values
other than majoritarianism—including pluralism10 and individual self-
determination11—would be undermined by strict enforcement of
income tax.”); John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to
Modern America 239–60 (1987) (describing legacy of World War I draft); Ajay K.
Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise of
Progressive Taxation, 1877–1929, at 294 (2013) (“The Great War . . . was a watershed
event in the consolidation of the modern American fiscal state.”); William E.
Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in Change and Continuity in
Twentieth-Century America 81, 81–143 (John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner & Everett
Walters eds., 1964) (describing how New Deal state-builders drew on experience and
rhetoric of World War I-driven administrative development); Ernst, American Rechtsstaat,
supra note 1, at 174 (“The United States’ entry into the Great War brought the
nationalization of the railroads and merchant marine, a burgeoning of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and the creation of agencies of war insurance and finance.”).
7. The Act stated:
[N]othing in this Act . . . shall be construed to require . . . any person to serve in
[the armed forces] who is found to be a member of any well-recognized religious
sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed
or principles forbid its members to participate in war . . . but no person so
exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall
declare to be noncombatant . . . .
Selective Service Act § 4, 40 Stat. at 78. See also 1 U.S. Selective Serv. Sys., supra note 6, at
49–59 (noting this language recognized as legitimate objectors only official members of
pacifist religious sects, such as Quakers and Mennonites).
8. See infra Parts II–III.
9. See, e.g., Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Newton D.
Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1–4 (Sept. 18, 1917) [hereinafter Frankfurter
Memorandum] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
10. Progressives entertained several competing accounts of pluralism, some focused
more on the importance of group diversity and self-determination, others focused more
on the role that individual diversity and self-determination played in informing and
shaping an overarching common good or public interest. See Graber, supra note 2, at 87–
92 (describing Progressive views on social value of individual difference); Stears, supra
note 1, at 145–66 (describing Progressive views on pluralism and public interest); Daniel
R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial
Disputes, 1915–1943, 11 Law & Hist. Rev. 59, 62–79 (1993) [hereinafter Ernst, Common
Laborers] (contrasting approaches to group autonomy taken by industrial pluralists and
legal realists). The pluralism espoused by the Progressive administrators discussed here
was very much of the latter kind, interested in the role that individual citizens—in all of
their political and cultural diversity—played in shaping the state and securing the public
interest.
11. For the language of self-determination, see Press Release, Comm. on Pub. Info.,
Immediate Release (Sept. 28, 1918) [hereinafter Immediate Release, Comm. on Pub.
Info.], reprinted in U.S. Dep’t of War, Statement Concerning the Treatment of
2014] ADMINISTRATIVE ORIGINS 1089
Congress’s narrow definition.12 They also feared that such democratic
harms would create additional administrative problems, encouraging
pro-war “mob rule” and antiwar disobedience within the draft apparatus
and society at large.13
In devising a civil-libertarian solution to the problem of conscrip-
tion, Frankfurter and Stone confronted three challenges that perennially
occupied Progressive governance: class conflict, cultural pluralism, and
international rivalry.14 At its most ambitious, the goal of Progressive gov-
ernance was to create a unified yet democratic national polity capable of
competing with—even leading—the world’s less-democratic great pow-
ers.15 Conscription, an administrative tool for uniting the nation and
channeling its power abroad, could well serve as a means to this
Progressive end. But for it to do so, administrators would have to manage
resistance to the draft in a manner that preserved, and even enhanced,
the democratic character of the national state.16
Frankfurter, Stone, and their War Department colleagues responded
to this set of challenges by constructing centralized procedures to hear
Conscientious Objectors 47 (1919) [hereinafter U.S. War Dep’t, Statement] (“It has been
the liberal American policy of according a measure of self-determination to the few . . .
whom direct participation in the war would violate religious convictions, as well as a sense
of self-respect and integrity of character.”). This language was probably inspired by
President Wilson’s contemporaneous call for an international order based on the
principle of self-determination, which the President anchored in the “consent of the
governed.” Woodrow Wilson, A League for Peace, S. Doc. No. 64-685, at 8 (1917). See
infra Part II.A for further discussion of this point.
12. See infra Parts II–III (describing Frankfurter and Stone’s arguments).
13. See Steele, supra note 5, at 5–7, 17–23 (describing relationship between
Progressive interest in civil liberties and Progressive efforts to disrupt local mob rule); see
also Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism 16–27, 33–41, 165–199 (1997)
(describing how wartime democratic governments secure compliance from individuals
with a range of material interests and cultural commitments, including through provision
of conscientious objection).
14. For class conflict, see Shelton Stromquist, Reinventing “The People”: The
Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and the Origins of Modern Liberalism 165–90
(2006) (describing impact of class conflict on Progressive movement); Forbath, Caste,
Class, and Citizenship, supra note 1, at 58–61 (discussing labor conflict during Progressive
era). For cultural pluralism, see Graber, supra note 2, at 87--100 (describing Progressive
belief that “polity [should] encourage[] citizens to express a wide variety of opinions on
matters of public interest”); Stears, supra note 1, at 145--66 (tracing relationship between
nationalism and pluralism in Progressive thought); Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order,
1877–1920, at 44–132 (1967) (describing bureaucratic response to pluralism). For
international rivalry, see Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War
and Revolution 181–216 (2003); Eisenach, supra note 1, at 225 (“Reform at home meant
both conflict and the need for conquest.”); Rodgers, supra note 1, at 367–408 (describing
impact of competition with Europe on American progressive movement); Robert B.
Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy 195–227 (1991) (describing Progressive
split due to World War I).
15. See supra note 14 for sources on Progressive governance and international
rivalry.
16. See infra Parts II–III.
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and respond to the individual claims of antiwar draftees. In doing so,
they imbued the national bureaucracy with democratic norms of delib-
eration and dissent.17 They also asserted their own legal and political
authority as civilian administrators against competing modes of draft
governance—voluntary, local, military, and legislative.18 In particular, the
War Department’s administrative civil-libertarian response to the prob-
lem of antiwar dissent was opposed by military lawyers who argued that
Congress’s narrow conscience clause expressed the majority will and was
essential to the war effort, and so should be rigidly enforced.19
The story of World War I administrative civil libertarianism helps to
solve, or rather dissolve, the puzzle that surrounds the invention of mod-
ern civil liberties law. It is only puzzling to learn that Progressives sup-
ported both civil-libertarian rights and a powerful state if we view civil-
libertarian rights as trumps against state power. At the moment of their
inception, however, civil-libertarian rights and state building were not so
obviously in conflict. The Progressive administrators who went out of
their way to accommodate minority views during World War I never
backed away from their support for a strong state.20 They conceived of
the right of individual conscience not as a right to opt out of the warfare
state, but rather as a right to participate in the warfare state in a particu-
laristic manner.21 What Progressive administrators meant by “self-
determination” was individualized involvement in the administrative
17. See Levi, supra note 13, at 168 (“The institution of conscientious objection
legitimates objection to war, provides a stimulus for public discussion and debate about
the war itself, and delimits the bounds of legal objection by sanctioning those who misuse
the process.”).
18. For the influence of voluntarism and local authority on the draft, see Capozzola,
supra note 6, at 36–54, 83–143; Chambers, supra note 6, at 73–101.
19. Previous accounts of the World War I system of conscientious objection have
missed both Felix Frankfurter’s formative role and the extent to which that system
represented a radical departure from congressional and military policy. E.g., Capozzola,
supra note 6, at 71–73; Chambers, supra note 6, at 217; Charles Chatfield, For Peace and
Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941, at 70–76 (1971); Ronald B. Flowers, To Defend
the Constitution: Religion, Conscientious Objection, Naturalization, and the Supreme
Court 68–72 (2003); 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution 50 (2006);
Johnson, supra note 3, at 30–36 (1963); Murphy, supra note 3, at 158–60; Michael J.
Davidson, War and the Doubtful Soldier, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 91, 130
(2005) (noting briefly expanded Army policy in World War I allowed exemptions for
nonreligious objection); Louis Fisher, Nonjudicial Safeguards for Religious Liberty, 70 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 31, 53–56 (2001) (noting though scope of conscientious objectors remained
limited through World War I, Congress began to entertain ideas of broader exemptions);
Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection,
1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 35–36 (summarizing 1917 conscientious-objector law).
20. See infra Part IV.B (discussing legacies of World War I administration).
21. In Laura Weinrib’s apt phrase, the administrative right of conscience “meant
‘freedom to’ (participate in government, bargain collectively, protest governmental
abuses) rather than ‘freedom from’ (centralized government tyranny)”; it was “not yet
negative, but . . . nonetheless countermajoritarian.” Weinrib, Public Interest to Private
Rights, supra note 4, at 201.
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state, not the protection of private individuals, local communities, or civil
society from the state’s grasp.22 After the war, Frankfurter, Stone, and
other veterans of the World War I executive branch went on to play criti-
cal roles in the continuing development of modern civil liberties law,
imbuing that law with their commitment to a powerful administrative
state capable of sustaining a pluralistic democracy.23
By unearthing the administrative roots of modern civil liberties law,
this Article reveals that our current understanding of civil-libertarian
rights as judicially enforced trumps against state power is neither natural
nor timeless. Legal scholars have noted that civil liberties law took on an
increasingly antistatist, judicially enforced character during the 1930s
and 1940s in response to the growth of American bureaucracy and the
fear of foreign totalitarianism.24 The history of administrative civil
22. Such individualized involvement was thought to serve normative and functional
imperatives: As administered subjects both persuaded and informed expert administrators,
administrative decisionmaking would become more democratic and more effective. In
contrast to contemporary civic-republican theorists of administration, Progressives
embraced administrative expertise as a necessary and legitimate bridge between individual
diversity and a synthetic public interest. See Note, Deweyan Democracy and the
Administrative State, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 580, 589–90 & n.57 (2011) (comparing civic-
republican and Progressive evaluations of role of administrators); see also Schiller, Free
Speech and Expertise, supra note 4, at 14 (“Central to the Progressives’ faith in expertise
was the idea that administrative experts needed the flexibility to shape governmental
responses to individual problems.”). Some contemporary legal scholars have proposed
neo-Progressive and neopragmatist accounts of administration that similarly emphasize
individual participation mediated by expertise. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F.
Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School
Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 183, 187–89 (2003)
(describing emerging public educational system as advancing Deweyan vision of
responsive, experimental administration); Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy and
Democratic Experimentalism, Contemp. Pragmatism, Dec. 2012, at 35, 44–45 (arguing for
broad goals-based lawmaking informed by administrative expertise); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Geo.
L.J. 53, 93 (2011) (advocating for experimentalist administrative regimes “that try to
combine accountability with local initiative in ways that facilitate learning and
individuation”); Note, supra, at 594–96 (calling on agencies to follow Deweyan path of
identifying and communicating with “intended regulatory beneficiaries”); Blake Emerson,
Critical Bureaucracy: The Communicative Power of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 4 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/68 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission “enacted deliberative democracy through their
bureaucratic practices”). This Article contributes to the contemporary recovery of early-
twentieth-century administrative and democratic theory by identifying an account of civil
libertarianism that emerged in concert with that theory, and remains consistent with it.
For further discussion of the theory of democratic participation that motivated both
administrative civil libertarianism in particular and Progressive administration generally,
see infra notes 157–167 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part IV.B (discussing postwar legacies of World War I executive-branch
activism).
24. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and
Ideology in New York, 1920–1980, at 121–37 (2001) (discussing antitotalitarian roots of
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libertarianism illuminates the legal and political obstacles that stood in
the way of this antistatist and judge-centric turn. Before the antistatist
conception of civil liberties could become dominant, it had to defeat an
earlier administrative conception and its remaining adherents, including
Felix Frankfurter himself.25 In defending administrative governance from
the new judicially enforced civil libertarianism of the World War II
period, Frankfurter and his allies were not simply subordinating civil
liberty to judicial restraint. Rather, they were reaffirming a well-pedigreed
administrative model of civil-libertarian rights enforcement first devel-
oped in World War I.
This Article also contributes to the contemporary study of
“administrative constitutionalism,” a form of constitutional development
that encompasses “the constitutional understandings and interpretations
developed by agencies as well as those that structure the administrative
modern civil liberties and civil rights jurisprudence); Richard A. Primus, The American
Language of Rights 177–97 (1999) (describing foundation of rights discourse in
opposition to Nazi Germany and Soviet Union); Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms:
The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties
Jurisprudence, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 623, 649 (1994) (arguing judges developed tradition
addressing “threats to civil liberties posed by the rise of the modern state” by “mitigating
[its] totalitarian impulses”); Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise, supra note 4, at 75–76
(describing how “Americans came to expect the judiciary . . . to protect individuals and
minorities from the deadly tide of totalitarianism that seemed to be infecting legislative
and administrative actors in Europe and, perhaps, in the United States”); John W.
Wertheimer, A “Switch in Time” Beyond the Nine: Historical Memory and the
Constitutional Revolution of the 1930s, in 53 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 3, 13–15
(Austin Sarat ed., 2010) (describing transformation in American legal culture in response
to totalitarianism); Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 4, at 558–571 (summarizing
civil-libertarian responses to New Deal).
25. Until the late 1930s, the fate of civil libertarianism as a mainstream legal and
political program largely depended on the commitment of those who saw the promotion
of civil-libertarian rights and the construction of a powerful administrative state as
complementary rather than conflicting projects. This mainstream civil-libertarian advocacy
largely focused on infusing administrative decisionmaking---both at the local level and at
the federal level---with civil libertarian norms. See Auerbach, supra note 4, at 8–11, 51–73
(describing use of executive and legislative coercion to vindicate workers’ civil liberties);
Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 27–30 (2007) (discussing American
Civil Liberties Union’s involvement with National Labor Relations Board in securing labor
rights); Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing shift from
administrative to judicial protection of free speech after New Deal); Jeremy K. Kessler,
“Calculations of Liberalism”: John W. Davis and the Crisis of Civil Libertarianism in the
1930s, at 5–34 (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter Kessler, Calculations of Liberalism] (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting relationship between civil
libertarianism and state building in early 1930s); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Civil Libertarian
Conditions of Conscription 5–17, 34--38 (Jan. 2014) [hereinafter Kessler, Civil Libertarian
Conditions] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
emergence of antistatist vision of civil liberties law); Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties
Enforcement and the New Deal State 4–21, 26--34 (n.d.) [hereinafter Weinrib, Civil
Liberties Enforcement] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing relationship between civil liberties and federal government in 1930s).
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state itself.”26 The administration of conscientious objectors during
World War I illuminates several core features of administrative constitu-
tionalism: the emergence of new constitutional understandings from
ordinary lawmaking and policymaking,27 the tendency of those new
constitutional understandings to reconfigure both the substance and
structure of administration,28 the lack of transparency that often
accompanies such constitutional creativity,29 and the relationship
26. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 Tex. L. Rev 1897, 1901
(2013) [hereinafter Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism]. Metzger elaborates that
forms of administrative constitutionalism include: “the application of established
constitutional requirements by administrative agencies,” “the elaboration of new
constitutional understandings by administrative actors,” and “the construction . . . of the
administrative state through structural and substantive measures” taken by a variety of
governmental actors. Id. at 1900. While Metzger includes the interplay between
administrative lawmaking and judicial review within the ambit of administrative
constitutionalism, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn contrast administrative
constitutionalism—“the process by which legislative and executive officials . . . advance
new fundamental principles and policies”—with “judicial Constitutionalism.” William N.
Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 33
(2010). Sophia Lee’s treatment of administrative constitutionalism, meanwhile, zeroes in
on “regulatory agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitutional law.” Sophia
Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace,
1960 to the Present, 96 Va. L. Rev. 799, 801 (2010). Metzger’s definition is not only
capacious but dynamic, illuminating administrative constitutionalism as both an effect and
a necessary condition of administrative governance.
27. See infra Parts II.B, III (describing War Department officials’ reliance on
subconstitutional arguments from administrative, military, and political prudence in
asserting substantive and structural norms of constitutional gravity); cf. Metzger,
Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 1911–14 (describing “[a]dministrative
constitutionalism’s emphasis on the constitutional dimensions of seemingly ordinary
implementation and policymaking”); Desai, Wiretapping, supra note 4, at 568–77
(describing eventual constitutionalization of postal-service privacy norms).
28. See infra Parts II, III.B, IV.A. (describing how civil-libertarian administrators in
War Department displaced military and legislative authority over draft while implementing
right of individual conscience); cf. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note
26, at 1910–11 (describing interplay between administrative development of constitutional
understandings and construction of administrative state itself); Lee, supra note 26, at 810–
57 (comparing Federal Communications Commission’s efforts to expand its lawmaking
authority in course of promoting equal protection norms with Federal Power
Commission’s efforts to limit its lawmaking authority in same realm).
29. See infra Parts II.C, IV.A (describing how War Department’s decision to take
accommodating approach to conscientious objection reversed conclusion of earlier,
public debate and was first implemented through series of covert orders); cf. Dawn E.
Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1594–98 (2007) (describing how “secrecy” compounds dangers of
constitutional decision-making by executive actors); Lee, supra note 26, at 824–33
(discussing elision of constitutional reasoning in publicly-accessible administrative
decision-making); Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 1902, 1914,
1929–30 (discussing problem of transparency in both agency- and judge-driven
administrative constitutionalism); Anjali Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism and the
Re-Entrenchment of Surveillance Culture 7, 14–23, 28 (Mar. 4, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236502 (on file with the Columbia
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between administrative constitutionalism and constitutional construc-
tion.30 At the same time, Frankfurter and Stone’s wartime work suggests a
specific role for administrative constitutionalism in the articulation and
promotion of civil-libertarian norms.31
Part I of this Article tracks the passage of the Selective Service Act of
1917, which offered noncombatant duty only to members of pacifist reli-
gious sects. It then describes the debate between civilian and military
officials about whether the Wilson Administration had the legal authority
to offer alternative service to nonsectarian objectors, despite the Act’s
restrictive language. Part II turns to Felix Frankfurter’s intervention in
this debate and his long-neglected September 1917 memorandum on
conscientious objection.32 Relying on arguments from administrative,
Law Review) (describing how “intelligence gathering culture centered on secrecy of
process” contributed to entrenchment of pro-executive First Amendment norms).
30. Metzger notes that “[a]dministrative constitutionalism’s emphasis on the
constitutional dimensions of seemingly ordinary implementation and policymaking,
combined with its frequent creative character . . . links administrative constitutionalism to
the wider category of constitutional construction.” Metzger, Administrative
Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 1912. Meanwhile, Keith Whittington has identified the
federal military draft as a signal case of constitutional construction. Keith E. Whittington,
Constitutional Construction 12 tbl.1.2 (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional
Construction]. The War Department’s conscientious-objector policy can be understood as
a construction in its own right—a mixed practice of law and policymaking by which
governmental actors “flesh[ed] out constitutional principles, practices and rules that are
not visible on the face of the constitutional text and that are not readily implicit in the
terms of the constitution.” Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American
Constitution, 27 Const. Comment. 119, 120 (2010) [hereinafter Whittington, New
American Constitution]. See infra Part II for further discussion of conscientious-objector
policy as constitutional construction.
31. See infra Parts II.B, III, IV.B, Conclusion (discussing Frankfurter’s administrative
arguments for accommodating approach to conscientious objection, Board of Inquiry’s
intervention in draft apparatus, and enduring impact of World War I conscientious-
objector policy).
32. Frankfurter’s memorandum has never been identified as the blueprint for, and
legal justification of, the Wilson Administration’s accommodating conscientious-objection
policy. Indeed, in his important study of Frankfurter’s evolving views of individual liberty,
Melvin Urofsky devotes only two sentences to the memorandum, citing it as an example of
Frankfurter’s lack of sympathy for “those who . . . refused to meet their civic obligations.”
Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties 50 (1991).
To the contrary, Frankfurter’s work on the problem of conscientious objection laid the
groundwork for a strikingly accommodating policy. Joseph Lash provides the longest
treatment of Frankfurter’s memorandum in the secondary literature, noting that it
“emphasized that even those who refused alternative service and had, therefore, to be
jailed, should be treated soberly and magnanimously—advice, unfortunately, that went
unheeded the further down the chain of command that it traveled.” Joseph P. Lash, A
Brahmin of the Law: A Biographical Essay, in From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 21
(Joseph P. Lash ed., 1975). Though there is nothing inaccurate in Lash’s description,
Frankfurter’s memorandum was far more detailed and legally nuanced than Lash suggests.
Several other biographers neglect to mention the memorandum altogether. See Leonard
Baker, Brandeis and Frankfurter: A Dual Biography (1984); H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of
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military, and political prudence, this memorandum asserted the equality
of sectarian and nonsectarian objectors, called for the creation of a
three-member board to interview all objectors and assign sincere ones to
belief-respecting forms of alternative service, and asserted the War
Department’s authority to take these measures. Between October 1917
and May 1918, Secretary of War Newton Baker and President Wilson
implemented an administration of conscientious objectors that hewed
closely to Frankfurter’s proposal. Part III describes the work of the three-
member Board of Inquiry, on which Harlan Fiske Stone served, and the
military noncompliance it encountered. Part IV first traces the reception
of the War Department’s administrative civil libertarianism in Congress
and the press. Then it sketches Frankfurter and Stone’s postwar contribu-
tions to the intertwined development of civil liberties law and administra-
tive governance.
I. DEBATING AND INTERPRETING THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1917
The United States’ drift toward war in the winter and spring of 1917
split the Progressive movement. While most Progressives saw the war as
an opportunity to accelerate the country’s economic growth, legal devel-
opment, and social integration, some were staunch pacifists and suspi-
cious of the militarization of American society. As the Wilson
Administration pushed for a draft in April 1917, these antiwar
Progressives sought to mitigate what they saw as conscription’s antidemo-
cratic character by including a broad accommodation for conscientious
objectors within the draft bill. Emphasizing the participatory and plural-
istic nature of conscientious objection, these Progressives argued that
individuals opposed to war—regardless of religious belief or affiliation—
should be offered a variety of nonviolent ways to serve the state.
Although both Congress and the Wilson Administration rejected this
expansive vision of conscientious objection at first, this vision would even-
tually find a more sympathetic audience within the executive branch.
Secretary of War Newton Baker had stacked the War Department with
young Progressives who shared many of their antiwar friends’ concerns
about the threat that military mobilization posed to a pluralistic polity.
Throughout the summer of 1917, these administrators considered the
legality and practicality of crafting a system of conscientious objection
more participatory and pluralistic than the one indicated by the Selective
Service Act. Military lawyers, however, pushed back against this flirtation
with administrative innovation, arguing that Congress had dictated a
narrow accommodation of dissent. In September, the task fell to Felix
Frankfurter to make the case for the War Department’s authority to
implement a more civil-libertarian draft.
Felix Frankfurter (1981); Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The
Reform Years (1982).
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A. The Debate
Secretary of War Newton Baker was not a military man. Rejected
from the army during the Spanish-American War because of his poor
eyesight, Baker went on to become the reformist Mayor of Cleveland and
served for many years as president of the National Consumers League, a
center of Progressive legal reform.33 Through these activities, Baker
became friends with social workers and lawyers—including Jane Addams,
Louis Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter—who were the lifeblood of early-
twentieth-century Progressive advocacy.34 It was also out of this network of
reformers that some of the most outspoken critics of the Wilson
Administration’s wartime policies emerged.35
When President Wilson and Secretary Baker did decide to raise a
new American army through conscription, they did so in part to margin-
alize more bellicose factions within the military and society at large. Since
1914, Wilson’s chief political antagonist, Theodore Roosevelt, and
Roosevelt’s close military ally, Major General Leonard Wood, had been
pressuring the White House to institute universal military training and
service, a form of peacetime national conscription.36 Roosevelt was not
only a former President and a military hero, but the chief advocate of a
militant and majoritarian interpretation of democratic state building,
one that had little room for the pluralism that many of Wilson’s support-
ers prized.37 When Wilson scuttled the peacetime draft plan, Roosevelt
switched tacks, requesting permission to lead his own volunteer division
into battle against the Germans.38 If the ex-President got his way, the
American army that brought peace to Europe would be Roosevelt’s, not
Wilson’s. Anxious to avoid “politico-military challenges to presidential
33. See C.H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biography 49–56, 190–93 (1961)
(chronicling Baker’s accomplishments as mayor and work for National Consumers
League).
34. See Cottrell, supra note 3, at 59 (discussing Baker’s connection to members of
antiwar organizations); Parrish, supra note 32, at 84–85 (describing relationship between
Baker, Frankfurter, and Brandeis); Urofsky, supra note 32, at 28 (highlighting Frankfurter
and Brandeis’s work with National Consumers League).
35. See Chatfield, supra note 19, at 30–32 (describing emergence of antiwar
movement).
36. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 79–80, 135–36 (arguing Wilson enacted
compulsory draft to “forestall” Roosevelt’s “dangerous” military plan); Jack C. Lane,
Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood 197–201 (1978) (describing Wood’s support
for universal military training); Jack McCallum, Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon,
Architect of American Imperialism 264–66 (2006) (explaining Wood’s efforts to prepare
nation for possibility of war).
37. John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and
Theodore Roosevelt 303–23 (1983) (discussing contentious relationship between Wilson
and Roosevelt prior to American entry into World War I).
38. Chambers, supra note 6, at 137.
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direction of the war,” Secretary Baker refused Roosevelt’s request.39 Days
later, Wilson and Baker decided to design the nation’s first all-conscript
National Army.40 Such a method of recruitment would place manpower
policy directly under civilian control, and make the denial of Roosevelt’s
volunteer division less incongruous.41
The day after the United States declared war on Germany, Secretary
Baker delivered a conscription bill to Congress.42 Although he was
opposed to what he saw as the militarism of Roosevelt and Wood, Baker
would not win over his pacifist friends with such legislation. The
language in the bill concerning men who refused to fight was narrow,
offering the possibility of noncombatant service in the military only to
members of pacifist religious sects.43 Nonsectarians—whether religious
objectors from nonpacifist sects or secular objectors—could not qualify
for this exemption, and no alternative service under civilian command
was made available. Before a confidential session of the House Military
Affairs Committee, Baker explained that looser language would, “in my
judgment, [be] inoperable.”44 The problem, he went on, was that such
language could make “the question of exclusion purely a question of
individual statement and, as lawyers might say, of a self-serving
declaration made after the event.”45
Baker’s testimony is noteworthy given how far his War Department
would later go in granting legitimacy to the nonsectarian or individual
conscience. The simplest explanation for this reversal is that Baker did
not want to incentivize conscientious objection before the fact by making
the statutory provision too lenient or indeterminate; once the number of
men refusing to fight was known and was small, he would be happy to
39. Id. Stymied once again, Roosevelt lashed out at Baker, challenging “the authority
of the administration to deny him a command” and suggesting that there were those in
the army ready to grant him one despite civilian reluctance. Id. at 138. Baker forwarded
Roosevelt’s letter to Wilson who remarked that it was “one of the most extraordinary
documents I have ever read.” Id. (quoting President Woodrow Wilson).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 138–41. Wilson and Baker also demoted Major General Leonard Wood,
Roosevelt’s chief ally on active duty, assigning him to training camps and ensuring that he
would not hold a command in Europe. Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the
American War Effort: 1917–1919, at 41–43 (1966).
42. Chambers, supra note 6, at 152.
43. S. 1871, 65th Cong. § 3 (1917) (offering noncombatant service to “member[s] of
any well-organized religious sect or organization, at present organized and existing, whose
creed forbids its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious
convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed of said
religious organization”).
44. Increase of Military Establishment: Hearings on the Bill Authorizing the
President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States Before
the H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 65th Cong. 7 (1917) (statement of Newton D. Baker,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War).
45. Id.
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recognize the individual conscience.46 An alternative explanation is that
Baker simply changed his mind over the course of the summer and fall of
1917, as Progressives within his department, including Felix Frankfurter,
came to advocate for a broader accommodation.47 In either case, the con-
gressional debate discussed below suggests that efforts to seek more
accommodating language would have met significant political resistance.
Disturbed by the draft bill, Jane Addams met with the Secretary of
War on April 11. Addams was a nationally renowned Progressive
reformer and a member of the American Union Against Militarism
(AUAM), the nation’s premier antiwar organization.48 She was also one of
Baker’s “heroes.”49 After their meeting, Addams forwarded Baker an
AUAM memorandum detailing proposals for a more lenient policy
toward conscientious objectors.50 The AUAM’s account of legitimate con-
scientious objection emphasized individual self-determination:
“Exemptions should be granted to individuals on the ground of their
own belief; not on the ground of the sect to which they belong,” Addams
explained.51 “[T]his is a matter not of corporate but of individual
conscience.”52 Since what mattered was the intensity of the individual’s
beliefs, not the community to which he belonged, exemptions should be
given to men with “religious or other conscientious convictions.”53
Finally, the AUAM memorandum explained that conscientious
objectors were not seeking to avoid public service, but to perform service
that did not violate their deepest commitments. Consequently, the gov-
ernment should tailor different modes of public service to different
forms of objection. Those men who objected “simply to bearing arms
personally” could perform noncombatant duty within the military, while
46. In support of this explanation, Christopher Capozzola notes that when Baker
learned of initial military estimates that suggested comparatively few men in camp
professed objections to fighting, he “breathed to Wilson a sigh of relief,” saying that “‘it
does not seem . . . as though our problem [is] going to be . . . so large that a very generous
and considerate mode of treatment [of conscientious objectors] would be out of the
question.’” Capozzola, supra note 6, at 67 (quoting Letter from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of War, to Woodrow Wilson, President (Sept. 19, 1917)).
47. See infra Parts I.B, II (discussing War Department lobbying for broader
accommodation of conscientious objectors).
48. See Cottrell, supra note 3, at 49, 58. Like many Progressive organizations, the
AUAM had an ideologically diverse membership, running the gamut from upright
Christian ministers, such as John Haynes Holmes, to the increasingly radical Crystal
Eastman, who would soon become a staunch Bolshevik. See Chatfield, supra note 19, at 23
(noting Holmes’s involvement with AUAM); Witt, supra note 2, at 208 (describing
Eastman’s radicalization).
49. Louisa Thomas, Conscience: Two Soldiers, Two Pacifists, One Family—A Test of
Will and Faith in World War I, at 159 (2011) [hereinafter Thomas, Conscience].
50. Letter from Jane Addams et al., Am. Union Against Militarism, to Newton D.
Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (Apr. 12, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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those men whose beliefs prevented any work that “directly aids military
operations” could perform “alternative service” within the civilian
branches of the government.54 The AUAM could only “plead” leniency
for “absolutists,” those men who refused to participate in any way.55
That the AUAM declined to take a stronger stand on absolutism
reflects a basic Progressive commitment to individual participation in the
public sphere.56 In keeping with this participatory vision, the AUAM
memo did note that leniency toward absolutists might be particularly
advisable if such men were already doing socially useful work.57 As will be
seen below, the system of conscientious objection designed by Baker and
his War Department staff would eventually fulfill much of the AUAM’s
vision, privileging individuality over group membership, recognizing a
plurality of reasons for objection, and tailoring forms of service to the
specifics of individual objections. But this system did little to accommo-
date absolutists, who refused all participation in the nation’s mobiliza-
tion. Above all, the War Department’s procedures would tie legitimate
antiwar dissent to ongoing participation in the administration of the
draft.
After Secretary Baker deferred responsibility for the conscientious-
objector exemption to Congress, the AUAM turned to the legislative
process.58 Roger Baldwin, secretary of the AUAM and future founder of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),59 and Norman Thomas,
well-respected minister and future head of the Socialist Party, took the
lead. Throughout their lobbying, Baldwin and Thomas asserted a strong
connection between freedom of conscience and democratic legitimacy.
Baldwin quoted President Wilson’s own words in making this point to the
House Military Affairs Committee. How could the United States, he
asked, “wage war ‘for the privilege of men everywhere to choose their
way of life and obedience’ while we compel the conscientious objector to
war”?60 Thomas and Baldwin warned the committee that “autocracies
54. Id. (italics omitted).
55. Id.
56. See Eisenach, supra note 1, at 191–95 (discussing Progressive belief in individual
participation in institutions as both means of developing individual identity and necessary
for democracy).
57. Letter from Jane Addams to Newton D. Baker, supra note 50, at 3.
58. Letter from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Jane Addams, Am.
Union Against Militarism 1 (Apr. 12, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
59. After studying sociology at Harvard, Baldwin followed the advice of his mentor,
Louis Brandeis, and moved to St. Louis to pursue urban-reform work. Cottrell, supra note
3, at 19–20. Soon, however, Baldwin became radicalized by the outbreak of war in Europe,
and, when the socialist Crystal Eastman fell ill, he took her place at the helm of the
AUAM. Id. at 47–48; see also Witt, supra note 2, at 196–200.
60. Thomas, Conscience, supra note 49, at 161. For Wilson’s original speech, see
Woodrow Wilson, Address by the President of the United States, S. Doc. No. 5, at 104
(1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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may coerce conscience in this vital matter; democracies do so at their
peril.”61
The AUAM lobbyists also continued to emphasize the theme of par-
ticipation, framing a pluralistic approach to wartime service as a way of
bridging the gap between freedom of conscience and democratic obliga-
tion. They noted that most objectors did not object to participation in
the state as such, only to certain forms of participation that violated their
deepest commitments.62 Thomas proposed that “any person who is
conscientiously opposed” to service in the armed forces be exempted
and drafted instead for service within the “civil branches of the
Government.”63 He argued that this approach—which involved compul-
sory service but not coercion of conscience—would preserve “the
principle of freedom of conscience, which is absolutely vital to
democracy.”64
Several amendments supported by AUAM and introduced by con-
gressmen echoed Thomas and Baldwin’s views.65 On April 28,
Representative Edward Keating, a Colorado Democrat, assailed the draft
bill for accommodating only the “man who belongs to an organization
which is opposed to participation in war.”66 In addition to “the organized
conscience of the Nation,” Keating called on the House to recognize “the
unorganized conscience of the Nation”67—the conscientious individual
who fashioned his own ethical and political worldview. Indeed, Keating
implied that there was something unconscientious about the “organized
conscience.” Conscientious opposition to war, he argued, should be
based on the individual’s active choice to adhere to a particular kind of
belief, not on the inheritance of, or fealty to, a shared tradition.68
Keating’s opponents, however, argued that the “unorganized
conscience” and the orderly management of the draft were utterly
opposed. For instance, Georgia Democrat William Howard suggested
that the “practical operation” of Keating’s broad exemption “would
resolve itself into the voluntary system.”69
61. Cottrell, supra note 3, at 52.
62. 55 Cong. Rec. 928 (1917) (statement of Sen. James Brady) (quoting letter from
Norman Thomas explaining objectors “are not cowards and are very eager to serve
society”).
63. Id. at 929.
64. Id.
65. See Letter from Jane Addams, Am. Union Against Militarism, to Newton D.
Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (Apr. 27, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(detailing AUAM support for imperiled amendments).
66. 55 Cong. Rec. 1528 (1917) (statement of Rep. Edward Keating) (proposing
amendment exempting from service “any person who is conscientiously opposed to
engaging in such service”).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1529 (asserting amendment “recognizes the conscience of the individual
instead of the organization”).
69. Id. (statement of Rep. William Howard).
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In the Senate, debate also pitted those who saw the individual con-
science as essential to democracy against those who saw it as inimical to
the orderly management of the draft. Colorado Senator Charles Thomas
argued that to recognize only “those with conscientious scruples who are
members of religious organizations” would not be “democratic.”70 For
Senator Thomas, the integrity of an individual’s beliefs was the essence of
democratic citizenship, not the details of his private religious associa-
tions. Senator William Stone quickly rose to object: “[I]f you confine it to
religious organizations . . . I see no objection to that; but if you frame it
so that any man who is conscientiously opposed to going into the military
service will be exempt, the Lord only knows what that will lead to.”71
By the end of April, Congress had decisively rejected all amend-
ments extending legal recognition to nonsectarian individuals conscien-
tiously opposed to combat.72 While defenders of the nonsectarian con-
science associated it with democracy, congressional majorities saw this
“unorganized conscience” as a disorderly and potentially disloyal force,
inimical to the management of the draft and the national solidarity it
sought to create. At the time of the congressional draft debates, the
threat posed by anarchism and socialism was felt keenly by the nation’s
elites, who had had lived through more than thirty years of labor unrest
at home and had recently witnessed the overthrow of the Czar.73 Legiti-
mate opposition to war, many politicians reasoned, could only reliably be
found in the “organized conscience,” a conscience possessed by men who
had bound themselves to well-established religious organizations with
pacifist doctrines. Such an organized religious commitment may have
removed the taint of anarchy and socialism from those who refused to
fight.
According to the law that passed, local draft boards in the first
instance and district boards in the case of appeal would determine
whether or not an individual was a member of a well-recognized religious
sect opposed to war.74 If the draft boards did find that someone qualified
under this legislative exemption, then that man would receive a certifi-
cate to present at training camp in order to be assigned noncombatant
70. Id. at 1473--74 (statement of Sen. Charles Thomas).
71. Id. at 1474 (statement of Sen. William Stone).
72. See id. at 1478–79, 1529 (describing defeat of amendments).
73. See Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in Its First
Age of Terror 2–3 (2009) (describing rise of reform and militant movements between
1890–1920, leading to “‘civil war’ between capital and labor”); Joseph A. McCartin,
Labor’s Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern
American Labor Relations, 1912–1921, at 40 (1997) (noting factors contributing to 1917
labor unrest “accentuated what Secretary of Labor [William Bauchop] Wilson called the
‘traditional cleavages between employers and wage earners’”).
74. See Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 79 (granting local draft
boards authority to “hear and determine . . . all questions of exemption under this Act”),
repealed by Act June 15, 1917, ch. 29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217 (providing compulsory military
service should cease four months after proclamation of peace by President).
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duties.75 Men without certificates who refused to train for combat would
be treated as disobedient soldiers.
Although the Wilson Administration had supported this narrow
exemption, Baker wrote Addams a day after the defeat of the more
accommodating amendments, implying that he had tried but failed to
get recognition for conscientious objectors: “I think it is unlikely that we
can secure a legislative exemption for conscientious objectors.”76 Strik-
ingly, however, Baker added, “In the meantime I hope that the
administration of whatever law is passed will make it possible for us to
avoid” the abuse of objectors.77 Throughout the legislative debate, the
Administration’s priority had been to seek “broad powers to implement
and enforce the draft.”78 Even as Baker refrained from endorsing the
AUAM’s proposals for more accommodating legislation, he left the door
open for a more flexible administration of conscientious objectors in the
coming months.79
B. Interpretations
On May 18, 1917, Woodrow Wilson signed the Selective Service Act
into law and called for a national registration holiday on June 5.80
Although attempts to legislate the right of individual conscience had
failed, the War Department still had to design the details of the Act’s
administration, which Baker had suggested to Addams might be more
accommodating than the Act itself.81 Nongovernment advocates of the
75. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 182 (discussing creation and composition of local
draft boards); Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, The Facts About Conscientious Objectors in
the United States 7 (1918), available at http://debs.indstate.edu/a505f3_1918.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he local and district boards may grant special
certificates, exempting from combatant service, men who are members of religious sects
or organizations recognized by the boards . . . . [The certificate] authorizes exemption
from actual combatant service when drafted.”).
76. Letter from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Jane Addams, Am.
Union Against Militarism 1 (Apr. 29, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Chambers, supra note 6, at 154.
79. In doing so, Baker indicated his awareness of the “unhappy difficulties which
occurred in England”—referring to harsh treatment of objectors at the hands of
unsympathetic tribunals. Letter from Newton D. Baker to Jane Addams, supra note 76, at
1; see also James McDermott, British Military Service Tribunals, 1916–1918, at 36–58
(2011) (reviewing difficulties British tribunals faced in implementing conscientious-
objection legislation); John Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the
Conscientious Objector to Military Service 1916–1919, at 117–28 (1970) (describing
British tribunals’ resistance to more accommodating implementation of objection
legislation).
80. President Calls the Nation to Arms; Draft Bill Signed; Registration on June 5;
Regulars Under Pershing to Go to France, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1917, at 1.
81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing Baker’s hope for flexibility
in Act’s administration).
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individual conscience had reason to hope that Baker meant what he said,
given the personnel he was bringing to the War Department.
Throughout the winter and spring of 1917, Baker worked to put his
secretariat’s office on a war footing, appealing to young Progressives he
knew from his reformist work. Felix Frankfurter was an obvious choice
for Baker: A disciple of Baker’s friend and progressive hero Louis
Brandeis, Frankfurter had also served under Secretary of War Henry
Stimson during the Taft Administration.82 Although Frankfurter had
initially returned to Harvard Law School when the Wilson
Administration came to power, he kept in touch with Baker, writing to
the Secretary of War from Cambridge in February 1917 to recommend
Walter Lippmann for the position of wartime censor.83 Frankfurter knew
Lippmann from Harvard and the New Republic, shared his commitment
to strong, centralized national government, and felt he was just the man
to manage the flow of wartime news for Baker.84 Baker took Frankfurter’s
advice, but also continued to pursue the young law professor. When the
U.S. entered the war, Baker asked Frankfurter to come down to
Washington for the weekend. As Frankfurter later recalled, “I packed my
suitcase, and the weekend didn’t terminate until the fall of 1919.”85
Baker also recruited Frederick Keppel, who was dean of Columbia
University and secretary of the American Association for International
Conciliation, a premier peace society that had long advocated for legal
checks on international conflict.86 Along with Baker’s personal secretary,
Ralph Hayes, Frankfurter, Keppel, and Lippmann formed the heart of
the Secretary’s office at the War Department. Notably, all three served as
civilians. Although Baker offered to make Frankfurter a major in the U.S.
Army, Frankfurter declined, explaining that “every pipsqueak Colonel
would feel that he was more important [than I].”87 Frankfurter’s assess-
ment of the army hierarchy presaged future tensions within the War
Department between civilian and military leadership.
Baker’s recruitment of such admired Progressives to the War
Department boosted the morale of antiwar Progressives. Indeed, after
the upsetting imposition of conscription and the passage of the
82. See Cottrell, supra note 3, at 19–20 (describing Baker’s relationship to Brandeis);
Cramer, supra note 33, at 191 (describing relationship between Baker, Brandeis and
Frankfurter); Urofsky, supra note 32, at 4, 9–10 (describing Frankfurter’s service under
Secretary of War Stimson and later under Baker).
83. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Newton D. Baker,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (Feb. 6, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
84. For a perceptive analysis of the vision of national citizenship shared by
Progressives around the New Republic, including Frankfurter and Lippmann, see Stears,
supra note 1, at 4–7, 61–68.
85. See Hirsch, supra note 32, at 50 (quoting Felix Frankfurter).
86. See Ralph Hayes, Third Assistant Secretary of War, in Appreciations of Frederick
Paul Keppel by Some of His Friends 17, 19 (1951) (describing Keppel’s decision to join
War Department).
87. Parrish, supra note 32, at 85 (quoting Frankfurter).
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Espionage Act in the spring of 1917,88 AUAM Secretary Crystal Eastman
viewed the War Department administrators as a great boon to the cause
of civil liberty. She remarked that
It was as though [Wilson] said . . . , “I know you are
disappointed in me—you don’t understand my conversion to
the draft—my demand for censorship . . . . But as guarantee of
good faith I give you Baker and Keppel[] and Lippmann . . . to
carry out these laws. No matter how they look on paper, they
cannot be Prussian in effect with such men to administer
them.”89
Though Eastman did not mention Frankfurter, he too would prove a vital
ally in dampening the collectivist implications of wartime legislation.
The day after the Selective Service Act passed, Roger Baldwin, who
had recently taken over the role of AUAM secretary from Eastman, pro-
posed forming a “Bureau for Conscientious Objectors” as a branch
within the AUAM.90 Baldwin’s Bureau aimed to work with Baker’s
Progressive appointees to ameliorate the problems faced by men who
refused to fight.91 In keeping with this cooperative vision, the Bureau’s
first press release called on men conscientiously opposed to fighting to
enter into a dialogue with the government. Rather than refusing to regis-
ter or evading the draft, these men should “register and indicate . . .
their personal opposition to participation in war.”92 “Obedience to law, to
the utmost limit of conscience, is the basis of good citizenship,”93 the
release explained.
The task of the conscientious objector was not simply to avoid kill-
ing, Baldwin explained, but to practice a form of conscientious citizen-
ship: The “opportunity provided by the Bill to specify one’s claim to
exemption from military service should not be missed by those who
desire to state their objection to that service on religious or other
conscientious grounds.”94 This last statement was, in part, strategic.
Baldwin and the AUAM knew that the Selective Service Act did not, in
fact, recognize “other conscientious grounds” for legitimate objection.
By encouraging objectors to register their nonreligious objections,
Baldwin sought to open further negotiations with the government over
the interpretation and administration of the Act.
88. The Espionage Act outlawed, among other actions, willful attempts to “obstruct
the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.” Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30,
§ 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799 (2012)). For a recent
study of the Act’s passage and enforcement, see Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at
146–82.
89. Chatfield, supra note 19, at 34 (quoting Eastman).
90. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 18.
91. Id. at 92–93.
92. Statement from the Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (May 23, 1917) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Although Baldwin looked forward to working with Baker’s recent
civilian appointees, they were not the only relevant decisionmakers. Two
days after the Bureau’s press release, Oswald Garrison Villard, another
AUAM board member and editor of The Nation, met with Provost Marshal
General Enoch Crowder concerning the treatment of conscientious
objectors.95 Crowder was a highly accomplished military lawyer who, after
the Spanish-American War, had helped draft the Philippine criminal
code and the Cuban Constitution.96 As Provost Marshal General, the War
Department official responsible for overseeing military discipline,
Crowder had taken a lead role in drafting the Administration’s conscrip-
tion bill and, after its passage, became chief administrator of the
Selective Service System. Crowder shared some disheartening news with
Villard and the AUAM: “[C]onscientious objectors [unrecognized by
statute] will be treated as military men after acceptance as conscripts
and . . . they will be tried by court-martial.”97 The War Department would
not deviate from congressional legislation and thus, nonsectarian men
opposed to fighting would be prosecuted as disobedient soldiers.
Yet AUAM lobbyists hoped that Baker’s civilian administrators might
still wrest the rudder from Crowder. On June 2, Roger Baldwin told
Third Assistant Secretary of War Frederick Keppel “We don’t want to
make a move without consulting you.”98 On June 15, Baldwin wrote
directly to Baker, explaining, “We are entirely at the service of the War
Department in rendering any assistance that you think lies in our power
to give.”99 Covering their bases, Baldwin and Villard met on June 21 with
President Wilson’s private secretary, Joseph Tumulty. Baldwin reported
that Tumulty “knew very little about the problem” of conscientious objec-
tors, but when Villard suggested that military brutality be checked,
Tumulty was “entirely sympathetic,” and asked for material to bring to
the President.100
That same day, the AUAM submitted detailed recommendations to
Tumulty about how to deal with the “many thousands of young men who
are Conscientious Objectors to war, but are not affiliated with any
95. Memorandum from Oswald Garrison Villard, Bd. Member, Am. Union Against
Militarism 1 (May 25, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
96. David A. Lockmiller, Enoch H. Crowder: Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman 116, 140
(1955).
97. Memorandum from Oswald Garrison Villard, supra note 95, at 1.
98. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to Frederick
Keppel, Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (June 2, 1917) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
99. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to Newton
D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (June 15, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
100. Memorandum of Interview with Joseph Tumulty, Sec’y to President Woodrow
Wilson, by Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (June 21, 1917) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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religious organization.”101 Villard laid out two paths forward, one based
on a strict construction of the draft law, the other on a more liberal one.
If the Administration “intend[ed] to adhere strictly to the letter of the
law,” then “no one but members of well recognized religious sects
w[ould] be exempt from combatant service.”102 The question would then
become one of appropriate punishment for the disobedient nonsectar-
ians. But the Administration could also “propose[] to interpret the law
liberally and to provide non-combatant service for other than members
of well recognized religious sects.”103
Villard put plainly before the Administration a choice it had yet to
make: How closely would it hew to the narrow recognition of conscience
provided in the draft law? Of course, the Administration itself had sup-
ported narrow statutory language—apparently to ensure passage of con-
scription and to forestall a flood of alleged conscientious objectors. Yet
many administrators were sympathetic to the call for the accommodation
of conscientious objectors, particularly as that call came from longtime
Progressive allies. Indeed, upon receiving Villard’s memo, Wilson for-
warded it to Baker, saying that “I am sure you will be interested in the
enclosed, particularly since it outlines a policy very similar to the one you
were outlining to me the other day.”104
Just as Baldwin and Villard seemed to be gaining traction in the
executive branch, Provost Marshal General Crowder began to push back
against calls for a more lenient policy. In response to Villard’s memoran-
dum, Crowder rejected both a liberal reading of the statute itself and the
possibility that the Commander in-Chief had independent authority to
administer draftees as he saw fit. Noting that Villard’s “suggestions
[we]re not based upon the exact language of the law but on the
expressed intention of the administration,” Crowder argued that this
appeal to administrative sympathy was entirely out of bounds: “[T]he law
determines our action and restricts us to [the language of the statute].”105
Indeed, Crowder advised Secretary of War Baker that an implemen-
tation of the Act that offered noncombatant duty to nonsectarians would
“be quite outside of the law and one you have no authority to establish or
follow . . . . There is nothing left for us to do but to execute the law as it
was enacted by Congress.”106 When Baker met with Roger Baldwin the
next day, he endorsed Crowder’s point of view: “Baker made it clear at
101. Memorandum from Oswald Garrison Villard, Bd. Member, Am. Union Against
Militarism, to Joseph Tumulty, Sec’y to President Woodrow Wilson 1 (June 21, 1917) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. at 3.
104. 43 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 5 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983) (footnote
omitted) (providing Villard’s proposal).
105. Memorandum from Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal Gen., to Newton
Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (June 21, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
106. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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once that the War Department would follow the letter of the law. He
apparently approved General Crowder’s memorandum to the effect that
nine-tenths of our suggestions were outside the Act and impossible of
consideration unless the law is changed.”107
Not only did Secretary Baker appear to agree with Crowder’s view of
the legal impossibility of an executive recognition of individual con-
science, but the increasingly influential Army War College also supported
Crowder’s interpretation. The Army War College had been a central
player in the campaign for universal military service and was also the
institutional center for the nascent field of military intelligence. Since
1910, a group of military offices spearheaded by Colonel Ralph Van
Deman had been pushing to extend military intelligence tactics pio-
neered in the Philippines and along the Mexican border to the conti-
nental United States.108 After months of lobbying from Joseph Kuhn,
Chief of the War College, Baker “officially assigned the War College the
job of espionage and counterespionage” within the United States and
appointed Van Deman as Chief of the Military Information Division.109
While Baker’s vision of domestic military intelligence was quite narrow—
“guarding against German spies and saboteurs”—Van Deman and his
supporters at the College “had much more ambitious plans.”110 They
were committed to military expansion, resistant to their political masters,
and suspicious of the competence and loyalty of the American people.111
The enemies at home whom military intelligence sought to target would
include conscientious objectors.
On July 4, Joseph Kuhn addressed the subject of conscientious
objection directly.112 Defining “conscientious objectors” as those
nonsectarians unrecognized by the Selective Service Act, Kuhn told
Baker that “it would not be legal to designate ‘Conscientious Objectors’
as a class entitled to exemption from combatant service.”113 The only
lawful course, Kuhn counseled, was to treat nonsectarian objectors as
disobedient soldiers, liable for harsh treatment. Their “sentences should
107. Memorandum of Interview with Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, by
Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (June 22, 1917) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
108. See Joan Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980, at 121, 125 (1991)
(describing role of Van Deman and Army War College in development of intelligence
capabilities).
109. Id. at 134–36.
110. Id. at 160.
111. See id. at 124–25 (describing efforts to expand scope of military-intelligence
operations and resistance to civilian control); Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle:
The Army’s Way of War 109–115 (2007) (noting military commanders viewed civilian
population as “incapable of the necessary preparation and sacrifice needed to secure
victory . . . in case of war”).
112. Memorandum from Joseph E. Kuhn, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army 1 (July 4, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
113. Id.
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be, if possible, ‘for the period of the existing emergency,’ and should
involve hard labor.”114
Even as Kuhn declared the individual conscience illegitimate, Roger
Baldwin pressed on, believing that he still had an audience among the
civilian administration. On July 13, he sent a new memorandum to Baker,
explaining that, at the “request” of Third Assistant Secretary of War
Keppel, he was enclosing “definite suggestions for dealing with the
problem of ‘Conscientious Objectors’ in line with our recent
conversation and correspondence.”115 One of these suggestions was that
“[m]en opposed to participation in war who are willing to accept non-
combatant service in the Army . . . should be assigned to such service
without court[-]martial.”116
When Baker forwarded this new memo to Crowder, the Provost
Marshal General rejected it out of hand: Nonsectarian men who refused
combat service, Crowder explained, “have incurred the penal clauses of
the law which provides that they be tried by court martial.”117 Not only
did these men break the law, Crowder went on, if the Administration
showed them mercy, it would itself flirt with law breaking: “No
administrative action avoiding such trial could be taken that would not
be plainly subversive of the law which we are sworn to execute.”118
Crowder’s legal opinion could not have been be clearer—the extension
of noncombatant service to nonsectarian objectors was barred by statute.
By the end of the summer, Baldwin found himself no closer to secur-
ing administrative recognition of the individual conscience than he had
been in April. But the situation began to change in early September
when he held meetings with Felix Frankfurter, Frederick Keppel, and
John Henry Wigmore, a renowned legal scholar who had left his post as
Dean of Northwestern Law School to join the Provost Marshal General’s
office as a military officer.119 The results of these meetings marked a turn-
ing point in the administration of conscience, as the last doors to military
support closed and a crucial door to civilian support opened.
Baldwin first met with Wigmore, who had “been giving the problem
of conscientious objectors some attention”; Wigmore appeared surpris-
114. Id.
115. Memorandum from Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to
Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (July 13, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
116. Id.
117. Memorandum from Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal Gen., to Newton D.
Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (July 17, 1919) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
118. Id.
119. Memorandum of Interview with John Henry Wigmore, Major, U.S. Army, and
Allen W. Gullion, Colonel, U.S. Army, by Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against
Militarism 2--6 (Sept. 11–12, 1917) [hereinafter Wigmore Interview] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also William R. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore: Scholar and
Reformer 45, 125 (1977) (noting Wigmore’s deanship and military service).
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ingly open-minded, given previous resistance from his office.120 He sug-
gested that some form of alternative service for objectors of all types
might be possible, and looked forward to an agreement “so as to forestall
further propaganda” that might inveigh against harsh military
treatment.121
Baldwin next met “at length” with Felix Frankfurter.122 Frankfurter
explained that Secretary Baker had referred all correspondence involv-
ing conscientious objectors to him, and that he was now “considering
some plan to meet the situation.”123 Frankfurter and Baldwin discussed
the possibility of assembling a committee of all the administrators—both
civilian and military—who were working on the problem of conscientious
objection so they could devise a comprehensive solution together.
Frankfurter, Baldwin reported, “took kindly” to the idea.124 Finally,
Baldwin met with another civilian administrator, Frederick Keppel, who
also supported the committee idea and asked Baldwin “to find out if Maj.
Wigmore could represent the Provost Marshal General” on it.125
On September 13, Wigmore followed up with Baldwin, reiterating
his hope that Baldwin would send a memorandum detailing the condi-
tions that nonsectarian objectors would be willing to accept.126 If
Wigmore found such a proposal practicable he would approach his supe-
riors, acting as a go-between.127 Wigmore’s letter is a striking document
in that it provides the one instance in the archives of the World War I
administration of conscience in which a high-level military (as opposed
to civilian) official entertained the possibility of administrative leniency
with regard to nonsectarian objectors. As such, it is not surprising that
Wigmore ended his letter with a caution: “Please understand that this
memorandum and this proposal emanate entirely from my own
unofficial mind, in that I have not consulted my superiors about it, and
that I shall not do so until I receive the memorandum from you . . . .”128
Knowing that he was out on a limb, Wigmore sought to put on record his
appreciation of his own lack of authority over the issue.
120. Wigmore Interview, supra note 119, at 1.
121. Id.
122. Memorandum of Interview with Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War, by Roger
N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (Sept. 11–12, 1917) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Memorandum of Interview with Frederick Keppel, Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of War, by Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (Sept. 11–12,
1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
126. Letter from John Henry Wigmore, Major, U.S. Army, to Roger N. Baldwin,
Assoc. Dir., Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (Sept. 12, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
127. See id. at 2 (requesting detailed, written memorandum to present to superiors
for further action).
128. Id.
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Baldwin, however, was blind to Wigmore’s anxieties. On September
14, he wrote to Wigmore but not with a memorandum that Wigmore
could discreetly communicate to his superiors. Instead, Baldwin told
Wigmore about his subsequent meetings with Frankfurter and Keppel,
and Frankfurter’s interest in forming “a committee to go into the whole
matter, consisting of those who are already engaged on it [including
Frankfurter and Wigmore].”129 Another potential member of this
committee, Baldwin explained, was the civilian Judge Julian Mack.130
Mack was a Progressive circuit judge, urban reformer, and close friend of
Louis Brandeis, Frankfurter’s mentor. Frankfurter’s assistant in the War
Department, Max Lowenthal, had also served as Mack’s law clerk.131
The committee scheme, proposed by Baldwin, Frankfurter, and
Keppel, and including both military and civilian officials as well as out-
siders such as Mack, was decidedly not the discrete, unofficial process that
Wigmore had sought. The next day, Wigmore fired off an angry telegram
to Baldwin: “[S]o far as I am concerned you may count me out unless
and until you do precisely as stated in my letter.”132 Although Baldwin
followed up with a more responsive memorandum, Baldwin, Frankfurter,
and Keppel’s attempt to implicate Wigmore in a high-profile committee
of civilian officials created a permanent breach.133 A month later,
Wigmore would pen a memorandum advocating the harsh treatment of
nonsectarian objectors.134
Wigmore’s fear of exposure is understandable in light of the strict
legal line his superiors were taking toward exemptions. Five days after
Wigmore sent Baldwin the telegram, his boss, Provost Marshal General
Crowder, sent Baker the most definitive memorandum yet on the legal
impossibility of treating conscientious objectors as anything other than
disobedient soldiers. Crowder first reviewed the Selective Service Act’s
exemption language and then concluded: “[I]t is evident that
individuals, as such, are not considered. They must be members of well-
recognized religious sects or organizations, and that it is as members, not
as individuals, that they are entitled to exemption.”135 Not only was the
129. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to John
Henry Wigmore, Major, U.S. Army 1 (Sept. 14, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
130. Id.
131. Urofsky, supra note 32, at 10 & 188 n.40.
132. Telegram from John Henry Wigmore, Major, U.S. Army, to Roger N. Baldwin,
Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (Sept. 15, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
133. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to John
Henry Wigmore, Major, U.S. Army 1 (Sept. 18, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
134. Memorandum from John Henry Wigmore, Major, U.S. Army 1 (Oct. 12, 1917)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
135. Memorandum from Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal Gen., to Newton D.
Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 2 (Sept. 20, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Act clear, its authority to bind the President was also certain. In adminis-
tering the Act, Crowder reemphasized, “The President . . . is not a free
agent.”136 The Executive had no authority over drafted men independent
of the clear instructions provided by Congress.137
As Baldwin must have understood after his contretemps with
Wigmore, the individual conscience’s best hope lay with the thirty-five-
year-old Felix Frankfurter, who had been assigned the conscientious-
objector portfolio by Baker and Keppel.138 On September 26, Frankfurter
vaguely—if prophetically—offered Baldwin some comfort: “Speaking
about the matter personally, your own peculiar helpfulness in the
situation has been constantly borne in mind, and presented where it
should be presented. Just continue your attitude of cooperation. I am full
of confidence the thing will work out all right.”139 A week earlier,
Frankfurter had in fact sent the Secretary of War an in-depth memoran-
dum on the treatment of conscientious objectors.140
As the next Part will discuss, Frankfurter’s memorandum outlined a
set of administrative procedures capable of accommodating a wide range
of antiwar dissent within the draft; it also offered a creative legal defense
of the executive’s authority to implement such procedures. Both the
proposed approach to conscientious objection and the legal arguments
that justified it diverged widely from the opinions of military lawyers.
While these lawyers argued that Congress’s exclusive reference to the
sectarian conscience was decisive, Frankfurter countered that where stat-
utory language—whether through silence or narrowness—created an
administrative problem, the executive branch had ample authority to
innovate. Resting his argument on administrative, military, and political
prudence, Frankfurter advocated for a civil-libertarian approach to con-
science that military officials themselves considered impractical, even
dangerous.
II. FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION
The development of the federal military draft is a signal case of con-
stitutional construction,141 the mixed practice of law and policymaking by
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Memorandum of Interview by Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against
Militarism, with Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War, supra note 122, at 1; Letter from
Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against
Militarism 1 (Sept. 18, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing
Frankfurter’s willingness to collaborate with Baldwin on issue of conscientious objectors).
139. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y,
Am. Union Against Militarism 1 (Sept. 27, 1917) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Second Letter
to Baldwin] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
140. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9.
141. Whittington, Constitutional Construction, supra note 30, at 12 tbl.1.2.
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which governmental actors “flesh[] out constitutional principles,
practices and rules that are not visible on the face of the constitutional
text and that are not readily implicit in the terms of the constitution.”142
Like most significant constructions, the draft has generated new substan-
tive and structural constitutional understandings, transforming both the
inventory of “individual and collective rights” and the “delegation and
distribution of political powers” within the constitutional order.143 As
initially outlined by Felix Frankfurter, the administration of conscien-
tious objectors within the World War I draft would innovate along both of
these dimensions—rights and structure. First, Frankfurter called for a
broad accommodation of antiwar belief within the draft, an accommoda-
tion that had been denied by both Congress and the courts. Second, he
asserted civilian and executive control over draft policy in the face of
competing military and legislative claims of authority.
In urging the War Department to implement new rights and claim-
ing it had the authority to do so, Frankfurter was appealing to
“[s]omething external to the [constitutional] text”144—a mix of
administrative, military, and political prudence. Yet these practical argu-
ments had constitutional resonance, sounding in the separation of pow-
ers, Commander in Chief authority, and individual-liberty and equality
interests. The development of constitutional understandings within the
context of everyday lawmaking and policymaking is a hallmark of con-
struction, especially as it unfolds within the administrative state—such
development increasingly goes by the name of “administrative
constitutionalism.”145 Because the Constitution itself says little about
administration, legislators, judges, and executive officials will generally
have to appeal to ordinary law and policy considerations when building
142. Whittington, New American Constitution, supra note 30, at 120. Since
Whittington mooted the term, legal scholars have developed multiple, overlapping
theories of constitutional construction and construction-like processes. See, e.g., Jack M.
Balkin, Living Originalism 4–5 (2011) (describing constitutional construction as
“implementing and applying the Constitution using all of the various modalities of
interpretation”); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 1–24 (describing “small ‘c’
constitutionalism” as a mode of constitutional development unbound by constitutional
text); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 5–7 (2001) (describing court-
centered theory of constitutional “implementation”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution
Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 410 (2007) (arguing content of Constitution
“must be derived functionally, not formally”).
143. Whittington, Constitutional Construction, supra note 30, at 12 tbl.1.2.
144. Id. at 6 (“Something external to the text—whether political principle, social
interest, or partisan consideration—must be alloyed with it in order for the text to have a
determinate and controlling meaning within a given governing context.”).
145. See Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 1912
(“Administrative constitutionalism’s emphasis on the constitutional dimensions of
seemingly ordinary implementation and policymaking, combined with its frequent
creative character, is also what links administrative constitutionalism to the wider category
of constitutional construction.”).
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out or constraining the administrative state.146 This is just what
Frankfurter did in articulating his vision of a civil-libertarian draft. This
vision would anger military and legislative officials who considered dis-
sent and wartime administration incompatible; it would also fail to satisfy
civil libertarians who saw any form of compulsory participation in the
state as an illegitimate encroachment on liberty. The World War I system
of conscientious objection and the debate that surrounded it would have
long-term implications for the shape of the draft and the relationship
between civil liberties and the administrative state more generally.
A. The Social and Political Background of Frankfurter’s Memorandum
By the time Felix Frankfurter entered Woodrow Wilson’s War
Department he had already made a name for himself as an expert
administrator.147 During the previous presidential administration,
Frankfurter had also served in the War Department, at the Bureau of
Insular Affairs.148 There, he tackled the question of colonial citizenship—
how, and to what extent, to incorporate the inhabitants of imperial
acquisitions into the American polity.149 This work acquainted
Frankfurter with the intimate relationship between individual rights and
state building as he took part in the administrative construction of a new
mode of citizenship. Over the course of World War I, he would tackle a
new set of challenges involving the incorporation of marginal yet politi-
cally mobilized citizens into an expanding administrative state. Legal
scholars and historians have long recognized Frankfurter’s effort to
resolve one of these challenges—labor unrest in vital wartime indus-
146. Id. (“Given the Constitution’s silence on administration and the fact that
agencies only exist and function as a result of ordinary law delegations of authority, agency
officials’ constitutional engagement and development necessarily occurs in ordinary law
contexts, as they seek to implement a statutory regime or presidential policy.”).
Frankfurter was especially likely to avoid explicit constitutional argument given the
Progressive context in which he wrote. Progressive politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals—
from Woodrow Wilson in the White House to Roger Baldwin at the Bureau of
Conscientious Objectors—were suspicious of formalism of all sorts, and viewed veneration
of the Constitution as a tool of the defenders of traditional property rights. See, e.g.,
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Citizenship, supra note 1, at 53–55 (describing Progressive
antiformalism); Skowronek, supra note 1, at 2088–89 (describing Wilson’s pragmatism and
respect for popular opinion); Weinrib, Public Interest to Private Rights, supra note 4, at
210 (describing Baldwin’s distrust of courts).
147. His former boss, William Howard Taft, once remarked that “‘Mr. Frankfurter is
like a good Chancellor, he wants to amplify his jurisdiction.’” Parrish, supra note 32, at 82
(quoting William Howard Taft, Co-Chairman, Remarks at the Executive Meeting of the
National War Labor Board (May 11, 1918)).
148. Parrish, supra note 32, at 40–42 (describing Frankfurter’s work during the Taft
Administration).
149. See Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional
Change 61–63, 71, 73 (Feb. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2226754 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Frankfurter’s
approach to colonial citizenship).
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tries.150 But Frankfurter’s work on behalf of conscientious objectors has
been almost entirely forgotten.
This oversight is particularly poignant given that labor militancy and
draft resistance posed related challenges to the legitimacy and stability of
a putatively democratic wartime state. Some of the staunchest opposition
to the war came from workers who argued that while the war benefited
capitalists and kings, it was common men who died.151 Many conscien-
tious objectors echoed the socialist or quasi-socialist worldview of these
labor militants.152 Millions across the globe also shared this view, and at
war’s end three of the major combatants—Russia, Germany, and
Hungary—were in the grip of revolution.153 Concerned by this atmos-
phere of political instability, Frankfurter and his fellow Progressive
administrators were loath to antagonize socialist sympathizers, both in
the labor movement and within the draft apparatus.154
150. Between September 1917 and the end of the war, Frankfurter worked for the
Mediation Commission on the problem of labor relations, as workers in essential
industries pushed for better wages and working conditions and owners fought back, at
times with massive force. See Parrish, supra note 32, at 87–97; Urofsky, supra note 32, at
10. Frankfurter was sympathetic to labor’s demands and condemned the repression of
striking miners in Bisbee, Arizona. Parrish, supra note 32, at 88–95; Urofsky, supra note
32, at 10–12. Subsequently, President Wilson asked Frankfurter to investigate the case of
labor organizer Thomas Mooney, who had been convicted of bombing the 1916
Preparedness Day parade in San Francisco. Parrish, supra note 32, at 98. Discovering
serious irregularities in the prosecution, Frankfurter urged Wilson to pardon Mooney. Id.
at 98–99. Theodore Roosevelt assailed Frankfurter’s interventions: “You are engaged in
excusing men precisely like the Bolsheviki in Russia . . . who are traitors to their allies, to
democracy, and to civilization, as well as to the United States.” Id. at 99.
151. Capozzola, supra note 6, at 30 (describing workers’ resistance to draft);
Chatfield, supra note 19, at 58–59, 76 (describing economic and political sources of
antiwar activism); David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American
Society 26–30, 70–72 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy, Over Here] (describing socialist
opposition to war and its appeal to workers); David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of
Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925, at 371–72
(1987) (describing tension between classes during war); Christopher M. Sterba, Good
Americans: Italians and Jewish Immigrants During the First World War 124–26, 155–63
(2003) (describing antiwar socialist activity).
152. See Chatfield, supra note 19, at 76--77 (describing views of political objectors);
Norman Thomas, The Conscientious Objector in America 4 (1923) (describing
relationship between “religious pacifists” and “socialists and internationalists”); Morris
Hillquit, Introduction, in Alexander Trachtenberg, The American Socialists and the War 3
(1917) (discussing socialist views on the war); Harlan Fiske Stone, The Conscientious
Objector, Columbia U. Q., Oct. 1919, at 254 [hereinafter Stone, The Conscientious
Objector] (discussing religious beliefs of objectors); Letter from Stedman & Stoelke to
Woodrow Wilson, President 1 (Aug. 21, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(seeking conscientious-objector recognition for members of “council of Socialist
Conscripts, Local Division of Cook County, Illinois”).
153. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I, at 434 (2000).
154. In formulating his response to the problem of conscientious objection,
Frankfurter explicitly referred to the “damage that a strictly rigorous policy may bring
upon the public mind” as exemplified by the earlier “British experience” with draft
resistance. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2; see also McDermott, supra note
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Just as pro-labor and antiwar sentiment often overlapped, anti-labor
and pro-war fervor frequently converged, undermining the Progressive
vision of a “war for democracy” with bouts of mob violence. As
Frankfurter learned firsthand both as a draft administrator and as a labor
mediator, bellicose politicians, unyielding soldiers, and vigilante gangs
harried those cultural groups associated with antiwar and anti-American
beliefs—labor activists, German Americans, Eastern European immi-
grants, Jews, and pacifists of all stripes.155 The draft—an officially sanc-
tioned form of pro-war coercion—was a catalyst for such violent “mob
rule.”156 But for Frankfurter and other Progressive administrators, the
draft was also an opportunity for the federal bureaucracy to model an
alternative approach to the governance of political, economic, and cul-
tural difference.
In his September 18 memorandum, Frankfurter gave Secretary of
War Baker a long-term blueprint for accommodating a range of antiwar
belief within the draft apparatus. Frankfurter framed conscientious
objection not as an opportunity to retreat from the state, but as an
opportunity for objectors and administrators to engage with one another
in a respectful fashion.157 He also argued that the executive branch had
independent authority to administer drafted men as it saw fit—which, if
Frankfurter had his way, would mean more flexible procedures than
Congress had authorized. Such an assertion of executive authority would
be countermajoritarian, frustrating the legislative will in the interests of a
few-thousand idiosyncratic draftees. Yet such an assertion would also
accord to dissenting citizens what Frederick Keppel characterized as a
“measure of self-determination.”158
Keppel’s use of the phrase “self-determination” was probably
inspired by President Wilson’s contemporaneous call for an international
order based on the principle of “self-determination” of national popula-
tions, which the President himself anchored in the “consent of the
governed.”159 Wilson’s account of self-determination was not synonymous
with simple majoritarianism, however, and like Progressive thought more
generally, it both prized the participation of all citizens in public affairs
and disdained mob rule. Such a participatory yet antipopulist politics
arose from a belief that democracy should be truth seeking, a belief that
79, at 36–58 (reviewing troubles British tribunals faced in implementing conscientious
objection legislation); Rae, supra note 79, at 117–28 (describing British tribunals’
resistance to more-liberal implementation).
155. Capozzola, supra note 6, at 117–43 (describing assaults on antiwar groups);
Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 151, at 163–67 (discussing suppression of dissent).
156. Capozzola, supra note 6, at 117--43.
157. See, e.g., Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing objectors, by
making their case to “wisely constituted board” of lawyers, would develop “belief in the
good faith and justice on the part of the government”).
158. U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 47.
159. Woodrow Wilson, A League for Peace, supra note 11, at 8.
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self-government meant the collective discovery of a common yet objective
good.160
This democratic theory was elaborated at great length by the circle
of Progressive intellectuals around the New Republic, a circle that
included both Frankfurter and his War Department colleague Walter
Lippmann.161 It depended on a highly normative account of the role of
the individual citizen in democratic life. For these thinkers, individual
self-determination—and the individual rights that enabled such self-
determination—did not mean individual license, but rather individual
empowerment to contribute one’s own capacities and perspectives to the
search for a common good.162 In the course of this self-reflective work, all
citizens would be engaged in what was essentially a learning process, a
kind of civic education during which some perspectives might prove
more valuable than others.163 Accordingly, neither the intensity of an
individual’s viewpoint nor the sheer quantitative force of a majority’s
viewpoint had the authority to determine the common good. Only well-
administered processes of public deliberation and institutional experi-
ment could decide between the plurality of individual viewpoints and
thus legitimately and effectively steer the ship of state.164 In this context,
160. See, e.g., Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life 207 (1909) (“Democracy
does not mean merely government by the people, or majority rule, or universal suffrage.
All of these political forms or devices are a part of its necessary organization but the chief
advantage such methods of organization have is their tendency to promote some salutary
and formative purpose.”).
161. Indeed, Lippmann was intimately involved in the development of Wilson’s
Fourteen Points, which included an emphasis on self-determination. Stears, supra note 1,
at 132 (discussing involvement of Lippman). For an excellent analysis of intellectual
network around the New Republic and its role in World War I-era state building, see id. at
52–87, 127–67.
162. See John Dewey & James Tufts, Ethics 472 (1908) (calling for “generalized
individualism: which takes into account the real good and effective—not merely formal—
freedom of every social member”); Eisenach, supra note 1, at 194 (describing Progressive
view of individual rights as providing “resources necessary for effective participation in
democratic society”); Stears, supra note 1, at 16 (describing Progressives’ “radically
socialized account of human nature” that “combine[d] the demands of liberty and
community”).
163. See Stears, supra note 1, at 81–85 (describing “educative” character of
Progressives’ “notion of democracy”); Westbrook, supra note 14, at 164–94 (describing
John Dewey’s account of relationship between education and democracy).
164. See Graber, supra note 2, at 87 (“Addams, Dewey, Brandeis, and others
maintained that the scientific method would not function efficiently and the community
would not be fully unified unless the polity encouraged citizens to express a wide variety of
opinions on matters of public interest.”); Stears, supra note 1, at 83 (describing
Progressive search for “set of government institutions that could combine a system of
democratic participation which would be truly educative in its effect with a system of
efficient and expert administration capable of identifying and pursuing an actual common
good”). At the heart of Progressive thought was a belief in the convergence of the
rationally true and the politically good, what Robert Gordon has characterized as a belief
in the “immanent rationality of the social order.” Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, in Professions and Professional
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individual self-determination ensured a degree of pluralism within the
public sphere, but it also assumed—even required—participation in the
public sphere.
Majoritarian decisions that undermined self-determination—that
entirely excluded certain perspectives from public deliberation and insti-
tutional experiment—risked two harms: First, such decisions deprived
the polity of ongoing exposure to a diversity of views and thus short-
circuited public learning; second, they constrained the citizenship of
individuals who held such views, forcing them outside the public
sphere.165 This second harm—the exclusion of individuals from the pub-
lic sphere—was not only a problem for the excluded individuals. For the
Progressives, participation in public deliberation had a disciplining effect
on individuals, exposing them to social norms and forms of reasoning
essential to responsible democratic life.166 The exclusion of individuals
with supposedly irresponsible views risked exacerbating the threat such
individuals posed to democracy.167
Ideologies in America 95 (Gerald Geison ed., 1983). It was this very refusal to recognize a
distinction between the true and the good that led Progressives also to deny any
fundamental tension between bureaucracy and democracy, expert administration and
popular participation in governance. This denial would lie at the heart of Felix
Frankfurter’s innovative approach to the problem of conscientious objection, as well as his
later work on administrative law. It also helps explain the ongoing disagreement between
legal scholars as to whether Progressive civil libertarians such as Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Frankfurter’s younger colleague at Harvard Law School, hewed to an epistemic
(“marketplace of ideas”) or political (“democracy-enhancing”) theory of speech
protection. Compare G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 137–38 (2000)
(emphasizing epistemic, marketplace-of-ideas model), with Rabban, supra note 2, at 298
(emphasizing political, democracy-enhancement model).
165. For a representative, contemporary statement of such Progressive pluralism, see
John Dewey, The Principle of Nationality (1917), reprinted in 10 The Collected Works of
John Dewey: The Middle Works 288 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 2008) (“[S]ocial institutions
depend upon cultural diversity among separate units. In so far as people are all alike,
there is no give and take among them. And it is better to give and take.”).
166. See Eisenach, supra note 1, at 195 (explaining how Progressive efforts to
empower individuals to participate in democracy “entail[ed] expectations of more social
responsibility and greater self-discipline”); Stears, supra note 1, at 80 (describing New
Republic editor Walter Weyl’s belief that “[b]y encouraging individuals to think through
problems and by forcing them to be responsible for their own decisions, it would be
possible to transform the ‘crowd’ into a knowledgeable and reliable ‘public’”).
167. Even those Progressives most critical of state power, such as Randolph Bourne,
acknowledged this positive aspect of public coercion. In February 1918, Bourne himself
wrote to Frankfurter on behalf of a pacifist musician who, upon his induction into the
army, had been hospitalized as a “constitutional psycopath [sic].” Letter from Randolph
Bourne to Felix Frankfurter 1 (Feb. 21, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Arguing that such a diagnosis was simply “the evasion of doctors who are stumped by a
healthy, non-religious, non-fanatical, and courageous pacifism,” Bourne condemned “this
illogical position” in which his friend found himself. Id. “If he is a ‘constitutional
psycopath,’” Bourne continued, “he should be discharged as unfit for the army; if he is
sound, they have no business to keep him in the hospital. If his conscientious objections
are not accepted, then he should be frankly dealt with.” Id. What Bourne wanted was not
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The problem posed by the treatment of conscientious objectors was
thus a democratic one. To be sure, the Selective Service Act was enacted
by congressional majorities and would be found constitutional by the
Supreme Court. But by treating those individuals who refused to fight on
religious, moral, or political grounds as disobedient soldiers, the Act
risked undermining their experience of self-determination. Categorized
as subordinates who refused an order, not as citizens with dissenting
views about the common good, conscientious objectors would be shut
out of deliberation altogether; they would lack both the opportunity to
express their normative visions and the opportunity to have those visions
subjected to reasoned correction. Frankfurter’s memorandum called for
a novel administrative process capable of acknowledging the individual
conscientious objectors’ views. In such a scheme, rights of individual
conscience functioned as occasions for the collective construction of a
pluralistic state.168
B. Frankfurter’s Memorandum as Law and Policy
Frankfurter’s approach to the problem of conscientious objection
departed markedly from legal opinions issued by military officials. While
those opinions hewed closely to the language of the Selective Service Act,
Frankfurter began with the complaints of those nonsectarian individuals
who had lost out during the Act’s drafting and who now asked the
Administration to innovate beyond the statutory language. By proceeding
in this inductive fashion, Frankfurter approached the “Treatment of
Conscientious Objectors” primarily as an administrative and political
problem rather than a question of statutory interpretation. Rather than
engaging with the question of whether the statute was simply silent on
the question of nonsectarian objectors or explicit in its failure to accom-
modate them, Frankfurter assumed a reserve of executive authority to
resolve tensions between antiwar beliefs and efficient administration.
Referring to the “mass of communications which has poured in on
the President and the Secretary of War by and on behalf of Conscientious
Objectors,”169 Frankfurter discerned four categories of objectors that
each required separate treatment: “unconscientious” objectors, whose
objections were insincere; sectarian objectors offered noncombatant duty
total emancipation for his friend but for the War Department to “meet his case squarely.”
Id. Bourne concluded his message to Frankfurter by praising the “great piece of work you
have been doing on the labor situation” and hailing him as “the liberal hope.” Id. For
Bourne’s views on the question of war, conscription, and dissent, see generally Randolph
S. Bourne, War and the Intellectuals: Essays, 1915–1919 (1964).
168. Frankfurter’s vision exemplified the redefinition of rights and citizenship that
Eldon Eisenach finds at the core of the Progressive project: “To link personal freedom to
national democracy—a substantive and inclusive public good—not only placed issues of
rights within a framework of national institutions, it redefined the idea of citizenship on
those terms as well.” Eisenach, supra note 1, at 221.
169. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
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by Section 4 of the Selective Service Act; “individualistic” conscientious
objectors who did not belong to a pacifist religious sect but who had sin-
cere political, moral, or religious objections to fighting; and “absolutists,”
all those objectors who refused to perform even noncombatant service.170
The recognition of “individualistic conscientious objectors” most directly
responded to the repeated calls from Baldwin and the AUAM for
administrative innovation. These individualistic objectors possessed what
Rep. Edward Keating had called the “unorganized conscience”—a con-
science formed not by institutional affiliation but by individual reflec-
tion.171 Frankfurter’s religiously neutral definition, “men whose
conscience honestly resists military service,” indicated that the category
allowed for both religious and nonreligious grounds of objection.172
What could be done, Frankfurter asked, with these “true Conscientious
Objectors whose honest convictions are unsupported by the beliefs of a
sect or organization”?173
Frankfurter noted that the statute neglected these nonsectarian
objectors: “Congress in the Selective Draft Law dealt only with the latter,”
that is, objectors whose “honest convictions” were supported “by the
beliefs of a sect or organization.”174 But he then presented a prudential
argument for giving administrative recognition to nonsectarians anyway.
The sectarian provision in the draft law, Frankfurter explained, “does not
answer the administrative or military problem of the use to which certain
men called to the colors are to be put in view of their peculiar fitness or
unfitness.”175 In this sober sentence, Frankfurter brushed aside the statu-
tory and structural arguments presented by Crowder and Kuhn that had
denied the President’s authority to recognize the individual conscience.
Yet Frankfurter’s pivot from statutory interpretation to administra-
tive problem-solving itself implied an argument from institutional
competence and the separation of powers. The military, as directed by
the Commander in Chief, had its own set of problems and needs; its task
was to decide how best to use drafted men according to their “peculiar
fitness or unfitness.” Although the Selective Service Act established the
draft, the implementation of the draft—including its relationship to the
individual conscience—was necessarily left to administrators and, signifi-
cantly, civilian administrators, culminating in the President himself.
Thus, although Frankfurter emphasized practicalities, his practical
problem—what to do with “true” conscientious objectors unrecognized
by statute—rested upon a legal assumption: that the category “true
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 58–72 and accompanying text (discussing efforts to include
nonsectarian conscience objector exemption in draft bill).
172. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Conscientious Objector” could be determined by an administrative
rather than legislative decision. He reasoned: “Once assume a true
Conscientious Objector and he is as ill-suited for combative military
service as a sectarian Conscientious Objector.”176 But why, Crowder might
have asked, “assume a true Conscientious Objector” at all? Crowder and
Kuhn had seen fit only to assume what Congress had legislated—that
sectarians were to be offered noncombatant service. Frankfurter instead
conducted an independent executive review of a policy problem: What
should be done with drafted men—and their vocal, nongovernmental
supporters—who had objections to fighting? Having conducted the
review, Frankfurter suggested the construction of a new, pluralistic legal
category—the “true Conscientious Objector.”
The question then remained how to treat this pluralistic genus,
given that Congress had only provided for one of its species, the sec-
tarian. Frankfurter once again put forward a policy argument for offering
all conscientious objectors—whether sectarian or nonsectarian—
noncombatant duty, despite the congressional statute’s refusal to do so:
“[A]s a matter of military discipline, merely as a decision as to the best
use to be made of the human material, it would seem that all those who
are attested true Conscientious Objectors should be treated as one class
in the disposition that is to be made of them.”177 Frankfurter’s policy
argument both understated the legal work he was doing and reflected a
distinctly Progressive approach to social problems.
Legally speaking, Frankfurter claimed autonomy for the executive in
the realm of conscientious-objector policymaking. By framing the ques-
tion of conscientious objection as a question of how best to discipline
conscripts, Frankfurter implied that the answer lay beyond congressional
decisions about how to raise a conscript army. Socially speaking,
Frankfurter framed the problem of dissent as a practical problem of
manpower management—what was the “the best use to be made of the
human material,” including that “human material” resistant to certain
forms of legal ordering? In keeping with Progressive lawyers’ tendency to
search for the “immanent rationality of the social order,”178 Frankfurter
saw the challenge of conscientious objection as susceptible to rational
calculation. At the same time, his approach was not devoid of normative
content—within the phrase “best use . . . of the human material” lurked
a Progressive theory of political morality, in which individual and group
differences were valuable to the extent they contributed to an overarch-
ing public interest.179
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Gordon, supra note 164, at 95.
179. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Progressive views on self-
determination and individualism in relation to administrative state).
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Having asserted the need and implicit justification for a more
accommodating policy toward conscientious objectors, Frankfurter faced
two further questions: how to separate the insincere, “unconscientious”
objectors from all categories of sincere objectors (sectarian, nonsec-
tarian, and absolutist) and how to determine the particular noncombat-
ant service that sincere objectors should be asked to perform.
Frankfurter explained that although Congress had provided no proce-
dures for a particularized inquiry into the sincerity and character of indi-
vidual conscientious objections, there would be nothing out of the ordi-
nary about such procedures: “The problem is an inquiry such as the law
has to make in the settlement of many issues; namely, an inquiry into the
existence of certain beliefs and certain feelings.”180 To be sure, this task
would require a “sympathetic and sophisticated” legal temperament.181
Yet Frankfurter was certain that the “right kind of lawyers” could handle
it.182
Accordingly, Frankfurter proposed the establishment of a board of
three such lawyers with the twin mandate of testing the sincerity of each
objector and determining the kinds of noncombatant duty for which the
sincere objectors were best suited. As to the board’s exact composition,
Frankfurter suggested that “headed by some one like Judge Amidon of
North Dakota, or Judge Mack of Chicago, with a representative of the
Provost Marshal General’s Office, and one more member, [it] could
handle the situation expeditiously and adequately.”183 Charles Fremont
Amidon was a stalwart Progressive and nascent civil libertarian who
“deplor[ed] . . . the surrender to hysteria of judges on the federal bench”
in enforcing the Espionage Act.184 Mack would be even more critical of
Espionage Act enforcement. One advantage to the use of “[s]uch a
committee, wisely selected,” Frankfurter explained, would be political:
such a committee would “serve as the best assurance to the liberal friends
of the Administration that the matter is being adequately dealt with.”185
As to the exact kinds of noncombatant service such a politically cor-
rect committee might offer sincere objectors, Frankfurter recommended
an evolving, pragmatic approach.186 Suitable forms of service would
depend in part on “how many Conscientious Objectors the sifting
process will finally disclose,” and thus “[t]he problem should be worked
out practically and not by abstract speculation.”187 Wilson and Baker
180. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id. at 1–2.
183. Id. at 3.
184. Murphy, supra note 3, at 203; see also Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at
162–64 (describing Judge Amidon’s Progressive philosophy).
185. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2–3.
186. Id. at 2–3.
187. Id. at 2.
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would indeed wait several months before deciding what forms of
noncombatant service to make available.188
Finally, Frankfurter turned to the question of the “absolutists,” those
men who would refuse even the noncombatant service offered to them
by the ad hoc committee. In keeping with the Progressive worldview,
Frankfurter insisted that no individual could simply claim to be free of
obligations to the state—the absolutist, like any other citizen, lived in
interdependence with society: “[R]espect as one must the rigor of their
simple logic in a complicated world, it will not do to discharge them of
all responsibility in a society with whose advantages and sacrifices they
are inextricably bound up.”189 Impressed by the absolutists’ zeal for self-
determination, however, Frankfurter condemned the idea of harshly
punishing them.190 He recommended instead that they be “convicted
and confined” at Fort Leavenworth, “but under conditions which in
effect would be the performance of noncombatant duties.”191 As with
most of Frankfurter’s proposals, the Wilson Administration would eventu-
ally follow this policy.
Taken as a whole, Frankfurter’s memorandum was a pathbreaking
document. Its two main premises—the equality of individualist and sec-
tarian objectors, and the authority of the executive to recognize this
equality despite the distinction Congress had made between them—were
premises explicitly rejected by the previous memoranda that Baker and
Wilson had received from their advisors. Frankfurter’s vision of a single,
three-member civilian-military board empowered to evaluate the sincerity
and specific demands of each individual conscience was also novel. This
committee would offer each objector an opportunity to express his nor-
mative commitments and to seek forms of alternative service that could
best reflect them. Frankfurter’s policy thus treated the problem of con-
science as an opportunity for dissenters from government policy and
government officials to communicate with one another in a responsive
fashion.
Third Assistant Secretary of War Frederick Keppel later hailed this
policy as distinguishing American “Democracy” from the “Prussian
practices” of the nation’s authoritarian, militarist enemy.192 Yet the mean-
ing of American “Democracy” was itself in a state of flux during the war,
and the conscientious-objector policy supported by Frankfurter and
Keppel embodied a particularly modern and controversial democratic
188. See infra Part II.C (describing Baker and Wilson’s gradual implementation).
189. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 3–4.
190. Id. at 4 (“[T]he barbarous incarceration of criminals is fast becoming obsolete
in practice, as it is anachronistic in principle . . . . This subordination of the punitive
element especially deserves to be kept in mind in dealing with the absolutists.”). General
Kuhn had proposed punitive treatment for all nonsectarian objectors, including but not
limited to absolutists. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
191. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 4.
192. U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 48.
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vision. This vision acknowledged both the legitimacy of marginal beliefs
and identities, and the legitimacy of a strong and centralized administra-
tive apparatus. These two features of the War Department’s account of
“Democracy”—individual rights to expression and identity and expansive
administrative authority—were inextricably linked by Frankfurter’s legal
justification for the conscientious-objector policy.
As Frankfurter argued in his September 1917 memorandum, and as
Secretary of War Baker would reiterate the following autumn,193 the legal
basis for the War Department’s democracy-enhancing conscientious-
objector policy lay in an appeal to civilian executive authority over mili-
tary manpower management. The provision of democracy-enhancing
“rights of individual conscience”194 was thus a matter of administrative
policymaking, not legislative will or purely military perceptions of expe-
dience. Furthermore, the function of these rights of individual conscience
was both to encourage democratic deliberation and to sustain and legiti-
mate the administration of the draft. Since Frankfurter and like-minded
Progressives embraced conscription itself as a peculiarly democratic ap-
proach to building a powerful warfare state,195 they were not inclined to
see any paradox or hypocrisy in an effort to expand democratic engage-
ment within the draft. To the contrary, rights of individual conscience
could both foster democratic engagement and, in doing so, strengthen
wartime state-building efforts.
C. Secretary of War Baker and President Wilson’s Orders
Neither the archives nor the available secondary literature contain
evidence of Secretary Baker’s or President Wilson’s direct response to
Frankfurter’s memorandum. Yet the procedures for dealing with consci-
entious objectors that Wilson’s War Department would implement over
the next year reflected the spirit—and often the letter—of Frankfurter’s
recommendations.196
193. See infra notes 305–313 and accompanying text (discussing Secretary Baker’s
defense of conscientious-objector policy on commander-in-chief grounds).
194. Press Release, Comm. on Pub. Info., For Release in Morning Papers 1 (May 30,
1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
195. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 128 (discussing Progressive support for
conscription as embodying principles of democracy); John A. Thompson, Reformers and
War: American Progressive Publicists and the First World War 221–22 (1987) (same).
196. In implementing these procedures, Wilson and Baker were not bowing to a pro-
conscientious-objector bloc in Congress. Over the course of the war, the War Department
and the President received scattered congressional complaints of abuse of conscientious
objectors—but these generally came from the representatives of sectarian constituents
who were covered, if not satisfied, by the original legislative accommodation. See, e.g.,
Letter from Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal Gen., to W.W. Griest, U.S. Representative
(Sept. 13, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (addressing complaints about
treatment of “Mennonite, Quaker, Dunkard and Amish sects”); Letter from W.W. Griest,
U.S. Representative, to Woodrow Wilson, President 1 (Aug. 27, 1917) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (complaining about treatment of “nonresistant sects”); Letter from
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Less than a month after Frankfurter sent his memorandum to Baker,
signs of a policy in harmony with it began to emerge. On October 10,
1917, Baker issued a confidential order to all generals in charge of train-
ing camps.197 The order instructed them to “segregate the conscientious
objectors in their divisions and to place them under supervision of
instructors who shall be specially selected with a view of insuring that
these men will be handled with tact and consideration.”198 Baker also
ordered that objectors were “not to be treated as violating military laws”
or subjected “to the penalties of the Articles of War.”199 Instead, seem-
ingly disobedient objectors “will be quietly ignored and they will be
treated with kindly consideration.”200 The October 10 order finished with
a call for secrecy: “Under no circumstances are the instructions
contained in the foregoing to be given to the newspapers.”201 Publicity of
lenient treatment might have encouraged “unconscientious” objection as
well as attacks from the Administration’s right-wing critics.202
By the middle of November, Baker provided additional evidence of
his commitment to Frankfurter’s vision. In a letter to Mennonite leaders
who were seeking greater contact with their drafted congregants at army
camps, Baker signaled a striking divergence from congressional policy.
He announced to the Mennonites that “‘[t]he Government of the United
A.W. Gullion, Lieutenant Colonel, to George Chamberlain, U.S. Senator (Sept. 26, 1917)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (advising Chamberlain that Christadelphians were
entitled to noncombatant service within “Military Establishment,” not total exemption).
The Frankfurterian procedures that the World War I executive branch established did
little for these groups. See infra notes 203--206 and accompanying text (describing Baker’s
reversal of earlier pro-sectarian policy). Instead, Baker and Wilson’s policy more closely
tracked the concerns of those whom Frankfurter had called the Administration’s “liberal
friends”—Progressives committed to a pluralistic vision of national citizenship, not
outright exemption from national obligation. See Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note
9, at 3.
197. Memorandum from H.G. Learnard, Adjutant Gen., U.S. Army, to Commanding
Gens. of all Nat’l Army and Nat’l Guard Div. Camps (Oct. 10, 1917), reprinted in U.S. War
Dept., Statement, supra note 11, at 37.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Although the October 10 segregation order was covert, Roger Baldwin clearly
knew about it. On October 20, he reported to Baker several incidents in which objectors
had not been treated as leniently as the order required. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin,
Dir., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, to Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 53 (Oct.
20, 1917) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Baker responded a week later, noting
that he had also received such reports. Showing a faith in military goodwill that would be
tried as the administration of conscientious objectors evolved, Baker ascribed these reports
to “a momentary failure to execute in the proper spirit the orders of this Department with
regard to Conscientious Objectors. My investigations, however, always lead me to the
conclusion that the Commanding Generals are thoroughly anxious to solve this problem
in a helpful way . . . .” Letter from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Roger N.
Baldwin, Dir., Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau 55 (Oct. 28, 1917) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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States is not dealing in the matter, and cannot deal, with organized
religious bodies, but must of necessity deal with individuals.’”203 Baker’s
stance was a “direct reversal of earlier policies.”204 Only some six months
earlier, Congress had declared that the government of the United States
would only deal with members of “organized religious bodies” that had
doctrinal objections to combat service and not individuals with idiosyn-
cratic objections.205 Baker’s letter to the Mennonites revealed the impact
of the legal and political vision that lay behind Frankfurter’s policy
recommendation, a vision that Baker apparently shared. While
Progressives like Frankfurter prized pluralism, they believed that
individuals should be first and foremost citizens of the nation, their
allegiance to the national state unmediated by sectarian attachments.206
On December 19, 1917, Baker finally granted formal—if provi-
sional—recognition to Frankfurter’s “individualistic” objectors. The
Secretary of War directed all camp commanders “that until further
instructions on the subject are issued ‘personal scruples against war’
should be considered as constituting ‘conscientious objections’ and such
persons should be treated in the same manner as other ‘conscientious
objectors’ under the instructions contained in confidential letter from
this office dated October 10, 1917.”207 This order identified a new cate-
gory of legitimate objector, marked by the religion-neutral and
nonorganizational language of “personal scruples against war.” Now, any
individual professing such personal scruples—regardless of their spiritual
203. Capozzola, supra note 6, at 71 (quoting Newton Baker).
204. Id.
205. Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, §4, 40 Stat. 76, 78, repealed by Act June 15,
1917, ch. 29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217 (providing compulsory military service should cease
four months after proclamation of peace by President); see also supra notes 58–78 and
accompanying text (discussing Congressional debate surrounding individual, unorganized
conscientious objectors).
206. For a perceptive analysis of this vision of national citizenship, see Stears, supra
note 1, at 61–70; see also Eisenach, supra note 1, at 207 (“[D]emocracy now required
national, not regional-local ‘embodied selves’; national, not local, patriotism and
citizenship; and national, not party-local, institutions of civic mobilization and political
education.”); Ernst, Common Laborers, supra note 10, at 62–79 (contrasting two early-
twentieth-century responses to pluralism, one focused on the preservation of group
autonomy, the other on gradual construction of common good). This vision helps explain
Frankfurter’s reluctance to excuse sectarian Jehovah’s Witnesses from saluting the
American flag during the 1940s. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600
(1940) (Frankfurter, J.) (holding requirement school children salute flag does not violate
First Amendment), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646–671 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Richard Danzig,
Justice Frankfurter’s Opinions in the Flag Salute Cases: Blending Logic and Psychologic in
Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 675, 705--11 (1984) (describing
Frankfurter’s approach to relationship between marginal beliefs and democratic reason).
207. Memorandum from H.G. Learnard, Adjutant Gen., U.S. Army, to Commanding
Gens. of All Nat’l Army and Nat’l Guard Camps Except Camp Grant (Dec. 19, 1917),
reprinted in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 37.
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or political pedigree—would be entitled to special treatment from his
commanding officers.208
Such special treatment meant far more than politeness. The
October 10 order had commanded that objectors should “not be treated
as violating military laws.”209 In conjunction with the December 19 order,
this language meant that a man without any certificate from his local
draft board could profess personal scruples against fighting and thereby
exempt himself from military prosecution for refusing combat duty,
pending further as-yet-unspecified administrative review. The December
19 order thus elided the distinction Congress had carefully introduced
between the sectarian objector and the “unorganized conscience.”210 In
place of this distinction stood a new regime designed to protect the
“individualistic” conscientious objectors whom Frankfurter’s memo had
defined and defended.211
Although Baker’s autumn orders moved administrative policy in the
direction of Frankfurter’s memorandum, opinion within the Executive
Branch on the matter of the individual conscience remained unsettled.
Two days after Baker’s first, October 10 order, Major John Henry
Wigmore circulated a startling set of recommendations about what to do
with nonsectarian objectors. Back in September, Wigmore had sternly
rebuked Roger Baldwin for trying to include him—as well as
Frankfurter—in a civilian-military committee tasked with developing a
more accommodating conscientious-objector policy.212 On October 12,
Wigmore issued his own suggestions about what the law required.213 In it,
he carefully distinguished between legitimate objectors “recognized by
the Act of May 18” and the nonsectarian “conscientious objectors” who
had “no status except that of garrison prisoners.”214
Turning to the treatment of the nonsectarian objector, Wigmore
proposed that upon such a man’s refusal of any order (for instance to
carry a gun), the commanding officer should immediately arrest him and
208. As William D. Palmer has noted, Baker’s order “was the first—and, until the
Supreme Court interpreted the exemption broadly beginning in the 1960s, the only—
example of the federal government granting an exemption to conscientious objectors
whose objections may not have been based on religious belief.” William D. Palmer, Time
to Exorcise Another Ghost from the Vietnam War: Restructuring the In-Service
Conscientious Objector Program, 140 Mil. L. Rev. 179, 184 (1993).
209. Memorandum from L.A. Dewey, Adjutant Gen., U.S. Army, to Commanding
Gens. of All Nat’l Army and Nat’l Guard Camps Except Camp Grant (Oct. 10, 1917),
reprinted in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 37.
210. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text (describing congressional
debate).
211. See supra Part II.B (describing Frankfurter’s approach to “individualistic”
objectors).
212. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing Wigmore’s reaction to
Baldwin).
213. Memorandum from John Henry Wigmore, supra note 134, at 1.
214. Id. at 4
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hold a “summary court [martial].”215 Wigmore vividly detailed the appro-
priate next steps: “The officer finds him guilty . . . and imposes 1 week
confinement.”216 After the week, the officer should give the disobedient
soldier the same order and, if he still refuses, another week of confine-
ment, this time in solitary.217 The isolation should be total: “Forbid any
one to speak to them.”218 When not actively confined, the nonsectarian
objector should be assigned harsh forms of labor: “It must be physically
exhausting . . . . It must have a stigma.”219 For Wigmore, only this regimen
of prosecution, confinement, isolation, and exhaustion could determine
the sincerity of the nonsectarian objector—not any committee of
lawyers.220
Not only did Wigmore’s memorandum differ penologically from
Frankfurter’s, recommending hard labor and isolation rather than mod-
ern “reformative” methods, it also differed legally. Wigmore was clear
that only sectarian objectors were “lawful.”221 Nonsectarian objectors
deserved harsh treatment precisely because their objections to combat
service were unlawful according to the Selective Service Act. Wigmore
was not the lone hardliner. In a January memorandum to Baker, who was
worried about the continuing imprisonment of nonsectarian objectors at
some camps, Provost Marshal General Crowder stated simply that
“individuals, as distinct from members of well-recognized religious sects,”
are not “entitled to treatment as noncombatants.”222 It would take the
President’s own intervention to change Crowder’s tune, but this inter-
vention was still some months away.
When Wilson did reach a decision about what to do with individu-
alstic conscientious objectors, he would do so with the knowledge that,
according to the Supreme Court, the draft’s narrow accommodation of
conscience was constitutional. On January 7, 1918, a unanimous Court
rejected the arguments presented in six separate cases involving political
radicals who had refused to register for the draft themselves or had
induced others not to register in violation of the Selective Service Act.223
The appellants’ briefs raised a variety of constitutional objections to the
draft.224 Harry Weinberger, attorney for one of the radicals and a mem-
215. Id. at 1.
216. Id. at 2.
217. Id. at 3.
218. Id. at 4.
219. Id. (emphasis in original).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Memorandum from Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal Gen., U.S. Army, to
Newton Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (Jan. 16, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
223. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 366, 387–90 (1918).
224. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 214 (“[T]he major part of the argument turned on
a contention that the Draft Act was unconstitutional, since it violated the Thirteenth
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ber of the AUAM, focused on First Amendment infirmities.225 He argued
that Section 4 of the Selective Service Act—which offered noncombatant
duty only to religious sectarians—violated both the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses.226 Walter Nelles, attorney for the National Civil
Liberties Bureau (NCLB), made the same argument in an amicus
brief.227
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Edward White was supremely
unimpressed with the First Amendment challenge to Congress’s sectarian
exemption: “[W]e pass without anything but statement the proposition
that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free
exercise . . . resulted from the exemption clauses of the act . . . because
we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more.”228
This decision came as no surprise: The Selective Draft Law Cases
“announced nothing new. Every single court that heard a challenge to
the draft denied it.”229 But Weinberger’s First Amendment challenge was
particularly “off the wall.”230 The freedom of conscience of nonsectarian
and secular objectors would be secured through administrative construc-
tion long before it received legislative or judicial recognition.231
On March 20, 1918, President Wilson advanced this construction,
issuing a lengthy Executive Order that formalized an administration of
conscientious objectors starkly different from that envisioned by
Congress.232 The timing of Wilson’s formal intervention in the conscien-
tious-objection debate is striking. The day after it was published, German
Amendment, . . . the First Amendment, . . . and . . . the Fifth Amendment due process
clause.”).
225. See Walker, supra note 3, at 18–23 (describing Weinberg’s involvement in
AUAM and his legal work on behalf of draft resisters).
226. Murphy, supra note 3, at 214; Walker, supra note 3, at 18–19.
227. Id.
228. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 389–90.
229. Capozzola, supra note 6, at 30.
230. For “off the wall” constitutional arguments, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in the
Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo. L.J. 173, 181 (2001).
231. Congress first accommodated religious nonsectarians in the 1940 Selective
Training and Service Act. See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g),
54 Stat. 885, 889 (“Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training or belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in war in any form.”) Only during the Vietnam War era did the
Supreme Court interpret this statutory provision to cover secular objections to war. Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176,
184–87 (1965). Even then, the Court avoided the constitutional question. Welsh, 398 U.S.
at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing majorities in Welsh and Seeger exceeded
permissible limits of constitutional avoidance in construing statute).
232. Exec. Order No. 2,823 (Mar. 20, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
see also U.S. Dep’t. of War, General Order No. 28 (Mar. 23, 1918), reprinted in U.S. War
Dep’t., Statement, supra note 11, at 38–39 (publishing President Wilson’s Executive Order
of March 20, 1918 to Army ).
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forces launched Operation Michael, a massive strike on the Western
front.233 The goal of this nearly apocalyptic show of force was to break the
Allied line before the bulk of fresh American troops could cross the
Atlantic.234 Desperate British leaders appealed directly to the American
people to hasten the muster.235 Yet these events did not lead to a
reconsideration of the accommodating approach to conscientious objec-
tion that the March 20 Order announced. At the height of the World
War, the War Department pushed ahead with its civil-libertarian response
to antiwar belief within the draft.
The purpose of the March 20 Order was four-fold. First, the Order
designated three types of noncombatant duty: service in the Medical
Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Engineer Corps.236 Second, the
Executive Order made permanent the equality between sectarians and
nonsectarians first established by Baker’s December 19 order:
Persons ordered to report for military service under the above
Act who have (a) been certified by their Local Boards to be
members of a religious sect or organization as defined in
Section 4 of said Act; or (b) who object to participating in war
because of conscientious scruples but have failed to receive certificates as
members of a religious sect or organization from their Local Board, will
be assigned to noncombatant military service . . . .237
The dichotomous structure of this language makes clear just how con-
scious Baker and Wilson were of extending the definition of legitimate
objection beyond what Congress had authorized. Wilson’s Order meant
that Frankfurter’s “individualistic” objectors were entitled to noncombat-
ant duty.
The Order’s third purpose was to institute a new method for certify-
ing conscientious objectors.238 This method downgraded the importance
of certificates issued by local and district draft boards. These draft boards
had been administering the Selective Service Act as interpreted by the
Provost Marshal General’s office—issuing certificates only to those men
who could prove that they were members of pacifist religious organiza-
tions.239 Now, however, Wilson ordered that “whenever any person is
assigned to noncombatant service by reason of his religious or other
conscientious scruples, he shall be given a certificate stating the assignment
and reason therefor, and such certificate shall thereafter be respected as
233. Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 151, at 170; Martin Kitchen, The German
Offensives of 1918, at 68 (2d ed. 2005).
234. Kitchen, supra note 233, at 17 (noting one argument against defensive strategy
was “[b]y the summer of 1918 [Germany] would be facing a large, fresh and excellently
equipped American army”).
235. Kennedy, Over Here, supra note 151, at 170–171.
236. Exec. Order No. 2,823, supra note 232, at 1.
237. Id. (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. Chambers, supra note 6, at 181.
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preventing the transfer of such persons from such noncombatant to
combatant service . . . .”240 Thus, the President’s order deferred the vital
moment of certification from the draft boards to the conscript’s arrival in
camp, where he would deal with military men operating directly under
the Commander in Chief’s authority. This new certification process
ensured that the determination of the legitimate conscience would occur
under presidential purview, as Frankfurter’s memorandum had sug-
gested it should.
Having established a new apparatus for the administration of
conscientious objectors, the Executive Order also rendered this appa-
ratus retroactive. The fourth purpose of the Order was to empower the
Secretary of War to “review the sentences and findings of courts-martial
heretofore held of persons who come within any of the classes herein
described, and bring to the attention of the President for remedy . . .
sentences and judgments found at variance with the provisions
hereof.”241
The legal innovations that Wilson’s Order represented were not lost
on nongovernmental advocates of the individual conscience. On April 2,
Roger Baldwin wrote to President Wilson, expressing the NCLB’s
“appreciation” for his Executive Order: “Your order not only liberally
and sympathetically meets the issue, but it is particularly gratifying
because it transcends the narrow limitations fixed by Congress, and
promises to undo the injustices already committed by courts-martial.”242
As Frankfurter had reassured Baldwin in September, “I am full of
confidence the thing will work out all right.”243
Days later, Frankfurter himself praised the new regime to a would-be
conscientious objector. By this point in the war, Frankfurter had moved
on to another aspect of the administration of dissent: labor conflict
within defense-related industries. But even as he faced this new chal-
lenge, Frankfurter had kept abreast of the conscientious-objector situa-
tion. On April 9, Frankfurter responded to the young pacifist lawyer
Joseph Kline, who had written seeking a way out of military service, even
those forms of noncombatant duty made available by the March 20
Order.244 Noting that Kline himself had been “just enough to
characterize the President’s recent proclamation on conscientious
objectors very fair,” Frankfurter explained that this was a “conclusion
240. Exec. Order No. 2,823, supra note 232, at 2.
241. Id.
242. Letter from Roger N. Baldwin, Sec’y, Am. Union Against Militarism, to
Woodrow Wilson, President 1 (Apr. 2, 1918) [hereinafter April 2, 1918 Letter from
Baldwin to Wilson] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
243. Frankfurter, Second Letter to Baldwin, supra note 139.
244. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Joseph Kline
(Apr. 8, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Letter from Joseph Kline to Felix
Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. 1–2 (Apr. 4, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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shared by the National Civil Liberties Bureau which says that the
President’s regulations ‘constitute a fair and liberal solution of the
problem.’”245 Since Kline had expressed doubt whether the range of non-
combatant duty described in the order would truly be made available,
Frankfurter assured him that “[e]very precaution is sought to be taken
for a just administration” and reasoned that “[s]omewhere or other in
some field of activities outlined by the President your past experience
and your attitude ought to find play.”246 Frankfurter’s assurances were not
simply a brush-off. Later that month, he followed up with the Adjutant
General’s office to ensure that Kline was being treated in accordance
with the new regime.247
Military officials also acknowledged the impact of Wilson’s Order,
though they often did so reluctantly. As late as January 16, 1918, Provost
Marshal General Crowder had insisted to Baker that nonsectarians were
not “entitled to treatment as noncombatants.”248 A month after Wilson’s
Order appeared, however, Crowder offered a new, humbler analysis of
his own authority. On April 29, when Crowder received a question from a
local administrator about how objectors could qualify for noncombatant
duty,249 Crowder replied that “[b]efore induction a registrant may apply
to his Local Board for a certificate of noncombatant service . . . . The
question of how a man already inducted is to obtain a certificate
restricting his transfer to combatant service does not come under the
jurisdiction of this office.”250 Crowder’s analysis of his own jurisdiction
and that of the Selective Service Act now mirrored the reasoning of
Frankfurter’s memo. Frankfurter had argued that the question of what
kind of treatment men should receive after induction was to be resolved
not by interpreting legislative language but by consulting the needs of the
military as determined by the Commander in Chief.251 Wilson’s public
Order operationalized Frankfurter’s arguments, and Crowder responded
245. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Joseph Kline, supra note 244, at 1.
246. Id.
247. See Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Adjutant Gen. 1
(Apr. 18, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (strongly suggesting “Private Kline
[be] segregated in accordance with the Secretary’s instructions, relative to the treatment
of conscientious objectors”); Memorandum from H.P. McCain, Adjutant Gen., to Newton
D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (Apr. 22, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting Kline’s commanding general “has been directed to see that the instructions
contained in Presidential Proclamation on Conscientious Objectors are carefully complied
with in [Kline’s] case”).
248. Memorandum from Enoch H. Crowder to Newton Baker, supra note 222 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
249. Letter from B.T. Shuler, Postmaster, to Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
War 1 (Apr. 23, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
250. Record from Letter from Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal Gen., to B.T.
Shuler 1 (Apr. 29, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
251. See supra Part II.B (describing Frankfurter’s approach to problem of
conscientious objectors in face of limited Congressional accommodation).
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by retreating to Frankfurter’s separate-jurisdictions analysis. As we will
see, however, the publication of Wilson’s Order did not end military
resistance to the Progressive administration of conscientious objectors.
III. HARLAN FISKE STONE AND THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
Wilson’s March 20 Executive Order had, in Roger Baldwin’s appre-
ciative words, “transcend[ed] the narrow limitations fixed by Congress”
by offering noncombatant duty to individualistic conscientious objec-
tors.252 But it left unclear how this transcendence of the legislative will
would work in practice. Specifically, the Order did not answer the ques-
tions of how the Secretary of War would police the new, in-camp certifi-
cation process of conscientious objectors or conduct the retroactive
review of earlier military judgments about conscientious objectors. Both
of these questions were answered on June 1, 1918, when Secretary of War
Baker instituted the “Board of Inquiry,” a three-member, civilian-military
review board that was a close approximation of the three-member
committee described in Frankfurter’s September memorandum.253 The
Board consisted of Judge Mack (whom Frankfurter had specifically sug-
gested), a Judge Advocate General (originally Major William Stoddard
and later Major Walter Kellogg), and, in keeping with Frankfurter’s two-
to-one civilian-military balance, another civilian lawyer, Dean Harlan
Fiske Stone.254
In coordination with the publication of the June 1 order, the
Committee on Public Information—Wilson’s propaganda unit—issued a
press release announcing the Board of Inquiry and declaring that the
“rights of individual conscience will be respected.”255 The release made
clear that, under the “new instructions,” the importance of determining
the sincerity of objectors’ particular commitments, not their sectarian
pedigree, was paramount.256 On June 3, Felix Frankfurter wrote to
Frederick Keppel, congratulating him on the “happy mingling of sense
and discipline” the War Department had finally achieved.257
252. April 2, 1918 Letter from Baldwin to Wilson, supra note 242, at 1.
253. Memorandum from Roy A. Hill, Adjutant Gen., to All Div. & Dep’t
Commanders in U.S. (June 1, 1918) [hereinafter June 1 Order], in U.S. War Dep’t,
Statement, supra note 11, at 41–42.
254. Immediate Release, Comm. on Pub. Info., supra note 11, at 47.
255. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of War, For Release in the Morning Papers 1 (May 30,
1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of War, Official
Statement as to Conscientious Objectors (June 8, 1918), reprinted in 75 Friends’
Intelligencer 357, 357 (June 8, 1918).
256. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of War, For Release in the Morning Papers, supra note
255, at 2; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of War, Official Statement as to Conscientious
Objectors, supra note 255, at 357, 358.
257. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Frederick Keppel, Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of War (June 3, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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As written, the Selective Service Act had aimed to resolve the prob-
lem of individual draft-related grievances, including conscientious objec-
tion, at the local level, through draft boards staffed by neighborhood
dignitaries.258 The Board of Inquiry represented a very different
approach to the management of dissent—a centralized apparatus staffed
by nationally recognized legal experts. These experts’ chief concern was
the legitimacy and stability of national governance in the face of antiwar
dissent, not the preservation of community norms.
A. The Board’s Approach to Conscientious Objection
The Board’s first destination was Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Back in
September 1917, Frankfurter had recommended sending all absolutists
to Fort Leavenworth for humane “treatment” and the June 1 order insti-
tuted this policy: All those men refusing noncombatant duty on consci-
entious grounds would be transferred from their training camps to the
Kansas military prison.259 There, the Board would personally interview
each man. While the March 20 Executive Order had defined three types
of noncombatant military duty available to conscientious objectors,260 the
June 1 order empowered the Board to offer a new form of alternative
service—nonmilitary “agricultural service” under civilian control.261 If the
Board found a man sincerely opposed to all forms of military service—
both combatant and noncombatant—it could offer him such alternative
service.262 Only objectors refusing even this nonmilitary service would
now be considered true “absolutists” and remain at Fort Leavenworth as
prisoners.
The Board of Inquiry did not just hold court over absolutists at Fort
Leavenworth but took to the road, traveling from training camp to train-
ing camp to perform the two functions Frankfurter had envisioned:
determination of sincerity and selection of appropriate service for those
men found sincere. Between June 1918 and June 1919, the “migratory”
Board traveled across the country, erecting makeshift courts of con-
science in mess halls and work yards.263 Over the course of its travels, the
258. Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76, 78–80 (1917), repealed by
Act June 15, 1917, ch. 29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 217 (providing compulsory military service
should cease four months after proclamation of peace by President).
259. June 1 Order, supra note 253, at 41.
260. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
261. Id.
262. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, supra note 152, at 253, 257--58; see also
June 1 Order, supra note 253, at 41. The Board could also, in “exceptional cases,”
“recommend the objector for service in connection with the reconstruction work
maintained in Europe by the Society of Friends.” Stone, The Conscientious Objector,
supra, at 258.
263. See Walter Guest Kellogg, The Conscientious Objector 26 (1919) (“The work of
the Board was essentially migratory in character.”); see also Stone, The Conscientious
Objector, supra note 152, at 258 (discussing travels).
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Board “examined a total of 2,294 alleged conscientious objectors and
determined that 1,978 were sincere,” either in their objections to combat
duty or to all military service.264 Of these, 1,588 were assigned to various
forms of civilian furlough, and 390 were assigned to noncombatant ser-
vice. An additional 1,560 men received noncombatant duty or civilian
furlough without Board investigation.265 About 450 men refused all forms
of alternative service (“absolutists”) or, having been found insincere, still
refused to fight. This relatively small group remained imprisoned at Fort
Leavenworth.266 The Board of Inquiry personally examined nearly sixty
percent of the 3,989 drafted men who maintained their objections
throughout the war.
These conscientious objectors were diverse in cultural background
and religious (or nonreligious) commitment. About seventy-five percent
hailed from the “historic peace churches.”267 These men were the sectari-
ans recognized by the Selective Service Act itself. The other twenty-five
percent were Frankfurter’s “individualistic” objectors who, under statute,
should have been considered disobedient soldiers and court-martialed.
Within this group of nonsectarians, a government study estimated that
approximately sixty percent were religious in some sense and the other
forty percent purely “political.”268 Even the purely political objector
could qualify for exemption as long as he convinced the Board that he
was opposed to war in any form.269
Stone saw the Board’s task, especially when it came to the non-
religious objectors, as one of dialogue rather than judgment:
The cases of political objectors or those who, upon purely
ethical grounds, felt that the state had no right to exact military
service, were much more serious [than sectarian cases]. In such
cases we had no formal rules of procedure or standards for
determining whether the objector was sincere. We usually
allowed him to tell his story, asked him rather searching
questions as to his background and experience, and as to the
264. U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 24.
265. Kellogg, supra note 263, at 127.
266. U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 25.
267. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 216 (“The majority belonged to historic pacifist
religious faiths . . . .”); Chatfield, supra note 19, at 75–76 (breaking down objectors by
religious affiliation); Mark A. May, The Psychological Examinations of Conscientious
Objectors, Am. J. Psych., Apr. 1920, at 154–61 (same).
268. May, supra note 267, at 160–61.
269. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 105 (1956)
[hereinafter Mason, Pillar] (quoting Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court, to Fred Briehl (Mar. 4, 1936)) (discussing standard for exemption and
requirement objector be opposed to war in any form). It would be over fifty years before
any branch of the U.S. government would again take such a liberal approach to
conscientious objection—and even then, in the Supreme Court’s 1970 decision in Welsh v.
United States, the validity of objection on purely political grounds remained uncertain. 398
U.S. 333, 342–43 (1970) (suggesting recognition should be denied to draftee whose
objections rest “solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency”).
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basis of his objections. In most cases we felt that objectors of this
type were sincere, and when sincere they had as sound moral
basis for their attitude as those who based their objections on
religious dogmas.270
To facilitate this dialogue, the Board declined to have conscientious
objectors sworn in and generally “disregard[ed] military discipline
during the conduct of the examination.”271 For instance, objectors did
not have to stand at attention or salute the Board members. Although
this disruption of military procedures was “a matter of concern to certain
of the Army officers,” Board member Walter Kellogg explained that “it
would be contrary to the spirit of [Baker and Wilson’s] orders . . . to
insist upon military observances from a class of men who strenuously
insisted that they were not to be regarded as soldiers at all.”272 Instead,
the Board created a communicative process in which men who pro-
foundly disagreed with the military worldview could engage in discussion,
even debate, with government decisionmakers who did not take the mili-
tary point of view. In doing so, the Board interrupted the managerial
norms of military obedience—vital for the efficient achievement of pre-
determined goals such as the training of massive conscript army—in the
interests of democratic norms, such as individual self-determination and
open-minded deliberation.273
As Stone explained, “denouncing” a man as a “coward” or “slacker”
was an “easy but undiscriminating and shallow way to dispose of the case
of the conscientious objector.”274 While Stone himself did not sympathize
with the objectors’ political or moral arguments, he did see them as an
expression of forces at work in society that needed to be recognized and
understood. Stone was particularly struck by the social and economic
views of the individualistic objectors, views that mirrored the complaints
of a restive labor movement then militating for greater recognition from
the American government.275 Not only could society benefit from under-
standing the motives behind conscientious objection, a society that
sought to punish rather than persuade such dissenters risked its own
integrity: “[I]t may well be questioned whether the state which preserves
270. Mason, Pillar, supra note 269, at 105 (quoting Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Arthur Basse).
271. Kellogg, supra note 263, at 54–55.
272. Id. at 55.
273. For this distinction between “management” (which involves “efficiency-minded,
goal-driven organization”) and “democracy” (which involves the continual harmonization
of individual self-determination and collective decisionmaking through “communicative
processes”), see Robert Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community,
Management 4, 11 (1995) (quoting Philip Selznick).
274. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, supra note 152, at 269.
275. Id. at 266 (“No member of the Board who listened to the voluble expositions of
their theories by these men during the summer of 1918 could have been surprised by the
manifestations of social unrest and the pronounced Bolshevist tendencies which have
since been exhibited by the working classes in America.”).
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its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual
will not in fact ultimately lose it by the process.”276 Thus, as much as law
breaking was a “serious concern,” especially in a time of war, so was “the
violation of the conscience of the individual by majority action.”277 In
order to avoid such majoritarian suppression of idiosyncratic views, the
Wilson Administration and its Board of Inquiry reopened a discussion
that the Selective Service Act had purported to close—which objections
to fighting had “social value” and which should be punished as deleteri-
ous to the war effort.278 Most boldly, Stone and the Board of Inquiry
staged this discussion in the midst of army training camps.
B. The Board’s Response to Military Noncompliance
Baker and Wilson’s decision to depart from congressional policy and
to intervene in ongoing processes of military justice met with significant
resistance. Since the passage of the Selective Service Act, military lawyers
had argued that a liberal policy toward individualistic objectors would
violate the congressional law. Now, military officers on the ground
appeared reluctant to comply with Baker and Wilson’s decision to ignore
their military advisors.
For example, on June 15, when Third Assistant Secretary of War
Keppel inquired about noncompliance and “very harsh treatment” of
Quakers at Camp Lewis, Washington, the Commanding General
responded with almost taunting indifference. Denying noncompliance in
regard to treatment of “alleged conscientious objectors,” the General
explained that “as to their harsh treatment, this office is unsure of what is
meant by this term; it may be that improper treatment is alleged and that
this in itself is largely a matter of opinion.”279
Later in the summer, Secretary of War Baker learned that camp
officers had failed to issue certificates guaranteeing noncombatant duty
to individuals professing conscientious objections.280 On August 2, he
released a terse memorandum, stating that the certification process laid
out by Wilson’s Executive Order “will be strictly complied with by all
concerned in the future.”281 Baker also included a “suitable form” that
officers could issue as “the certificate.”282
276. Id. at 269.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Letter from H.P. McCain, Adjutant Gen., to Frederick Keppel, Third Assistant
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War 1 (June 15, 1918) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(emphasis added).
280. Memorandum from John S. Johnston, Adjutant Gen., to All Dep’t, Camp, and
Cantonment Commanders All Excepted Places (Aug. 2, 1918), in U.S. Dep’t of War,
Statement, supra note 11, at 46.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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By September, reports of regularly administered “severe beatings
and humiliation” of “political objectors” at Camp Funston, Kansas be-
came too numerous to dismiss as exaggeration.283 Baker called an
investigation which eventually led to the dishonorable discharge of—
among other officers—Major Frank White Jr.284 White was the Judge
Advocate General (JAG) officer responsible for supervising the treat-
ment of the camp’s conscientious objectors, and he “had little tolerance
for the secularists” in particular.285 After his discharge, White “launched a
noisy campaign against Secretary Baker and his supposed coddling of
subversive pacifists”286 that would eventually reach Congress.287
In October, Third Assistant Secretary of War Keppel asked the Board
of Inquiry to review ninety-eight already-closed court-martial cases that
the War Department suspected had been improperly decided by camp
commanders.288 Previously, the Board had only been authorized to inter-
vene in open court-martial cases.289 Keppel’s October order expanded
the Board’s mandate to a form of appellate review. The chairman of the
Board, Walter Kellogg, recused himself because as a JAG officer he was a
member of the department that had signed off on the contested court-
martial decisions.290 Thus, Judge Mack and Dean Stone formed a wholly
civilian committee tasked with reviewing divergences between military
justice and Wilson and Baker’s policies.
On October 31, Mack and Stone wrote to Secretary of War Baker:
“We appreciate fully the weight to be attached to the deliberate
conclusions of the reviewing authorities in the Judge Advocate
Department, and we have most carefully considered their reports. But in
many, if not most, of the cases, we are unable to concur in their
recommendations.”291 As Harlan Fiske Stone later recounted to Nicholas
283. Beaver, supra note 41, at 233.
284. Capozzola, supra note 6, at 80.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See infra Part IV.A (detailing criticisms of War Department’s civil
libertarianism).
288. See Letter from Julian Mack, Judge, & Harlan F. Stone, Dean, Columbia Law
Sch., to Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (October 31, 1918) [hereinafter 1918
Letter from Mack & Stone], in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 26 (providing
report after requested inquiry); U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 26 (“Twelve
separate reports accompanied [the Mack and Stone] letter and consisted of comments
and recommendations based upon an examination of the court-martial records in 98
cases . . . .”).
289. Memorandum from Roy A. Hill, Adjutant Gen., to the Commanding Gens. of
All Dep’ts & Divs. (June 10, 1918), in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 42.
290. See Letter from S.T. Ansell, Acting Judge Advocate Gen., to Peyton C. March,
Chief of Staff (Nov. 16, 1918), in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 28 (“I am
advised by Maj. Kellogg that, being an officer of this department and having reviewed
some of the cases involved . . . he declined to take part either in the examination of the
records or in the report rendered thereon.”).
291. 1918 Letter from Mack & Stone, supra note 288, at 26.
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Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University, “‘In a good many
cases, it appeared to me that the objectors, sometimes through
misinterpretation of the orders of the President and the Secretary of War
and sometimes through excess of zeal, had been improperly placed on
trial by the military authorities.’”292
Mack and Stone asked to personally examine the men whose cases
they had reviewed—men who had already been convicted of disobedi-
ence. If they found that a man had been sincere in his initial objections,
they intended to offer him noncombatant service or civilian furlough,
remitting the remainder of his court-martial sentence if he accepted.293
Furthermore, given the problems identified in the first sample of cases,
Mack and Stone “strongly recommend[ed]” that the remaining court-
martial cases involving alleged objectors “be taken up promptly” and
offered that they were “ready to examine these” as well.294
When the Acting Judge Advocate General S.T. Ansell received Mack
and Stone’s “sweeping statement of disapproval” and their request for
further review, he fired off an indignant response to the Army’s Chief of
Staff, Peyton March.295 Striking the same formalistic note that military
lawyers Crowder, Kuhn, and Wigmore had earlier employed in resisting
recognition of the individual conscience, Ansell explained that his office
was “concerned solely with the question of the legality of the findings
and sentence in each case.”296 Ansell seemed to imply that Mack and
Stone’s “courteously worded, but ill-advised statement”297 had not con-
fined itself to the law.
Indeed, Ansell called Mack and Stone’s review “extra legal.”298 The
Board, Ansell explained, had no authority to “differ with the constituted
military tribunals upon matters of law . . . which have been reviewed by
the only authorities lawfully competent to review them.”299 The court-
martial decisions were “as a matter of law final, and are entitled to as
much respect as the decisions of any court in the land both as a matter of
law and as a matter of fair regard for honestly administered
institutions.”300 Ansell’s reference to “honestly administered institutions”
292. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: In Defense of Individual Freedom,
1918–20, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 147, 151 (1951) (quoting Stone’s January 5, 1919 report to
Butler).
293. U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 26.
294. 1918 Letter from Mack & Stone, supra note 288, at 26.
295. Letter from S.T. Ansell to Peyton C. March, supra note 290, at 27.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 28.
299. Id.
300. Id. (citation omitted). As Baker would respond, however, court-martial decisions
were not as final as Ansell suggested, being subject to command review. From the
Secretary of War’s point of view, the Board of Inquiry was just a vehicle for such oversight
further up the chain of command. See infra notes 305–312 and accompanying text
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raised the specter of dishonest administration, and Ansell went on to sug-
gest that the Board was motivated not by legal concern but by Baker and
Wilson’s “administrative difficulties in dealing with the problem of
conscientious objectors.”301 If such difficulties, as a policy matter, mili-
tated for “such persons . . . to be excused,” then the Secretary of War
should have executed such a policy in a straightforward and public
manner—“by withholding [the objectors] from trial or by extending to
them the pardoning power”—rather than “through manipulation of
tribunals of justice.”302
Not only did Ansell suggest the Board’s work was a politically moti-
vated “manipulation” of justice, but he also implied that it was interfer-
ing with the nation’s military in a time of war:
I think it my duty to ask the department to consider this report
of the board of inquiry . . . in the light of first principles which
lie at the base of military justice, the discipline of the Army and
its integrity, and to that extent involving the safety of this
country.303
In closing, Ansell counterposed the law and “‘human rights,’” as pro-
tected by military lawyers such as himself, to the “‘uncontrolled will,’” as
represented by Baker and his minions.304
On December 8, 1918, Baker responded to Ansell’s letter with a
careful but confident defense of his Department’s administration of
conscientious objectors. Echoing Felix Frankfurter’s framing, Baker
explained that the treatment of conscientious objectors was a question of
“military administration,” not statutory interpretation:
To some extent the novelty and difficulty of this problem was
recognized by the Congress, which made express provision for a
part of the general class. However, when the law came to be
administered it was found that only certain varieties of religious
experience had been adequately provided for, and that other
varieties of religious obligation and the whole class of
conscientious objection based upon ethical considerations and
not directly associated with formal religious beliefs was
unprovided for.305
The Secretary of War continued to follow the line of Frankfurter’s legal
reasoning: “The President, as Commander in Chief of the Army, thereupon
laid down a definite policy for the administration of the law, and the
(detailing authority behind administration of conscience and pointing to Baker’s
emphasis of hierarchical nature of administration).
301. Letter from S.T. Ansell to Peyton C. March, supra note 290, at 28.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. (quoting Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 558 (1887)).
305. Memorandum from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Peyton C.
March, Chief of Staff (Dec. 8, 1918) [hereinafter Baker, 1918 Memorandum], in U.S. War
Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 28.
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discipline of those called to the service who were affected by any of these
forms of conscientious objection not specifically included within the
limits of the statute.”306 As Frankfurter had argued, the executive branch
was free to recognize new forms of conscientious objection as “a matter
of military discipline.”307
After reviewing the reasoning and authority behind an accommodat-
ing administration of conscientious objectors, Baker introduced the
problem of noncompliance: “[A] number of cases have arisen in which
[the Commander in Chief’s] direction has not been complied with.”308 In
the interests of the very integrity of military justice which Baker’s
interlocutors wished to protect, this situation could not stand. Further-
more, Baker went on, such a situation would be “at variance with the
positively expressed wishes of the President as Commander in Chief.”309
Throughout his response, the Secretary of War invoked the phrase
“Commander in Chief” as a sort of refrain, reemphasizing a hierarchy
that he clearly felt his military subordinates had forgotten.
What, Baker asked, could be done about this failure to implement
the President’s binding commands? “Fortunately,” Baker answered, cor-
recting Ansell’s suggestion that authority to revise court-martial verdicts
was lacking, “we are not obliged to continue the results of such a system
[of misapplication].”310 Contrary to Ansell’s skepticism, “all the power
necessary to correct any inequality in the application of the law and the
executive order is in the Secretary of War.”311 Mack and Stone, Baker
explained, were merely his advisors: “The results of their inquiries are
laid before the Secretary for the information of his judgment, and are in
no sense an extra-judicial review of any action of the constituted military
authorities.”312 Having established the legal propriety of Mack and
Stone’s efforts and his own authority to act upon their recommendations,
Baker announced that Mack and Stone would continue their work and
demanded military cooperation.313
306. Id. at 28–29 (emphasis added).
307. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.
308. Baker, 1918 Memorandum, supra note 305, at 29.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. By statute, the Secretary of War had the authority to grant an “honorable
restoration to duty” to convicted soldiers. See Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 143, 38 Stat. 1062,
1074–1075 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-377, § 6(1), (3), 82 Stat. 288 (1968)) (extending
“authority . . . vested in the Secretary of War to give an honorable restoration to duty, in
case the same is merited, to general prisoners confined in the United States disciplinary
barracks and its branches . . . so that such restoration may be given to general prisoners
confined elsewhere”).
312. Baker, 1918 Memorandum, supra note 305, at 29.
313. Id. (“I desire . . . to have Judge Mack and Dean Stone continue the inquiry, as
suggested, by their seeing all records of courts-martial in these cases, and being permitted
to have access to all persons in this class whom they may elect to see in order that their
work may be comprehensive . . . .”).
2014] ADMINISTRATIVE ORIGINS 1141
On January 7, 1919, as a result of their further review of court-
martial records and personal interviews of objectors, Mack and Stone
recommended clemency for 113 men who had been convicted of
disobedience after refusing orders on conscientious grounds.314 Nine
days later, Baker told the Army Chief of Staff that he “believ[ed] that
essential justice will be rendered” by exercising in these cases “the power
of clemency intrusted to me by the President.”315 The next day, the War
Department officially issued the clemency order.316 Mack and Stone con-
tinued their review throughout the spring and on July 1, Baker wrote to
Wilson, recommending clemency for another batch of objectors found
sincere by the Board, and also clemency—after one month’s time—for
even those objectors that the Board had found insincere but whose
behavior while in prison had been “satisfactory.”317 The Board of
Inquiry’s work had come to an end.
At the moment of the United States’ emergence as the world’s most
powerful nation, American conscientious objectors forced state builders
within the executive branch to confront the question of the proper rela-
tionship between individual citizens, majoritarian decisionmaking, and a
centralized, professional bureaucracy. Even as the Wilson Administration
was developing a novel democratic theory for the international arena,
executive officials also sought new democratic solutions for a home front
roiled by mass military and industrial mobilization, hyperpatriotism, and
bold dissent. Indicative of these twin democratic projects was a public
statement that the Third Assistant of Secretary of War Frederick Keppel
released in September 1918.
Defending the War Department’s accommodating approach to
conscientious objectors, Keppel explained that the Administration had
“accord[ed] a measure of self-determination to the few who in all
sincerity have not been able to adjust their minds to the needs of the
present sudden and desperate emergency.”318 Noting that there was
“strong sentiment in many quarters against” such a policy, Keppel
allowed that “[w]e might imprison or shoot them.”319 But, he insisted,
“Prussian practices such as these would hardly appeal in a Democracy.”320
314. See Letter from Julian Mack, Judge & Harlan F. Stone, Dean, Columbia Law
Sch., to Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War (Jan. 7, 1919), in U.S. War Dep’t,
Statement, supra note 11, at 29–30 (providing report of results of examination of
prisoners).
315. Memorandum from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Peyton C.
Marsh, Chief of Staff (Jan. 16, 1919), in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 30.
316. See Memorandum from Frank McIntyre, Major Gen., to Roy A. Hill, Adjutant
Gen. (Jan. 17, 1919), in U.S. War Dep’t, Statement, supra note 11, at 31.
317. See Letter from Newton D. Baker, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to Woodrow Wilson,
President 3–4 (July 1, 1919) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
318. Immediate Release, Comm. on Pub. Info., supra note 11, at 47.
319. Id. at 48.
320. Id.
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Keppel’s use of the language of self-determination and reference to
“Prussian practices” situated the administration of conscientious objec-
tors within President Wilson’s larger foreign-policy agenda. The principle
of national self-determination—the right of a nation to “determine its
own institutions” and to “be assured of justice and fair dealing”—was at
the center of Wilson’s internationalist vision.321 For Wilson, however, true
self-determination had to be grounded in the “consent of the
governed.”322 Such consent meant more than the sort of plebiscitary
democracy that he believed was fueling Prussian militarism.323
Similarly, the vision of democracy enforced by the War Department’s
administration of conscientious-objector policy did not reduce to
majoritarian decisionmaking. Indeed, Harlan Fiske Stone suggested at
the end of the war that a state could risk its life by yielding to “majority
action.”324 Instead, War Department administrators tied democracy to
individual self-determination and created opportunities for such self-
determination within the wartime bureaucracy. Specifically, the Board of
Inquiry provided a zone of relatively unstructured dialogue within the
otherwise strict confines of the training-camp apparatus. Before the
Board, individuals were able to articulate their particular moral and
political commitments, and, in response, the Board was empowered to
offer forms of alternative public service that accorded with those particu-
lar commitments. The Wilson Administration invoked the language of
the rights—“rights of individual conscience” in particular—to describe
this synthesis of centralized administration and individual self-determina-
tion. It was only within the Board’s novel administrative process—not
within the halls of Congress or the federal courts—that such individual
rights would be realized.
In enacting this vision of democracy as individual self-determination,
Wilson’s War Department appeared to buck Congress’s intent to restrict
offers of noncombatant duty to sectarian objectors. When challenged by
military authorities on this score, civilian administrators, beginning with
Felix Frankfurter, repeatedly invoked the independent authority of the
President over matters of military discipline. The legitimacy of an expan-
sive right of conscience depended upon this particular situation of draft
administration within the separation of powers and the expansive execu-
tive policymaking that went with it. While such executive policymaking
was and remains least controversial in the realm of military discipline,
Frankfurter and his War Department colleagues chose to use this disci-
plinary realm to implement norms of pluralism and individual self-deter-
321. Woodrow Wilson, President, The Fourteen Points Address (Jan. 8, 1918), in 45
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 534, 536 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1984).
322. Woodrow Wilson, A League for Peace, supra note 11, at 8.
323. Ross Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and
America’s Strategy for Peace and Security 134 (2009) (discussing Wilson’s “assessing the
relationship between German democratization and prospects for international reform”).
324. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, supra note 262, at 269.
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mination that they felt Congress had stinted. They hoped that the
administrative recognition of the right of individual conscience would
imbue the draft apparatus with these norms and, in doing so, help to
stabilize and legitimate it. In a surprising series of turns then, a strikingly
modern theory of democratic self-government and individual rights was
articulated in the name of executive authority and at the expense of con-
gressional policy. The modern administrative state had arrived, cloaked
in the language of individual rights; at the same time, a modern theory of
individual rights for minorities and dissenters had arrived, cloaked in the
language of administrative state building. After the war, military discon-
tent would converge with legislative anger at this bold exercise of
presidential power in the name of idiosyncratic dissenters.
IV. CRITIQUES AND LEGACIES OF THEWARDEPARTMENT’S CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM
A. Critiques
Assaults on the legitimacy of the War Department’s conscientious-
objector policy did not conclude with the signing of the Armistice in
November 1918. To the contrary, continuing criticism of the War
Department’s policy toward conscientious objectors was a striking feature
of the postwar Red Scare. It was also during the Red Scare that an emerg-
ing movement of Progressive civil libertarians pushed back against the
Justice Department’s prosecution of political radicals and scored their
first (symbolic) victory at the Supreme Court, as Justice Oliver Wendell,
Holmes, Jr. endorsed a newly robust conception of freedom of speech in
his dissent in Abrams v. United States.325 Veterans of the World War I War
Department were intimately involved with these events, as Frankfurter
and Stone issued public denunciations of the Justice Department’s
suppression of radicals, and John Henry Wigmore, an early critic of the
accommodation of the individual conscience, published the first major
critique of Holmes’s new First Amendment theory.
The Red Scare was a widespread social, legal, and political phenome-
non, a stew of wartime xenophobia, postwar economic turmoil, and
intensifying anticommunism in the wake of the November 1917
Bolshevik coup in Russia.326 Even as Wilson’s Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer carried out his sensational antiradical raids and prosecu-
tions,327 some of the Administration’s critics bemoaned the government’s
softness toward anti-American elements. In particular, an alliance of mili-
tary-intelligence operatives, disgruntled training-camp officers, and
national and local politicians pointed to the War Department’s
325. 250 U.S. 616, 627–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
326. See Robert Murray, The Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920, at
12, 15–16 (1955) (describing societal circumstances that exacerbated Red Scare in 1919).
327. Id. at 78–83.
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accommodation of conscientious objectors as early evidence of the gov-
ernment’s sympathy for radicals. At the same time, as Progressives
became disillusioned with Wilson’s unwillingness to check Palmer, the
failures of conscientious-objector administration attracted their ire as
well.
In January 1919, as Judge Mack and Dean Stone were busy recom-
mending clemency for objectors, Archibald E. Stevenson, the former
director of propaganda for the Army’s Military Intelligence Division,
testified before the Senate’s Overman Committee.328 The Overman
Committee had been established to investigate the relationship between
beer brewers and German propaganda, but, after the war, Senator
Overman wanted its authority extended to the new communist threat.329
Stevenson helped Overman’s cause by drawing a line directly from the
“pro-German” defense of conscientious objectors to postwar
Bolshevism.330 Three of the dangerous citizens to whom he alerted the
Overman Committee were Jane Addams, Oswald Garrison Villard, and
Roger Baldwin, all of whom had lobbied the Wilson Administration on
behalf of conscientious objectors.331 Baldwin’s work was particularly famil-
iar to Stevenson, as the military-intelligence officer had, in August 1918,
led a raid on the NCLB’s office in New York City.332
While Stevenson’s alarming stories of well-placed radicals helped
expand the Overman Committee’s jurisdiction, he was most successful at
the state level. At Stevenson’s instigation, the New York State Legislature
established an investigation into the radical elements undermining
American society.333 Stevenson served as “special counsel” for what would
infamously become known as the Lusk Committee.334 In the course of
tracing the “Spread of Socialism in Educated Circles,” the Committee
detailed sympathetic interactions between the NCLB and War
Department officials:
328. Todd Pfannestiel, Rethinking the Red Scare: The Lusk Committee and New
York’s Crusade Against Radicalism, 1919–1923, at 13 (2003).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Cottrell, supra note 3, at 78. Military-intelligence officers had, in fact, launched
a campaign against the nongovernmental advocates of the individual conscience back in
December 1917. On December 19, the same day that Baker issued his order calling for
lenient treatment of the individual conscience, the Intelligence Section of the War
College—the organization that had produced the first legal opinion against recognition of
the individual conscience—circulated a memorandum entitled “Suspects,” with Roger
Baldwin at the top of the list. Id. at 66. Soon after, Col. Van Deman, the Chief of Military
Intelligence, ordered that the “Suspects” memo be distributed to “intelligence operatives”
across the country.” Id. Van Deman followed up in February, warning military intelligence
officers that the NCLB’s literature had “‘the obvious intent to disrupt American patriotic
sentiment.’” Id. (quoting Van Deman).
333. Pfannestiel, supra note 328, at 20.
334. Id. at 26.
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Considerable correspondence passed to and from Frederick
Keppel, of the War Department, to Roger Baldwin and Norman
Thomas of the Civil Liberties Bureau, indicating the efforts of
that organization to influence the War Department with respect
to its treatment of conscientious objectors. A letter from
Baldwin to Manley Hudson contains the following: “Lippmann
and Frankfurter are of course out of that particular job now, . . .
and I have to depend entirely upon Keppel.”335
Baldwin’s letter, implying that he had come to depend upon Lippmann,
Frankfurter, and Keppel in his antiwar activism, helped the Committee
indicate just how far “socialism” had “spread” in “educated circles.”
In February 1919, the New York Times dedicated a full page to allega-
tions that the War Department had violated congressional law out of
sympathy for conscientious objectors: “There are members of Congress
who assert that friendly influence was at work in the War Department to
shield the conscientious objector beyond what was his due . . . .”336 These
congressional critics had released a report written by Captain Eugene C.
Brisbain, who had been stationed at Camp Funston, Kansas, a site of sys-
tematic abuse of objectors.337 Brisbain, the Times explained, blamed a
crisis of discipline within the camps on the War Department’s unlawful
accommodation of conscientious objectors: “They all rest assured . . .
that nothing can happen to them, as they have a great friend in
Washington, Mr. Keppel, the Third Assistant Secretary of War, who will
support them . . . in anything their conscience tells them to do . . . .”338
The Times also quoted Congressman T.A. Chandler, who was out-
raged by the recent amnesty of 113 objectors upon the Board of Inquiry’s
recommendation.339 Noting “the large percentage of German names” in
the list of newly free objectors, the congressman cataloged the series of
orders by which the War Department had imperiously demanded the
segregation and lenient treatment of such suspicious malcontents.340
These orders “were in clear conflict with the law” as established by
Congress, and Chandler concluded that “[s]ome one at the War
Department was in close sympathy with these men.”341
In July, Congressman Walter Hughes Newton, a Minnesota
Republican, issued his own denunciation of the administration of con-
science on the floor of the House.342 Newton’s presentation showed—
with extensive evidence—that Wilson and his War Department had
335. 1 J. Legis. Comm. Investigating Seditious Activities, Revolutionary Radicalism: Its
History, Purpose and Tactics 1087 (1920).
336. Conscientious Objectors, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1919, at 41.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 58 Cong. Rec. 3063–66 (1919).
1146 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 114:1083
bucked the intentions of Congress, and had done so in a covert manner,
all while cooperating with radical organizations, including the NCLB.
Newton’s archive was ample, including a lengthy public interview from
Major Frank White—the man whom Baker had relieved of command for
his abuse of objectors at Camp Funston.343
Congressman Newton began by asserting that during the war
“numerous conscienceless objectors, consisting of pro-Germans, . . .
political Socialists, and cowardly slackers, were being exempted from all
military service . . . [and] were not being held to obey military law or
submit to military discipline.”344 Asking who could be responsible for
such a policy, Newton immediately ruled out Congress. He noted that
under the Selective Service Act neither the “individual with mere
conscientious scruples against war” nor the “individual with
conscientious religious scruples against war” were exempted.345 Local
draft boards, which had “conscientiously carried out the law and the
regulations to the very letter,” were also blameless.346 Instead, Newton’s
investigation had “disclosed” that responsibility for the coddling of trai-
tors, cowards, and communists “rested entirely upon the War
Department.”347
Citing Baker’s October 10 and December 19, 1917 orders, which
first equalized the treatment of sectarians and nonsectarians,
Congressman Newton remarked, “Here was a deliberate change and
enlargement of the exemption proviso in palpable violation of law and by
the exercise of authority which the Secretary did not possess. What right
had the Secretary of War to legislate? What power did he possess to
amend an act of Congress?”348 The congressman pointed to the conclud-
ing section of each of the fall 1917 orders—which commanded secrecy—
as further evidence of the insidious political and legal character of the
Administration’s efforts.
Newton next turned his fire on President Wilson himself. Through
his March 20, 1918 Executive Order, Wilson had “deliberately amended
and enlarged” Congress’s definition of legitimate objectors and explicitly
recognized both “religious and other conscientious scruples” as grounds
for alternative service.349 Latching on to Frederick Keppel’s own state-
ment that the Administration had sought to accord “a measure of self-
determination” to the conscientious objectors, Newton suggested that
Wilson had imported his mixed-up foreign-policy notions into the
343. See id. at 3065 (reading public interview of White describing conscientious
objectors as German sympathizers and Russian Socialists).
344. Id. at 3063.
345. Id. at 3064.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 3066.
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domestic arena.350 In doing so, the President had fomented a pluralistic
chaos, in which “anyone religious, atheistic, believer in a creed or
disbeliever, organization or individual” could refuse to fight.351
Noting that such chaos was “not in furtherance of the legislative will
but in direct conflict therewith,” Newton appealed to constitutional first
principles: “Under the Constitution it is the duty of Congress to raise
armies. In raising the Army to wage war against Germany they laid down
the principle that in a country where there was equality of opportunity
there was a corresponding duty upon our citizens to serve that
country . . . .”352 At the same time, Congress recognized “there were a few
individuals belonging to certain religious organizations who had sub-
scribed to certain creeds in good faith and had conscientious convictions
against shooting their fellow men even in time of war,” and accordingly
exempted these few “from service as combatants.”353 In doing so,
“Congress had determined what constituted a conscientious objector and
by implication what did not.”354 Despite this clear exercise of Congress’s
constitutional power to raise armies, “the Secretary of War and the
President assumed the authority to make addition of the terms ‘personal
scruples’ and ‘conscientious scruples’ . . . .”355
It was just this constitutional question that Felix Frankfurter had
confronted in his September 1917 memorandum. There, Frankfurter
had implied that the administrative recognition of nonsectarian, ind-
ividualist objectors was a matter not of raising the army, but of
administering the army once it was raised. Once men had been drafted
into the army, details of their discipline were not governed by Congress
but by the Commander in Chief and his “decision as to the best use to be
made of human material.”356 Congressman Newton did not address this
countervailing constitutional construction and did not mention
Frankfurter’s memorandum. In keeping with the interpretation of mil-
itary lawyers, the Congressman thought it incontestable that the con-
gressional definition of legitimate objectors was the final say on the
matter, legally binding upon future administrative decisionmaking. His
colleagues apparently agreed: When Newton finished his story of the
executive usurpation of the popular will, the House broke into
applause.357
Even as legislators and military officers accused the War Department
of protecting a radical minority from the judgment of the nation, War
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 2.
357. 58 Cong. Rec. 3065 .
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Department administrators also confronted accusations of brutality from
their Progressive friends outside of government. Previously pro-war
Progressives disturbed by wartime press censorship and the excesses of
the Red Scare began to protest the Wilson government’s overly harsh
treatment of some objectors.358 One indication of this turnabout was a
piece in the newly hostile New Republic criticizing the Administration’s
continuing imprisonment of absolutists.359 Calling the trials of the
absolutists “barbarisms” and the sentences handed down “atrocities,” the
piece’s author, William Hard, opined that “it is unworthy of [Secretary of
War Baker] to let this system so stand.”360
The previous fall, the Dial, another Progressive organ, had published
similar attacks on the War Department. John Dewey, who less than two
years earlier had himself criticized the sentimentality of the conscientious
objector in the pages of the New Republic,361 now sat on the Dial’s edito-
rial board and was more concerned with the “country’s reactionary
political posture.”362 A November 30 editorial called for amnesty for all
“political prisoners” still held by the government.363 And on December
28, the magazine printed a lengthy communication from the antiwar
minister John Nevin Sayre, detailing the treatment of absolutists—men
who had refused any form of alternative service.364 Sayre called the sen-
tences being handed out to absolutists over a month and a half after the
Armistice “a scandal.”365
Such attacks on the War Department reflected a contest within
Progressive circles over the function of civil libertarianism and its proper
relationship to the administrative state. As we have seen, War
Department administrators were themselves contributors to the emer-
gent Progressive commitment to civil liberties. Indeed, Frankfurter wrote
his September 18 memorandum calling for the recognition of the
“individualistic” objector nearly two months before Dewey’s public apol-
ogy for his earlier critique of individual rights to dissent, and conscien-
tious objection in particular.366 Yet while Frankfurter and his War
358. See Rabban, supra note 2, at 3–4 (describing Progressive views on free speech
before and after World War I).
359. William Hard, Your Amish Mennonite, New Republic, Feb. 1, 1919, at 11, 11–14.
360. Id. at 12.
361. John Dewey, Conscience and Compulsion, New Republic, July 14, 1917, at 297.
362. W. Anthony Gengarelly, Distinguished Dissenters and Opposition to the 1919–
1920 Red Scare 54 (1996).
363. Editorial, Amnesty for Political Prisoners, 65 Dial 497, 497 (1918).
364. John Nevin Sayre, Editorial, Political Prisoners in America, 65 Dial 623, 623–24
(1918).
365. Id. at 624.
366. As late as September 1, Dewey was “ridicul[ing] the ‘ultra-socialists’ and other
radicals who protested the suppression of their antiwar views by invoking . . . ‘the sanctity
of indiviudal rights and constitutional guaranties.’” Rabban, supra note 2, at 246–47
(quoting John Dewey, Conscience and Compulsion (1917), reprinted in 10 The Collected
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Department colleagues saw the expansion of executive authority as criti-
cal to this civil-libertarian agenda, some Progressives were coming to view
that expansion as a threat that civil liberties law had to neutralize.
War Department administrators felt misunderstood by their some-
time allies outside of government, and sought to defend their record
against increasingly vociferous critiques. For instance, when Frederick
Keppel read Sayre’s piece in the Dial, he sent Felix Frankfurter a draft of
a letter defending the War Department’s policies, proposing to send it to
the Dial, the New Republic, and other Progressive publications.367
Although Keppel felt that “we ought not take it all sitting down,” he
explained to Frankfurter that Secretary of War Baker had “requested that
no statement from the Department be made on this subject.”368
In his proposed letter, Keppel espoused the view that individual lib-
erty and strong administration were interdependent goals, the same view
that had motivated the policies developed by himself, Baker, and
Frankfurter early in the war. The “real issue” between Sayre and the
Secretary of War, Keppel explained, did not lie in their differing respect
for the individual conscience.369 Both parties agreed that conscientious
objectors should be treated “in a way that is creditable to the United
States in the Twentieth Century.”370 Rather, the true difference con-
cerned their differing evaluations of the ability of the administrative state
itself to enforce civil-libertarian norms. Rather than resorting to ad hoc
acts of mercy to dispose of the challenge of conscientious objection,
Keppel explained, “[Baker] prefers the slower but more durable and
more satisfactory process of guiding the development of an organic and
permanent procedure through the fabric of the Army itself.”371 Keppel
pointed specifically to the fastidious work of the Board of Inquiry as the
proper path to justice: “[A] personal examination to ascertain the
sincerity of a given man” conducted by a group of “distinguished men”
would respect the goods of individual and administrative integrity.372
On January 18, 1919, Frankfurter responded to Keppel. Although he
agreed with Baker’s hesitancy to engage in a public debate, Frankfurter
“share[d] the impulse” behind Keppel’s proposed response.373 Offering
the New Republic published a mea culpa, “In Explanation of Our Lapse,” in which Dewey
repudiated his summer essays, calling them “strangely remote and pallid.” Id. at 300–01
(quoting John Dewey, In Explanation of our Lapse (1917), reprinted in 10 The Collected
Works of John Dewey: The Middle Works, supra note 165, at 292).
367. Letter from Frederick P. Keppel, Third Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of War, to
Felix Frankfurter 1 (Jan. 16, 1919) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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a capstone to the crucial memorandum on the treatment of conscien-
tious objectors that he had written eighteen months earlier, Frankfurter
laid out what he thought should be done: “I think the Secretary, or
someone for him, should speak and speak pretty soon on the
Conscientious Objector.”374 It was necessary to detail the “limitations of
the law under which [Baker] was acting,” “the liberal scope of the
regulations” that Baker instituted, and “the sensitive instrument of
administration” that the Board of Inquiry represented.375 These careful,
clipped phrases indicated the tricky legal maneuver that Frankfurter had
proposed eighteen months earlier when he argued that the individual
conscience should be granted legitimacy, regardless of congressional
policy.
B. Legacies
Today, the World War I administration of conscientious objectors is
generally cited as an example of the wartime repression that Progressive
civil libertarians sought to resist, not as an institution paradigmatic of the
Progressive turn toward civil liberties. And yet, the accommodating
nature of the War Department’s approach shaped the development of
Progressive civil libertarianism throughout the postwar period.
Begin with the fact that the speech prosecutions that most publicly
energized Progressive civil libertarians arose from protests against the
draft. In March 1919, a few months after Frankfurter and Keppel’s wor-
ried exchange about the legacy of the administration of conscientious
objectors, the Supreme Court handed down its first decisions involving
convictions of political radicals under the Espionage Act. All three cases
featured radicals whose speech had targeted the operations of the
Selective Service Act. In Schenck v. United States, the defendants sent anti-
war circulars to men accepted for military service.376 In Frohwerk v. United
States, a newspaper editor had published an article that asked whether
anyone would “pronounce a verdict of guilty” upon a young man who
“stops reasoning” and participates in a draft riot.377 The implied—and
allegedly illegal—answer was “no.”378 And in Debs v. United States, Socialist
leader Eugene Debs praised several persons who had been convicted of
encouraging others to refuse induction.379 Thus, while the March cases
involved convictions under the Espionage Act, the substance of the
offending speech would have been familiar to War Department
administrators—criticism of the draft and the violence that it
underwrote.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919).
377. 249 U.S. 204, 207–08 (1919).
378. Id.
379. 249 U.S. 211, 212–14 (1919).
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote the unanimous opinions
upholding the convictions in all three cases. David Rabban has suggested
that Holmes chose Schenck as “the vehicle for discussing First
Amendment issues”380 because that case provided the clearest evidence
that the prosecuted speech was intended to persuade “persons subject to
the draft” to obstruct the draft’s operations.381 Holmes found that there
was “a clear and present danger” that antiwar circulars sent to draftees
would “bring about the substantive evils” that Congress had “a right to
prevent” through its espionage legislation, namely hindrance of the war
effort.382
Holmes’s decisions were deeply disappointing to Progressive civil
libertarians. Eight months later, however, he would vindicate their point
of view in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, which Justice
Brandeis joined.383 The rapid “transformation” of Justice Holmes from
realist critic to democratic defender of a robust First Amendment right
to free speech has received increasing historical attention.384 The availa-
ble evidence suggests that during the summer and fall of 1919, Holmes
was influenced by the same ideas that motivated the War Department’s
accommodating approach to dissent and by Felix Frankfurter’s own post-
war defenses of political radicals. Holmes’s dissent would also be promi-
nently opposed by a major opponent of the accommodation of the indi-
vidual conscience, who saw Holmes’s reasoning as threatening the legiti-
macy of conscription.
In June, Holmes read Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee’s just-
published article, “Freedom of Speech in War Time,”385 which argued
that the Justice’s “clear and present danger” language in Schenck should
be understood as suggesting a novel, protective approach to free
speech.386 This reading was probably a willful misinterpretation, but it
allowed the young law professor to put forward his own theory of First
Amendment protection, one that rested on “the importance of political
expression in a democracy.”387 He argued that the First Amendment was
380. Rabban, supra note 2, at 280.
381. 249 U.S. at 51.
382. Id. at 52.
383. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
384. See Thomas Healy, The Great Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed
His Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America 7 (2013) (“Holmes’s
dissent in Abrams marked not just a personal transformation but the start of a national
transformation as well.”); Rabban, supra note 2, at 342–80 (“Although the Abrams dissent
marked the transformation of Holmes . . . into [a] defender[] of free speech, [he]
developed [his] new approach to the First Amendment in opinions throughout the
1920s.”); Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at 198–211 (discussing Holmes’s
transformation).
385. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 932
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386. Healy, supra note 384, at 154–55; Rabban, supra note 2, at 342–43.
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“much more than an order to Congress not to cross the boundary which
marks the extreme limits of lawful suppression.”388 The right to free
speech was not some simple negative right against government interfer-
ence but rather “a declaration of national policy in favor of the public
discussion of all public questions.”389
As we have seen, War Department administrators approached the
right of individual conscience in a similar manner. These administrators
gave effect to that right by creating new opportunities for deliberation
and dissent within the structure of the draft. They introduced into the
summary processes of military justice the informal dialogue of the Board
of Inquiry, a dialogue that enabled idiosyncratic dissenters to articulate
and defend the depth and coherence of their moral and political
commitments.
The relationship between Chafee’s legal vision, the administration of
conscientious objectors, and Justice Holmes’s First Amendment transfor-
mation is not merely conceptual—Chafee, Frankfurter, and Holmes were
friends and collaborators.390 When Frankfurter returned to Harvard Law
School from the War Department, he joined Chafee in resisting ongoing
political prosecutions. Together, the two Progressives wrote an amicus
brief in Colyer v. Skeffington,391 defending twenty aliens who had been
swept up in a Justice Department raid.392 Their brief provided a compre-
hensive indictment of the Department’s aggressive procedures, and the
judge in Colyer—an old friend of Justice Brandeis—freed the aliens.393
Such legal work on behalf of political radicals raised eyebrows at
Harvard and created problems for Frankfurter and Chafee on the faculty.
But when Justice Holmes “heard that Frankfurter’s position at Harvard
might be in jeopardy . . . he promptly wrote [Harvard] President Lowell
praising Frankfurter for contributing to ‘the ferment which is more
valuable than an endowment.’”394 Frankfurter also asked Holmes to inter-
vene on behalf of the more junior Chafee, which the Justice did.395 The
next month, Frankfurter’s good friend and renowned political theorist
Harold Laski arranged a meeting between Chafee and Holmes at his
home, presumably to sway Holmes to Chafee’s new First Amendment
388. Chafee, supra note 385, at 934.
389. Id.
390. Healy, supra note 384, at 240–43 (noting collaboration between Chafee,
Frankfurter, and Holmes in Palmer Raids case).
391. 265 F. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev’d sub nom. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st
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392. Urofsky, supra note 32, at 21.
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Laski Letters 211 n.2 (M. Howe ed., 1953)).
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theory.396 Laski himself had recently dedicated his new book on the rela-
tionship between the individual citizen and the administrative state,
Authority in the Modern State, to Holmes and Frankfurter.397
The following November, Holmes wrote his famous dissent in
Abrams. In it, the Justice proclaimed that “we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.”398 As G. Edward
White has written, the Abrams dissent “served to supply First Amendment
jurisprudence with its first modern set of theoretical apologetics, which
associated protection for speech with a search for truth in a democratic
society.”399 But these “theoretical apologetics” did not emerge ex nihilo.
The august Justice was embedded in a social network of Progressive legal
advocates, some of whom had been struggling to synthesize wartime
administration and democratic deliberation and dissent for the past two
years.
If Holmes’s words were spurred in part by the “vigilance” of his
friend Frankfurter, they were quickly condemned by another veteran of
the conscience debates, Dean John Henry Wigmore, who issued the legal
community’s “most forceful criticism” of the Abrams dissent.400 During
the war Wigmore had served in the Provost Marshal General’s Office.
There, he had rejected Baldwin and Frankfurter’s early overtures of
cooperation on the conscientious-objection issue, penning a sharp
memorandum that prescribed court-martial, solitary confinement, and
“physically exhausting” work for the nonsectarian objector.401 Three
years later, Wigmore took to the pages of the Illinois Law Review to
denounce Holmes and Brandeis’s “disquisition on Truth” in their Abrams
dissent.402 Although the piece was prompted by a free-speech decision,
Wigmore’s critique replayed the intragovernmental debate over the
rights of individual conscience.
Wigmore used his understanding of the relationship between
individual rights and conscription to analyze the proper relationship
between individual rights and the Espionage Act: “Where a nation has
definitely committed itself to a foreign war, all principles of normal
internal order may be suspended. As property may be taken and corporal
396. Healy, supra note 384, at 158–59.
397. Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at 203.
398. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
399. White, Emergence of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 313.
400. Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at 207.
401. See supra notes 213–221 and accompanying text (describing Wigmore’s
recommendations on appropriate punishment for nonsectarian objectors).
402. John Henry Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of
Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 Ill. L. Rev. 539, 551 (1920) [hereinafter
Wigmore, Abrams].
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service . . . conscripted, so liberty of speech may be limited or
suppressed, so far as . . . needful for the successful conduct of the war.”403
A society at war, Wigmore argued, needed no more free speech than
existed in the military itself: Although freedom of speech “is limited for
all military men . . . yet enough is left of ‘free trade in ideas’ to secure
effective responsible leaders” and “intelligent action based on ample
deliberation.”404 The meaning of “ample deliberation” for Wigmore was
quite thin—the amount of discussion necessary to effectively execute
predetermined goals.405 Holmes and Brandeis’s dissent, on the other
hand, risked exposing the nation to the democratic vicissitudes of a “free
trade in ideas” and intellectual and political “experiment.”406 Such an
expansive conception of wartime deliberation, Wigmore argued, endan-
gered the “moral right of the majority” to survive.407 Indeed, if Holmes
and Brandeis’s approach had been supported by a majority of the Court,
such a decision “would have ended by our letting soldiers die helpless in
France.”408
It is unsurprising that Wigmore’s criticism of the Abrams dissent
sought to apply the legal structure of conscription to the realm of
speech; such an analogy was commonplace at the time.409 But what is
noteworthy about Wigmore’s argument is that it sought to apply a model
of conscription that had already been rejected by War Department
administrators. For Wigmore, war meant conscription and conscription
meant that “all rights of the individual, and all internal civic interests,
become subordinated to the national right in the struggle for national
life.”410 Unlike Wigmore, Frankfurter, Stone, and other Progressive offi-
cials within the executive branch did not believe that once the majority
decided upon war, all further debate about policy was foreclosed.
Instead, these administrators crafted communicative processes that
allowed minority voices to continue to participate in government deci-
403. Id. at 552.
404. Id. at 553.
405. As Wigmore later insisted, “[W]hen a nation has once decided upon war, it
must stop any further hesitation, or it will fail in the very purpose of the decision.” Id. at
554.
406. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
407. Wigmore, Abrams, supra note 402, at 554.
408. Id. at 551.
409. See, e.g., John Dewey, Conscription of Thought, New Republic, Sept. 1, 1917, at
128–129 (“What I am concerned with is . . . the historically demonstrated inefficacy of the
conscription of mind as a means of promoting social solidarity, and the gratuitous
stupidity of measures that defeat their own ends.”); Zechariah Chafee Jr., The
Conscription of Public Opinion, in The Next War: Three Addresses Delivered at a
Symposium at Harvard University: November 18, 1924, Norris F. Hall, Zechariah Chafee,
Jr. & Manley O. Hudson 39, 53--54 (1925) (“[S]ome men will refuse to devote their speech
and writing to the cause of victory, and for these force will be necessary---the conscription
of thought.”).
410. Wigmore, Abrams, supra note 402, at 553.
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sionmaking, even in that most severe of legal orders, the draft. Just as
Wigmore’s criticism of the Abrams dissent had already been undermined
by wartime executive practice, wartime executive practice had already
pointed toward the reasoning of the Abrams dissent.
Even as Wigmore dissented from their administrative civil-libertarian
point of view, veterans of the World War I War Department pushed back
against antiradicalism in other ways. Although Wigmore’s vision had lost
out within the War Department, it had flourished at the Justice
Department under Attorney General Palmer. After the war, Frankfurter
and Stone turned their attention to Palmer’s pursuit of political radicals.
Two months after Wigmore assailed the Abrams dissent, Frankfurter,
Chafee, Roscoe Pound, and nine other leading jurists signed their names
to the Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of
Justice, attacking the legitimacy of Palmer’s antiradical campaign.411
Steering clear of the more controversial First Amendment issue raised by
the campaign, the Report documented overzealous policing techniques
that violated Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights.412 Strikingly,
however, the focus of the report was on political reform, not judicial cor-
rection of executive overreach. “Since these illegal acts [of the Justice
Department] have been committed by the highest legal powers in the
United States,” the Report’s authors reasoned, “there is no final appeal
from them except to the conscience and condemnation of the American
people.”413 Echoing the concerns of War Department administrators in
confronting the treatment of conscientious objectors, the Report’s cen-
tral complaint against administrative misrule was that it undermined the
political stability of the national government:
American institutions have not in fact been protected by the
Attorney General’s ruthless suppression. On the contrary those
institutions have been seriously undermined, and revolutionary
unrest has been vastly intensified. No organizations of radicals
acting through propaganda over the last six months could have
created as much revolutionary sentiment in America as has
been created by the acts of the Department of Justice itself.414
And while emphasizing the political character and consequences of
the Justice Department’s failings, the Report suggested that a political
solution could take a specifically administrative, as opposed to legislative,
411. Nat’l Popular Gov’t League, Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United
States Department of Justice (1920) [hereinafter Nat’l Popular Gov’t League, Report].
Among other case studies, the report contained a fourteen-page description of the Colyer
case in which Chafee and Frankfurter had intervened. Id. at 42–56. For an overview of
Frankfurter’s anti-Red Scare activities, see Parrish, supra note 32, at 72–75, 81–128.
412. See Nat’l Popular Gov’t League, Report, supra note 411, at 4–6 (documenting
cruel and unusual punishments, arrests without warrant, unreasonable searches and
seizures, provocative agents, compelling persons to be witnesses against themselves, and
propaganda by Department of Justice).
413. Id. at 7.
414. Id.
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form. It singled out Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post for praise,
noting that his “courageous reëstablishment of American Constitutional
Law in deportation proceedings” had led to the cancellation of 1,547
deportations sought by Attorney General Palmer.415 Just as the War
Department’s implementation of a system for reviewing conscientious-
objector claims had sparked investigations in the U.S. Congress and the
New York State Senate, Post’s insistence on “full hearings and
consideration of the evidence” in deportation proceedings elicited
“attacks” on him in Congress.416
Eventually, reform came to Congress as well, and Harlan Fiske Stone
took a lead role in urging legislative investigations of the Justice
Department.417 Having returned to Columbia Law School after his work
on the Board of Inquiry was complete, Stone resisted the firing of
Columbia faculty for their antiwar views and vocally opposed the New
York State Assembly’s refusal to seat five elected Socialist representa-
tives.418 And on February 1, 1921, a letter from Stone was read into the
record at the Senate Judiciary Committee’s first hearing on “Charges of
Illegal Practices in the Department of Justice.”419 In it, Stone appeared to
reflect on his own recent experience on the Board of Inquiry reviewing
summary courts-martial. He insisted that “[i]t is inevitable that any
system which confers upon administrative officers power to restrain the
liberty of individuals, without safeguards substantially like those which
exist in criminal cases and without adequate authority for judicial review
of [their] action . . . will result in . . . intolerable injustice and cruelty to
individuals.”420 Of course, it was precisely over the question of Stone and
Mack’s quasi-judicial review of court-martial cases that civilian and mili-
tary lawyers within the War Department had clashed.
In the wake of their efforts to reform the Red Scare Justice
Department, Frankfurter and Stone continued to engage in the mix of
civil-libertarian advocacy and administrative state building that had
defined their brief tenures at the World War I War Department. In 1924,
Calvin Coolidge chose Stone to head a Justice Department still in need of
deep reform in the wake of the Red Scare and the Harding
Administration’s corruption.421 As Felix Frankfurter wrote to Stone on
hearing of his appointment, the new Attorney General was to correct the
415. Id. at 8.
416. Id.; see also Post Hearings, supra note 5, at 265–69 (describing Post’s behavior
in deportation proceedings); Irons, supra note 5, at 1218–21 (recounting conflict between
Justice Department and Labor Department).
417. Mason, Pillar, supra note 269, at 113.
418. Id. at 112.
419. Charges of Illegal Practices of the Department of Justice: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Cong. 279–80 (1921).
420. Id.
421. Mason, Pillar, supra note 269, at 141–50.
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Department’s “betrayal of law.”422 One of Stone’s earliest executive deci-
sions in this vein was to end the “surveillance of political radicals” that
the Bureau of Investigation had begun during the war.423 Stone ex-
plained that “a secret police may become a menace to free government
and free institutions,” and declared the “political or other opinions of
individuals” off limits to investigation.424 Ironically, Stone was drawing on
his experience as someone who had investigated the “political or other
opinions of individuals” during the war, but in order to end rather than
initiate prosecutions.
As Stone took control of the Justice Department, Felix Frankfurter
was becoming one of the premier civil-libertarian advocates in the coun-
try and an active member of the ACLU.425 Throughout Stone’s tenure as
Attorney General, Frankfurter corresponded with him, conveying the
ACLU’s views on Department of Justice investigations. In February 1925,
for instance, Frankfurter reported to Stone that the head of the ACLU,
Roger Baldwin, had spoken “in the warmest terms of appreciation not
only of your own work, but also of Mr. [J. Edgar] Hoover’s conduct of the
Bureau of investigation.”426 Two years later, Frankfurter would achieve
national prominence as a passionate and controversial critic of the mur-
der convictions of anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti.427
The Harvard Law School professor also took special interest in the
question of conscientious objection when it arose again in the context of
immigration and naturalization law during the late 1920s and early
1930s.428 Motivated by continuing fears of anarchist and socialist subver-
sion, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization refused citizenship
to a number of applicants who announced that they would seek conscien-
tious-objector status in the event of a future draft.429 Frankfurter partici-
pated in both a legal challenge to the Bureau’s requirement that success-
ful citizenship applicants swear to bear arms430 and legislative efforts to
422. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Harlan Fiske
Stone (Apr. 3, 1924) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
423. Stone, Perilous Times, supra note 3, at 230.
424. Id. at 230–31 (quoting Harlan Fiske Stone).
425. See Hirsch, supra note 32, at 65–98 (describing Frankfurter’s activities in
1920s); Parrish, supra note 32, at 118–28 (same); Urofsky, supra note 32, at 20–44 (same).
426. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Harlan Fiske
Stone, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 19, 1925) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
427. See Parrish, supra note 32, at 176–96 (describing Frankfurter’s role in Sacco
and Vanzetti case); Urofsky, supra note 32, at 22–26 (same).
428. See Jeremy K. Kessler, Calculations of Liberalism, supra note 25, at 15–34
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Frankfurter’s
involvement in United States v. Macintosh and related legislation).
429. See Flowers, supra note 19, at 17–19, 87–227 (describing Red Scare background
to these challenges and their outcomes).
430. See Letter from Charles E. Clark, Dean, Yale Law Sch., to Allen Wardwell (May
1, 1930) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (conveying Frankfurter’s views on legal
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overturn that requirement.431 As he complained to one congressman,
“the law as it stands will exclude those best qualified by character and
conscience for incorporation into American citizenship.”432 As to the
question of whether only religious pacifists should be naturalized,
Frankfurter answered in the negative, explaining that to the extent that
the U.S. government had permitted “conscientious objectors—not
necessarily religious—to decline to fight [in previous conflicts], I believe
a case can be made for their admission to citizenship.”433
Frankfurter and Stone’s continuing commitment to civil-libertarian
administration paralleled a more general interest in the modernization
of the administrative state. Both played important roles in the
Commonwealth Fund’s Committee on Administrative Law and Practice,
formed in 1921 to study and shape the landscape of administrative gov-
ernance in the wake of the war.434 As Daniel Ernst has shown, it was Stone
who recommended administration as the best subject for the Fund’s
investment in legal research, and his “ideas prominently appeared in the
proposal” for the Committee.435 Stone also served on the Committee’s
board, alongside Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, and other legal
elites. Despite the misgivings that some board members had about his
work on behalf of radicals during and after the war, Felix Frankfurter was
also recruited to participate in the Committee.436 There, he joined the
leading administrative law scholar of the last generation, Ernst Freund, in
guiding the Committee’s work.
For over a decade, Frankfurter and Freund struggled to entrench
their accounts of the social significance and legal structure of administra-
tive governance.437 Frankfurter’s position was informed by his work in
past presidential administrations and presaged by his World War I rec-
ommendations in the conscientious-objection debate. There, he had
argued that administrative discretion exercised at the national level was
the proper way to resolve potential clashes between individual rights and
situation of pacifist naturalization applicants); Letter from Charles E. Clark, Dean, Yale
Law Sch., to W. Charles Poletti (May 5, 1930) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing Frankfurter’s views); Letter from W. Charles Poletti to Felix Frankfurter,
Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (May 6, 1930) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(responding to Frankfurter’s suggestions).
431. See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to
Anthony Griffin, U.S. Rep. (Jan. 10, 1932) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)(giving
reasons for supporting change in law); Letter from W. Charles Poletti to Forrest Bailey,
Am. Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 13, 1931) (noting Frankfurter agreed with proposed
amendment to proposed legislation).
432. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Anthony Griffin, supra note 431.
433. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Allen Wardwell, supra note 430 (quoting Felix
Frankfurter).
434. Ernst, American Rechtsstaat, supra note 1, at 172.
435. Id. at 174.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 172.
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the public interest. Freund, on the other hand, was less certain of the
preeminence of national administration, committed to the protection of
private interests from public oppression, and suspicious of administrative
discretion.438
While Freund wished to study administration in a range of local,
state, and federal contexts, Frankfurter argued that the most useful pro-
gram would focus on national administration.439 More fundamentally,
Frankfurter objected to Freund’s method of evaluation, which asked
“whether private interests are adequately safeguarded” by a given admin-
istrative scheme.440 For Frankfurter, the task of administration was the
expert balancing of private and public interests, not the sacrifice of the
former to the latter: “[W]e can’t consider whether private interests are
safeguarded without equally considering the public interests that are
asserted against them.”441 Stone seemingly concurred with Frankfurter’s
views and felt that Freund’s approach was impractical.442
Freund and Frankfurter’s differing accounts of the social purpose of
administrative law drove different assessments of the legal status of
administrative discretion:
For Freund, administrative discretion was an evil, tolerable only
until experience under open-ended standards suggested the
content of a certain rule. Frankfurter’s outlook was quite
different . . . . He thought that the governance of modern
societies required more subtle adjustments of social interests
than any rule could anticipate. If Freund thought the first job of
administrative law was the constraint of administrative
discretion, Frankfurter thought it was the freeing of
administrators from the oversight of common-law courts. From
his vantage point, Freund’s [model] left too little to the
professional judgment of administrators.443
By 1927, Frankfurter’s view was winning out, as the Commonwealth Fund
asked him to prepare a “readable, synthetic account” of the Committee’s
findings.444 While Frankfurter declined to take on that formidable task,
he did publish a short law-review article on the same subject, The Task of
Administrative Law.445 In it, Frankfurter argued that the ultimate task of
administrative law was to “fashion[] . . . instruments and processes at
once adequate for social needs and the protection of individual
438. Id. at 173.
439. Id. at 179–80.
440. Id. at 180.
441. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor,
Harvard Law Sch., to Ernst Freund (Dec. 10, 1921)).
442. Id.
443. Id. at 173.
444. Id. at 184–85.
445. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 614 (1927)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Task of Administrative Law].
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freedom.”446 This synthetic work required a great deal of administrative
discretion, which itself posed a risk of abuse, even constitutional abuse.447
Indeed, it was precisely “[b]ecause of the danger of arbitrary conduct in
the administrative application of legal standards,” Frankfurter explained,
that “our administrative law is inextricably bound up with constitutional
law.”448
The constitutional gravity of administrative law did not, however,
merit the imposition of legalistic constraints by courts of law: “[A]fter all,
the Constitution is a Constitution, and not merely a detailed code of
prophetic restrictions . . . .”449 Just as his 1919 Report upon the Illegal
Practices of the United States Department of Justice had rested hope of reform
on the “conscience and condemnation of the American people,”450
Frankfurter in 1927 argued that the “[u]ltimate protection” against
constitutional abuses by administrators “is to be found in the people
themselves, their zeal for liberty, their respect for one another and for
the common good.”451 In addition to this external, political check, he
also recommended internal, administrative safeguards: “a highly
professionalized civil service, an adequate technique of administrative
application of legal standards, a flexible, appropriate and economical
procedure . . . easy access to public scrutiny, and a constant play of
criticism by an informed and spirited bar.”452
Over the course of the next decade, Frankfurter continued to pro-
mote a theory of administration that celebrated discretion while rooting
its legitimacy in political oversight and professional—specifically law-
yerly—expertise.453 As Daniel Ernst notes, this vision was “congenial to
Frankfurter’s protégés who worked in New Deal and wartime Washington
and created the modern regulatory law practice during the Truman
Administration.”454 Yet Frankfurter’s New Deal apologetics had a much
longer pedigree, dating back to Frankfurter’s own administrative service
during World War I.
446. Id. at 617.
447. See id. at 618 (describing how “legislative regulation of economic and social
activities . . . turned to administrative instruments . . . [and] greatly widened the field of
discretion and thus opened the door to its potential abuse, arbitrariness”).
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Nat’l Popular Gov’t League, Report, supra note 411, at 7–8.
451. Frankfurter, Task of Administrative Law, supra note 445, at 618.
452. Id. The 1919 Report had also noted the importance of constitutionally self-
aware lawyer-administrators, such as Louis Post, in avoiding administrative abuse. Nat’l
Popular Gov’t League, Report, supra note 411, at 7.
453. Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 124–67 (1930) (extolling
benefits of recruiting talented lawyers for public service); see also Cases and Other
Materials on Administrative Law vii–viii, 1–17 (Felix Frankfurter & J. Forrester Davison
eds., 1932) (citing various contemporary legal authorities on importance of lawyers, judges
and administrators to evolution of “the State”).
454. Ernst, American Rechtsstaat, supra note 1, at 188.
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Then, Frankfurter’s response to the problem of conscientious objec-
tion had been to recommend the exercise of administrative discretion by
the “right kind of lawyers”—specifically those with civil-libertarian lean-
ings.455 These lawyer-administrators’ “sympathetic and sophisticated”
legal temperament would, in turn, be underwritten by the Commander
in Chief’s own authority.456 Throughout the 1930s, Frankfurter’s
“protégés” and others sympathetic to his point of view would similarly
seek to imbue new administrative agencies with a specifically civil-
libertarian form of discretion, most notably at the National Labor
Relations Board and the Justice Department’s Civil Liberties Unit.457
With the coming of the next World War, Frankfurter and Stone
would themselves try to impart their vision of civil-libertarian administra-
tion to a new generation of political officials. On January 19, 1940, the
day after Robert Jackson became Attorney General, Justice Frankfurter
wrote to him about the wartime atmosphere then descending on the
nation.458 Reminding Jackson of how badly the Department had per-
formed in the aftermath of the last war, Frankfurter enclosed a copy of
the Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice
that he had coauthored in 1919.459 And when the prospect of a new draft
law surfaced that spring, both Stone and Frankfurter weighed in.
On June 22, two days after a peacetime conscription bill was intro-
duced in Congress, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote to the bill’s author,
Grenville Clark, pushing for a broader accommodation of conscientious
objectors:
The experience of the last war showed that conscientious
objection to military service was not confined to religious
objections or combatant service. Some of the most determined
objectors—undoubtedly conscientious—were non-religious and
455. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
456. Id. at 2.
457. See Auerbach, supra note 4, at 51–73 (describing ideology of National Labor
Relations Board); Forbath, Law and Shaping, supra note 4, at 165 (describing how “[a]
group of . . . attorneys, several of them students of Frankfurter . . . created . . . the National
Labor Relations Act . . . . They envisioned [NLRB] as . . . a more active guardian of labor’s
liberties than the courts could be . . . .”); Goluboff, supra note 25, at 111--24 (describing
formation and leadership of Civil Liberties Unit, later Civil Rights Section); Weinrib, Civil
Liberties Enforcement, supra note 25, at 4–21, 26--34 (discussing civil-libertarian milieu
from which National Labor Relations Board and Civil Liberties Unit emerged).
458. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert
Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Jan. 19, 1940) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
459. Id. Frankfurter wrote that the report “might, without using too grandiose
language, be called a historic document.” Id. Jackson responded with thanks and a
chuckle, “If your historic document does not rank with Magna Charta, it is at least a good
supplement to it, and I am glad to accept it.” Letter from Robert Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 1 (Jan. 23, 1940)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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logically enough they refused to aid in the war effort in any way
. . . . This was true of some of the religious objectors also.460
After the bill’s passage, both Stone and Frankfurter lobbied Attorney
General Jackson to develop an accommodating approach, as the new law
had assigned the Justice Department responsibility for hearing appeals
from men who had been refused conscientious-objector status by their
local draft boards.461
Even as Justices Frankfurter and Stone continued to push for civil-
libertarian administration within the wartime state, they confronted the
limits of administrative civil libertarianism at the Supreme Court.
Between Frankfurter’s arrival there in 1939 and Stone’s death in 1946,
the two veterans of the World War I War Department engaged in an
extended, and now famous, debate over the extent to which the First
Amendment deserved special judicial protection against legislative and
administrative encroachment.462 By the late 1930s, a combination of anti-
460. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Grenville
Clark 1 (June 22, 1940) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
461. In September, Frankfurter’s good friend Francis Biddle, then serving as Solicitor
General, passed along to the Attorney General Stone’s 1919 article, The Conscientious
Objector, detailing his World War I experience, as well as the War Department’s 1919
Statement on Conscientious Objectors, prepared under Third Assistant Secretary of War
Frederick Keppel’s supervision. Memorandum from Francis Biddle, Solicitor Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Robert Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Sept. 25, 1940) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). In October, Stone relayed a message to Attorney
General Jackson “stress[ing] the need for having the proper type of man as Hearing
Officer.” Memorandum from Matthew F. McGuire, Assistant to the Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Robert Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 10, 1940) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). And in December, Frankfurter wrote Jackson about early draft
resistance in Boston, where a group of university students were refusing to register. Letter
from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert H. Jackson, Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Dec. 5, 1940) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). He also
forwarded a letter to the editor written by his Harvard colleague Samuel Eliot Morison,
calling for an end to the House Un-American Activities Committee and the relocation of
all investigation of “subversive activities” to the Department of Justice, where “unnecessary
snooping and spying and smearing” might be avoided. Letter from Felix Frankfurter,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Dec. 9, 1940) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (enclosing Morison letter).
462. For the outlines of this debate, see Gerald T. Dunne, Hugo Black and the
Judicial Revolution 209–23 (1977) (noting development of allegiances in debate over First
Amendment rights); Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy: The Washington Years 372–88 (1984)
(discussing preferred position debate); Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Spirit of the Law:
Religious Voices and the Constitution in Modern America 27–47 (2012)(discussing debate
about scope of First Amendment in relation to Jehovah’s Witnesses); Mason, Pillar, supra
note 269, at 511–35 (describing preferred position debate); Shawn Francis Peters, Judging
Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution 230–59
(2002) (discussing debate about scope of First Amendment in relation to Jehovah’s
Witnesses); Urofsky, supra note 32, at 50–63 (describing Frankfurter’s role in preferred
position debate); White, Emergence of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 128–63 (discussing
relationship between New Deal and expanded constitutional protection for free speech);
Gillman, supra note 24, at 624 (discussing origins of judicial identification of “preferred
freedoms”); Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products
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totalitarian politics and anxiety about the growth of New Deal administra-
tion had given rise to a court-centric alternative to administrative civil
libertarianism.463 Championed by the American Bar Association and
supported by a growing faction within the ACLU, this negative account of
civil libertarianism saw state power and civil liberties as unavoidable
antagonists.464 Stone came to sympathize with this vision, arguing that
courts had a special obligation to police democratic encroachments on
First Amendment freedoms—freedoms that occupied a “preferred
position” in the constitutional order.465 Frankfurter, in keeping with the
earlier account of the civil-libertarian state, insisted that democratically
run political institutions should be the “primary resolvers” of “the clash
of rights,” even when that clash involved “ultimate civil liberties.”466 “For
resolving such clash we have no calculus,”467 he wrote to Stone, days
before the latter’s dissent in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.468 After a
change in Court personnel in the early 1940s, Stone’s approach began to
Footnote, 46 S. Tex. L. Rev. 163, 202–09 (2004) (discussing preferred-position debate);
Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Individual
Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 Const. Comment. 277,
277–78 (1995) (discussing competing interpretations of footnote four and its reception);
Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1093,
1093 (1982) (attempting to clarify misconceptions about drafting and reception of
footnote four); G. Edward White, Free Speech and the Bifurcated Review Project: The
“Preferred Position” Cases, in Constitutionalism and American Culture: Writing the New
Constitutional History 99–122 (Sandra F. VanBurkleo, Kermit L. Hall & Robert J.
Kaczorowski eds., 2002) (describing evolution of preferred-position cases).
463. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing rise of antitotalitarian civil
libertarianism).
464. Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 4, at 330–517 (describing emergence
of antistatist vision of civil liberties law at ACLU and American Bar Association); Kessler,
Calculations of Liberalism, supra note 25, at 35–59 (describing John W. Davis’ role in
development of antistatist vision of civil liberties law); Kessler, Civil Libertarian
Conditions, supra note 25, at 6–17 (describing Grenville Clark’s role in development of
antistatist vision of civil liberties law).
465. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
466. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harlan
Fiske Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 1–2 (May 27, 1940) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). .
467. Id. at 2.
468. 310 U.S. 586, 601–07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). For further background on
the Justices’ thinking about the relationship between administration and civil liberties in
the flag salute cases, see generally Vincent A. Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of
Thought, in Constitutional Law Stories 416–18, 424–31 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009);
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Wash. U. L. Rev. 363, 380 (2008).
1164 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 114:1083
win out, and by the time Frankfurter left the Court, judicial supremacy
and First Amendment enforcement had become tightly linked.469
CONCLUSION
Over the past century, the growth of the bureaucracy has made
administrative decisionmaking a main driver of constitutional develop-
ment.470 The development of civil liberties law is no exception. To a
significant degree, modern First Amendment doctrine emerged from a
contest between administrative and judicial authority over civil-
libertarian rights enforcement.471 This Article takes us back to the begin-
ning of that contest, when civil-libertarian innovation was still very much
dependent on agency-driven constitutional construction. The innovators
at the heart of the World War I story—Felix Frankfurter and Harlan Fiske
Stone—would go on to play key roles in the later struggle, as Justice
Frankfurter defended administrative civil libertarianism while Justice
Stone sought new authority for judicial actors to promote civil-libertarian
norms and to constrain the civil-libertarian constructions of nonjudicial
actors. Frankfurter largely lost that battle, but civil liberties law today
remains squarely in the ambit of administrative constitutionalism. For
instance, some contemporary commentators worry that aggressive First
Amendment enforcement is significantly redrawing the boundaries of
469. See sources cited supra note 462; see also Kessler, Civil Libertarian Conditions,
supra note 25, at 2--6, 33--38 (describing Court’s abandonment of Frankfurter’s approach).
470. See Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 1901
(“[Administrative constitutionalism] represents a main mechanism by which
constitutional meaning is elaborated and implemented today. Given the dominance of the
modern administrative state, a full picture of contemporary constitutionalism in the
United States must include administrative constitutionalism . . . .”).
471. As legal scholars have begun to document, mid-twentieth-century courts did not
simply discover robust civil-libertarian rights in constitutional text—more often than not,
they were modifying or adopting civil-libertarian norms embedded in administrative
practice. See Desai, Transformation, supra note 4, at 717–27 (describing judicial
constitutionalization of civil-libertarian norms immanent in postal administration); Desai,
Wiretapping, supra note 4, at 562–69 (describing judicial constitutionalization of privacy
norms immanent in postal administration); Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise, supra
note 4, at 57–74 (describing judicial intervention in administrative enforcement of civil-
libertarian rights); Weinrib, Public Interest to Private Rights, supra note 4, at 212–17
(describing increasingly court-centered nature of civil-libertarian advocacy); Kessler, Civil
Libertarian Conditions, supra note 25, at 2--6 (describing judicial rejection of Selective
Service enforcement of civil-libertarian rights); see also Eric Berger, Individual Rights,
Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91
B.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2049–50 (2011) (describing emergence of judicial review of
administrative procedure in licensing context); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 530–31
(2010) (discussing judicial review of administrative procedure in licensing context); Henry
P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 522–23 (1970)
(noting with approval trend toward judicial intervention in administrative evaluation of
speakers’ rights).
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the administrative state.472 If these commentators are right, we are
witnessing only the next stage in the intertwined constitutional develop-
ment of civil-libertarian rights and administrative governance. This devel-
opment began a long time ago, and it took a critical though forgotten
turn within the World War I War Department.
There, Progressive administrators exercised controversial forms of
executive authority in order to create a space within the administrative
state for the individual dissenter to express his deepest commitments—
whether religious, ethical, or political in nature. After this wartime work,
these same administrators took lead roles in the Progressive critique of
the persecution of political radicals, a critique that, in its earliest stages,
influenced Justice Holmes in composing his groundbreaking Abrams
dissent. The foremost contemporary critic of this innovation in First
Amendment jurisprudence—John Henry Wigmore—was an early oppo-
nent of the Progressive administration of conscientious objectors, and
read the Abrams dissent as a challenge not just to the government’s right
to censor speech but its right to raise an army and win a war. Despite its
poor civil liberties record elsewhere on the home front, the Wilson
Administration had rejected Wigmore’s vision of conscription, claiming
executive authority to create new procedures for deliberation and dissent
within the structure of the draft. In doing so, it presaged later Progressive
expansions of the public sphere, both through First Amendment advo-
cacy in the courts and through executive efforts to create a more plural-
istic and participatory administrative state.
The War Department’s attempts to respect the individual conscience
were, however, imperfect, and abuse of objectors—largely stemming
from military intransigence—did occur. These abuses came to light just
as the popularity of civil libertarianism was growing in Progressive circles
outside of government. Consequently, even as Progressive administrators
sought to defend their innovative policy from internal military resistance
and external charges of radicalism, the Progressive press associated their
472. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J.
dissenting) (warning invalidation of state medical-confidentiality law on First Amendment
grounds “reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic
decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue”); Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654, 693 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (calling injunction of contraception
mandate on religious-freedom grounds “reminiscent of the Lochner era, when an employer
could claim that the extension of statutory protections to its workers constituted an undue
infringement on the freedom of contract and the right to operate a private, lawful
business as the owner wished”); Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America,
Democracy, Winter 2012, at 46, 46–58 (describing use of First Amendment to create new
“free-market jurisprudence”); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation, New Republic
(June 3, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-
hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing use of free speech arguments to advance “corporate deregulation”); Joey
Fishkin, Who Is a Constituent?, Balkinization (Apr. 3, 2014), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2014/04/who-is-constituent.html (“[F]ive Justices continue to grind
campaign finance regulations through their First Amendment woodchipper . . . .”).
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efforts with governmental reaction. Today, what was perhaps the earliest
example of Progressive civil libertarianism is remembered as one of many
examples of the government’s violation of civil liberties during World
War I. This Article has sought to dispel this anachronistic reading of the
World War I administration of conscientious objectors and recover its
Progressive civil-libertarian core.
At the same time, this Article has argued that we misread Progressive
civil libertarianism when we read it as an effort to limit state power. The
Progressive lawyers who crafted the right of individual conscience did so
to build a pluralistic but powerful state. In the first third of the twentieth
century, most Progressives saw such a civil-libertarian state as the demo-
cratic embodiment of the First Amendment. Only during the next World
War would the American legal profession come to view civil liberties and
the administrative state as countervailing forces, locked in a potentially
irreconcilable conflict. It is because we have inherited this oppositional
view that we puzzle over—and often forget altogether—an earlier era of
civil-libertarian state building.
